



**HAWASSA UNIVERSITY**

**COLLEGE OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE**

**SCHOOL OF GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES**

**THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN FIGHTING URBAN  
LAND CORRUPTION: THE CASE OF ARBA MINCH TOWN, IN GAMO  
GOFA ZONE, SNNPRS, ETHIOPIA**

**BY**

**ABINET MAJORE KELELE**

**February, 2019**

**HAWASSA, ETHIOPIA**

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**ABINET MAJORE KELELE**

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**DECLARATION**

I, the undersigned declare that this MA thesis entitled “The Role of Community Participation in Fighting Urban Land Corruption: The Case of Arba Minch town In GamoGofa Zone, SNNPRS, Ethiopia”, is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University, and all sources of materials used for this paper have been duly acknowledged.

Student’s Name..... Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date\_\_\_\_\_

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## **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

<b>A.M</b>	Arba Minch
<b>CIS</b>	Corrugated iron sheet
<b>DERG</b>	Military Dictatorship Regime of Ethiopia since 1974-1991
<b>E PRDF</b>	Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
<b>FEACC</b>	Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission
<b>FGD</b>	Focused Group Discussion
<b>FT</b>	Feet
<b>Ha</b>	Hectares
<b>HH</b>	Household
<b>OECD</b>	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>SD</b>	Standard Deviations
<b>SNNPR</b>	South Nations, Nationalities and People’s Region
<b>SPSS</b>	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
<b>TI</b>	Transparency International
<b>WB</b>	World Bank

## **ABSTRACT**

*This study explored the role of community participation in fighting urban land corruption in Arba Minch town. The study considered households from purposively selected three kebeles of the study area, employees and officials from Arba Minch town land administration sector in GamoGofa Zone SNNPRS. Purposive and systematic sampling techniques were employed to select samples from total population. A total of 240 respondents were participated in this study. A self-administered questionnaire, interview, focused group discussion and document analysis were used. Three kebeles namely: Edigetber, Gurba and Kulfo were participated in the study. Data were analysed using descriptive statistics and T-test. The findings of the study indicated that; regarding drivers of urban land corruption: absence of land records, greediness of officials and lack of public concern, inability to maintain a given standard of living, inadequate land laws and procedures, lack of punitive measures, unclear delineation of state and private land, the weakness of justice system, poor incentive to employees, lack of awareness about anti-corruption laws were identified. Concerning challenges of institutional arrangement of land administration sector in fighting land corruption: lack of clear objective, availability of partiality, vagueness of transparency in the institution, in adequate employees readiness to be against corruption, lack of good governance within the institution, conflicts arise during sharing of incentives, lack of incentives for better performances of the workers, lack of regular follow up of performance, absence of norms of the institution in which performers are responsible and accountable on their duty. Regarding consequences of land corruption: failing to keep the interest of society, illegal transfer of land, lack of quality in services, disregard for officials, illegal land use certificate granting, inadequate land compensation, displacement of citizens were identified. Finally concerning the ways of community participation the community was not effectively participated in fighting urban land corruption of the study area. From these findings, it is recommended that the town administration was required to work hard in order to: alleviate land corruption drivers, improve institutional arrangements and minimize consequences of land sector corruption in the study area. Also the town administration was required to work harder to inform and empower the community in their fight against urban land corruption.*

**Key word:** Community, Community participation, Land corruption, Land administration

# CHAPTER ONE

## 1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the problem and its approach are discussed. It begins by pointing out the background of the study followed by a statement of the problem. Further, general and specific objectives of the study, the research questions, limitations and scope of the study, significance of the study, definition of key terms and organization of the study are all discussed in this chapter.

### 1.1 Background of the study

Land is a fundamental resource for the economic development of any country in the world (Burns and Dalrymple, 2008). As (Deininger, K., H.Selod&T.Burns, 2010) discussed, land is an enormously valuable asset, typically accounting for 30-50% of national wealth in developing countries. Globally, land governance is about the policies, processes and institutions by which land, property and natural resources are managed. This includes decisions on access to land, land rights, land use, and land development (Deininger et al., 2010). As (World Bank, 2009) stated, “land governance is basically about determining and implementing sustainable land policies and establishing a strong relationship between people and land. Sound land governance is fundamental in achieving sustainable development and poverty reduction.”

Land tenure in Ethiopia has undergone dramatic shifts – from feudalistic systems under the monarchy of Emperor Haile Selassie (1930-1974) to socialist land policies under the Derg military government (1974- 1991), to the current system under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) who took control in 1991. This has left populations uncertain about their rights (Tetra Tech, 2013).In Ethiopia, all land is under public/state ownership. While land is not subject to sale or other means of exchange, the government does recognize use rights and holdings (Solomon and Mansberger, 2003). Urban land administration is delegated under the federal constitution to city governments and municipalities (WB, 2012a). However, there is no common system to administer land in urban areas (WB, 2012a).

Urban land is provided through a lease system, a perpetual permit system and separate legislation for condominiums (WB, 2012a). While the 2002 Urban Land Lease Holding Proclamation

stipulates that the leasehold system will apply to all urban land areas irrespective of how they were acquired, relevant authorities have yet to adopt the leasehold system (WB, 2012b). This has led to the coexistence of different systems and a high level of informality (WB, 2012b). In addition, there is no real system to record rights and restrictions, and the registry faces capacity issues (Yirsaw, 2010). The land sector in Ethiopia has also been a key focus area of investigations by the country's Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC). In its 2007/2008 Annual Report, 28 of the 63 cases investigated during the year were in the land administration and development sector (WB, 2012b). Also, Ethiopia does not have sufficient land record-keeping systems. This risks undermining the land registration process itself (World Bank 2012b). Also landlessness is a major problem in Ethiopia. One of the reasons is the high and increasingly growing population (Ethiopia is currently Africa's second most populous country). Another is the issue of land grabbing and resettlement (Oakland Institute 2013).

Corruption is a complex social, political and economic phenomenon that is prevalent in all countries in varying degrees. There is no international consensus on the meaning of corruption. In the literature, corruption is commonly defined as the misuse of public power for private benefit (Lambsdorff, 2007). Corruption is perceived to be a serious problem in Ethiopia. It is ranked 111<sup>th</sup> out of 177 countries in Transparency International's 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index, with a score of 33 out of an achievable 100 (TI, 2013a). On the 2013 Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Ethiopia scores 47.9% - lower than the continental average 51.6% (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013).

The term land corruption is a relatively new term in both policy and academic literature. (Kakai, 2012) argues that the concept of land corruption is not in common use in social science. Lascoumes, 2009 (as cited in Kakai, 2012) argues that it is essential to think of land corruption as an operational concept reflecting the illicit acts and the abuses of power committed by those with the power (at different levels) when performing their duties as this relates to different land operations. Kakai(2012) argues that in the sphere of land corruption, power is both an exploited resource and the aim of the action undertaken. Corruption in the land sector is therefore the abuse of power and authority by those in charge of land administration for their own gain or benefit (Mutondoro and Ncube, 2013).

Corruption in land administration is a major problem in many developing countries. In terms of small-scale petty corruption, a recent international survey found that over one in five people reported having paid a bribe when dealing with land services, placing land as the third most corrupt sector (TI, 2010-2011).

Corruption in the land sector can be generally characterized as pervasive and without effective means of control (TI, 2011). It can be divided into two groups, small-scale and big-scale corruption. Small-scale corruption includes administrative corruption, while big-scale means political corruption (TI, 2011).

Combating corruption in the land sector, most likely cannot be successful as an isolated action. It should be part of a national integrity system as proposed by Transparency International (TI, 2001), as various general national anti-corruption measures directly might be applicable at the land sector such as: land information should be available (create sort of ‘cadaster’) ,guaranteed open access to all information (general interest priority over private interest) ,accountable process management (e.g. no change in register or map without a legally valid source document) ,land Tribunal (to enhance efficiency judiciary) ,computerization otherwise no efficient data-handling(TI, 2001).

Transparency is widely recognized as a core principle of good governance: transparency means ‘sharing information and acting in an open manner’, ‘it allows stakeholders to gather information that may be critical to uncovering abuses...’ (UN/Habitat 2004). The toolkit developed by UN/Habitat and TI ranges from assessment and monitoring tools, improved access to information and public participation, promotion of ethics, professionalism and integrity, towards increased transparency through institutional reforms. The World Ethics Forum urges for increase of emphasis on ethical leadership and public integrity (UNU, 2006).OECD asks attention for public service as a public trust, for which public service ethics are a prerequisite (OECD, 2000).Due to the significance of land for a country’s growth and development, experts like (Solomon and Mansberger, 2003) argue that the need for its appropriate administration and management is key for the country's future. Land administration is defined as the regulatory framework, institutional arrangements, systems and processes that encompass the determination, allocation, administration and information concerning land(Solomon and Mansberger, 2003).

Ethiopia is one of the developing countries where the prevalence of corruption has been uncontrolled (Selamu, 2010). Accordingly, Ethiopian Government established an independent Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission on May 24, 2001 with the aim of fighting against corruption (FEACC, Proclamation 235/2001). The SNNPRS Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission is one of Regional Anti-corruption Authorities which was established in 2002 (SNNPRS EACC Proclamation No, 142/2014). Beginning from its establishment the Commission made an effort to fight against corruption (EACCs' Profile of Ethiopia, 2012). However, this institution under its efforts to be more participatory and thereby to bring it more nearer to society and its people devised a remedy under decentralization to establish Ethics Liaison Units to prevent corruption in all public offices and government enterprises by the Regulation No 84/2003 as the backbone of Ethics Infrastructures of Regional EACC. Arba Minch town as a part of lower level of decentralization, Regional EACC has observed the prevalence of urban land corruption of different forms such as illegal transfer of land, illegal land use certificate granting, displacement of citizens, informal fees, corruption in auctioning processes, state capture, corruption in recruitment of employee, improper utilization of public assets and budgets, misappropriation, bribery, embezzlement, etc. Therefore, under this background, this research was conducted to assess the role of community participation in fighting urban land corruption in land administration sector of Arba Minch town.

## **1.2 Statement of the problem**

A 2011 study by TI( Transparency International) shows that there is a very strong correlation between levels of corruption in the land sector and overall public sector corruption in a country(TI,2011). The same study notes that corruption in land governance is often symptomatic of the breakdown of a country's overall governance. Poor governance increases the probability of corruption in the land systems and land administration and intensifies the impact of pressure on the use of the land (FAO 2007).

There is a growing worldwide concern over corruption at the present time. Because corruption exists in all countries both developed and developing in the public and private sectors as well of in non-profit and charitable organization. Also, corruption can be a major obstacle in the process of economic development and in modernizing a country. Many now feel that it should receive

priority attention in a country's development agenda (Long, 2001). Around the world, one in five people report that they had paid a bribe for land services. The high percentage of bribery in the land sector creates a substantial informal cost for those trying to register or transfer land. It can make land services inaccessible to people not able to afford these illegal payments. By creating a disincentive to register property transactions, the informality of land tenure increases, people are left with little or no protection under the law, making them vulnerable to evictions and other abuses (TI, 2013). In Africa, this percentage is even higher: every second person has paid a bribe to secure or access land administration services, with land services the third most corrupt sector after the police and the judiciary (TI Kenya, 2015).

In Ethiopia, during the imperial and the military regimes, corruption is said to have resulted in undermining the legitimacy of the governments and weakening their structures, reducing productivity, hindering development, worsening poverty, marginalizing the poor, creating social unrest, and finally speeding up their downfall. It encouraged the then public servants and senior government officials to place themselves above the law. Unfortunately, it has continued to pose threats to the country's development and democratization processes even now. Currently, corruption is believed to be one of the factors that contribute to the reduction of government revenue. It can also negatively affect the on-going poverty reduction and development programs (FEACC, 2012). The commission report stated that the areas where corruption is believed to be rampant are those where financial resources are transferred from the private to the public sector and vice versa. Other agencies where corruption is believed to be flourishing include those engaged with allocation of land and governmental housing, provision of telephone and electric services ,granting of loans, licensing and issuance of permits, collection of taxes and procurement of consumable and fixed assets. Customs and excise offices are also believed to be affected by corrupt practices (FEACC, 2012).

In the context of rapidly growing urban populations – such as in Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa, one of the fastest growing urban areas in the world (New Geography, 2012) – urban land and access to adequate housing becomes a highly sought-after commodity (WB, 2012b). It is difficult to promote development without participation of people. Development plans will not be effective if the community is unwilling to participate and is not the beneficiary of the development outputs.

The community knows best about its own economic and social needs and problems, and has insights and ideas about what might be done to solve its problems (Long, 2001).

According to Rogers (2008), participation is a process through which stakeholders can influence and share control over development initiatives and the resources used to fund them through engagement in decision making. It refers to —a situation in which two or more social actors negotiate, define and guarantee amongst themselves a fair sharing of the management functions, entitlements and responsibilities for a given territory, area or set of natural resources ( Pretty and Shah, 1996).Community participation requires respect for the deep understanding of local conditions that only residents can have, a supportive institutional and policy environment that helps groups to act on decisions they make, willingness to learn and share, and skilled application of these tools. In other words, community participation is a way of harnessing the existing physical, economic and social resources of rural people in order to achieve the objectives of development programs and projects (Gebremedih, 2004).

Kyambalesa (2006) argues that to curb corruption there is need for good governance, zero tolerance attitude to corruption, a trim civil service, decent pay to public servants, compulsory ethics education as well as the provision of anti-corruption hotlines. The UNDP includes citizen participation as one of the key ingredients (Kyambalesa, 2006).There is many popular factors that negatively affect the social development and economic progress. Among these, corruption is the one and common in governmental and non-governmental agencies Kyambalesa(2006).

Arba Minch town land administration sector as a part and parcel of the general governmental agencies, could suffer corruption problem. The side effect of urbanland corruption in the town could be overwhelming with its shadowing effect on poverty reduction efforts. What inspired the researcher to conduct this study was as he used to live in the town the researcher frequently heard complaints of land corruption cases here and there. In addition to this certain customers of the sector complained that “they were asked to offer bribe by some officials and employees of the sector and also friends and relatives of these individuals get priority during service delivery.” That is why it was a necessity of the need of the every citizens concern towards fighting corruption.

Furthermore, those researches which have been conducted in Ethiopia to assess the role of community participation in fighting urban land corruption mostly tend to focus on national and regional level. Therefore, probably this research is the first of its kind and represents a modest attempt to fill such gap in the research area by investigating the extent to which the community was discharging their responsibilities in fighting urban land corruption. In general, it focused on assessing the role of community participation in fighting urban land corruption in land administration sector of Arba Minch town.

This study is unique in area (location), in the approaches it makes to assess the role of community participation in fighting urban land corruption in land administration sector of Arba Minch town. In addition, the study is unique as it emerged based on personal experience of the researcher as community member of Arba Minch town and on the motivation the researcher took based on his civic and ethical education course in Hawassa University.

### **1.3 objectives of the study**

#### **1.3.1 General objective of the study**

The general objective of the study was to assess the role of community participation in fighting urban land corruption in Land Administration sector of Arba Minch Town.

#### **1.3.2. Specific objectives of the study**

To achieve the above stated general objective of the study, this study outlined the following specific objectives.

1. To assess the drivers of urban land corruption in the land administration sector in the study area.
2. To identify the challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector in fighting urban land corruption in the study area.
3. To find out the consequences of urbanland corruption in land administration sector of the study area.
4. To identify the ways of community participation in fighting urban land corruption in the land administration sector in the study area.

#### **1.4. Basic research questions**

To attain objectives of this study, the following basic research questions were answered at the end of the research.

1. What were the drivers of urban land corruption in the land administration sector in the study area?
2. What were the challenges of the institutional arrangement of land administration sector in fighting urban land corruption in the study area?
3. What were the consequences of urban land corruption in land administration sector in the study area?
4. What were the ways of community participation in fighting urban land corruption in land administration sector in the study area?

#### **1.5 Limitations of the study**

In conducting this study unwillingness of the respondents, community and the government officials to give reliable data, unavailable of secondary data sources and shortage of time were limitations which the researcher faced during his study time. Nevertheless, the researcher was tried to do his best to make the research more reliable and valid through briefly introducing the purpose of data to respondents and strictly following work plan of the study.

#### **1.6 Scope of the Study**

Since it is not possible to cover the whole aspects of the study area with the available time and resources, it is advisable to limit the study size and the scope of the problem to a manageable size. Hence, the study was focus on Arba Minch Town Administration of GamoGofa Zone, SNNPRS. The researcher was tried to see the means of community participation in fighting land corruption in land administration sector of land for dwelling. Furthermore, it tried to see the drives of land corruption, challenges of institutional arrangement in fighting land corruption and consequences of land corruption in the study area.

## 1.7 Significance of the study

It is clear that corruption has impact on development around the spheres of social, political and economic aspects in one's country. Therefore, the finding of this study may have the following significances. Firstly, the finding of this study may create awareness among the communities of Arba Minch town so as not to tolerate corruption. Secondly, the finding of this study may be helpful for government officials of Arba Minch town land administration sector to address the problem. Lastly, this study may give chance for other researchers who may be interested to conduct further detailed and comprehensive study on the same title.

## 1.8 Definition of key terms

**Land administration:** It is about the process of determining, recording and disseminating information, about ownership, value and use of land (Dale & McLaughlin, 1988).

**Community participation:** It is a process through which stakeholders can influence and engage in decision making (Rogers 2008).

**Corruption:** corruption is commonly defined as the misuse of public power for private benefit (Lambsdorff, 2007).

**Kebele:** Local government smaller than town or Woreda

**Role:** Part played by the members of the community

**SNNPR:** Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional State

**Town administration:** Local government of town which is proportional with woreda and smaller than zone.

**Zone:** Local government which is greater than woreda and town administration.

## **1.9 Organization of the study**

The study was organized in the following way. Chapter 1 introduces the problem statement and related issues. Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature and relevant research associated with the problem addressed in this study. Chapter 3 deals with the methodology that discusses the design, population and sample size , sampling techniques, instruments and procedures used for data collection and analysis. Chapter 4 contains the results and discussion of findings. Finally, Chapter 5 presents summary, conclusions and recommendations.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE**

Hereunder, relevant theoretical, conceptual and empirical literatures which focused on the research topic would be discussed. In the subsequent sections, closer examinations of the theoretical, empirical evidences are in order.

#### **2.1 Theoretical Framework**

There are various economic and social theories for examining corruption. These include principal agent, public choice, institutional, cultural and neo-institutional economics framework and distributive justice norms.

##### **2.1.1 Principal-agent theory**

Suzan Rose-Ackerman (2010) in title *Comparative Administrative Law*; used the principal-agent theory to posit relationships between citizens, civil servants, and clients that provide opportunities for corruption. The theory is based on the assumptions that a civil servants responsibility is to maximize the public benefit and that corruption occurs when that civil servant decides to maximize private benefit over public benefit. The principal agent theory operates under conditions of perfect information and under conditions of information not being completely available to agents. For instance, viewing corruption through a principal-agent lens emphasizes the rational choices of individuals that place in discrete incidences of corruption. This focus implies that corruption is 'solvable' with policies that alter the level of discretion given to agents and their individual incentive calculations. Consequently, anti-corruption interventions, guided by principal-agent models, have focused on reducing the discretion of civil servants, increasing monitoring mechanisms, promoting transparency in government, supporting anti-corruption civil society groups to serve as watchdogs, and strengthening sanctions on those who engage in corruption, so as to better align the incentives of potential 'agents' with those of their perspective 'principals'.

### **2.1.2 Public choice theory**

Leon Felkins (1994) in title *Introduction to Public Choice Theory* emphasized a model captured by Nobel Prize-winning Economist Amartya Sen, which give a focus on many developing economies that, corruption has evolved with the economic structure from a centralized economy to a decentralized economy. According to public choice theory, self-interest motivates officials' actions. The basis of public choice theory is the assumption of the existence of constitutional governance. For instance, Public choice analysis has roots in positive analysis ("what is") but is often used for normative purposes ("what ought to be") in order to identify a problem or suggest improvements to constitutional rules basing to constitutional economics.

### **2.1.3 Institutional theory**

Michael Kraft's *Public Policy* (2007) *Institutional Theory* is a policy-making that emphasizes the formal and legal aspects of government structures. Actually Institutional theory is a widely accepted theoretical posture that emphasizes rational myths, isomorphism, and legitimacy. Looking on clear picture you find that Institutional theory focuses on the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure. Richard Scott adding by saying that it considers the processes by which structures; including schemes, rules, norms, and routines, become established as authoritative guidelines for social behavior, whereby organizations are also social and cultural systems in which members compete for resources other than goods and services as Joe DiMaggio & Sidney Powell, in title *Licensed to Lie: Exposing Corruption in the Development of Justice* used institutional theory to study concepts of international alliances and pricing transfers that allow firms to transfer large sums of money without paying taxes and to take advantage of other cost advantages. Eduardo Campos and Sanjay Pradhan in title *The Many Faces of Corruption* concretizes that different components of institutional theory explain how these elements are created, diffused, adopted, and adapted over space and time; and how they fall into decline and disuse.

Though, Richard Scott in title *Institutions and Organizations* has defined three levels of institutional analysis for viewing developing countries: (a) Global structures, (b) governance structures, and (c) the actors within these institutional settings. The officials in

global structures set the formal models and menus and informally enact them for the other two. The leaders of the global structure organizations dictate what is deemed possible, acceptable, and legitimate within the organizational context (Scott, 2008). The World Trade Organization could be an example of a global structure for developing countries (United Nations, 2008b).

Governance structures consist of organizational fields that define the domain and organizations that influence the operations within the domain, emphasized by Scott (2008). In developing countries for instance Tanzania, the governance domain could be the government; and the influencing organizations would be contractors, aid providers, and other governmental partners (Shah, 2007). The influencing organizations vary by shape, structure, size, and cultures are subject to environmental influences and the organizational field (Suzan Rose-Ackerman, 2002).

Other researchers Jonathan Pinto, Carrie Lean and Frits Pil, have focused on individual Players as actors in corruption. Scott (2008) assumed all actors seek to legitimize their actions within the environment and keep adopting new legitimacy norms. Such action creates convergence for similarities of structure, thought, and action that could embrace corruption as an acceptable premise within the institutional environment, creating isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have defined three levels of isomorphism. The first level is coercive isomorphism and relates to political activities (Powell, 2007). The second level is mimetic isomorphism and refers to likelihood of organizations and individuals imitating actions of others (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The third level, normative isomorphism, refers to the collective values leading to conformity of ideas and thoughts.

According to the coercive isomorphism principle, corruption can be prevented by organizations that can force actors to conform to international norms. In developing economies, these norms could include adherence to global organizational rules, strong media protest, and actions conducted by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs; Kaufman, 2007). The positive influence of mimetic isomorphism is the integration of developing economies in the global economy.

Sandholtz and Taagepera (2005) found more integrated countries had lower levels of corruption. Normative isomorphism can stem from many group norms, such as those of religious organizations (Tawney, 2006; Weber, 1952). Under normative isomorphism, 18 corruptions are combated (Swanton, 2005). These aspects of institutional theory will provide a useful contextual framework for analyzing the accounts of Tanzanian government officials.

#### **2.1.4 Cultural and neo-institutional economics framework**

Jabbara and Dwivedi (2005) have argued corruption in Africa stems from defective cultural norms and behaviors. Other researchers have attributed corruption to cultural clashes between traditional and foreign norms and have tended to view corruption as an unavoidable product of economic modernization and political development (Alam, 1995; Bailey, 2006). Scholars have suggested that bureaucratic corruption stems from society's collective modes of thinking, whereas most tribes in Africa would see tribal demands as greater than the demands of individuals (Mbaku, 2007). Public officials may engage in corrupt activities, such as nepotism or embezzlement, to further tribal causes (Gould & Mukendi, 1989).

Most African governments have weak laws and regulations that tend to foster corruption (Mbaku, 2008). In such economies, resource allocation is politicized, and in many cases, civil servants have replaced the market as the main resource allocator (Shabbir & Anwar, 2008). Bureaucratic corruption is enhanced when government activities are prevalent in the running of the economy (Hanson, 2009).

#### **2.1.5. Distributive justice theory**

John E. Roemer in title *Theories of Distributive Justice* explores the major new philosophical concepts of the theory of distributive justice. Is a theory that takes as its primary aim the attainment of maximum possible happiness of a society as a whole? This goal is to be achieved in such a way that one first checks what makes every particular individual in a society happy, then sums up all these various wants and preferences, and finally finds out how to satisfy the greatest number of them. A policy which makes happy the greatest number of persons, or the one which frustrates satisfaction of desires of the least number of them, is the only one which is right to choose. Utilitarianism shows interest in distribution of goods only if this has some

impact on maximization of overall happiness. Authors that defend this line of thinking generally claim that approximately equal distribution of resources has the best effect. This is so, they believe, because a certain good is of less value to someone who already has a lot of it, than to someone who possesses a very short supply of the good (e.g. one extra dollar means much less to a millionaire than to a beggar). Harvey (2009:5) said, the distributive justice theory varies according to what is to be distributed. The purpose of distributive justice could be addresses the distribution of economic indices, such as income, wealth, jobs or opportunities. Another purpose could be to cover how resources are distributed, such as by individuals or groups of people.

Distributive justice theory implies equal access for all material goods and services. John Rawls in the book titled Handbook of Intergenerational Justice explain that, principle of distributive justice implies respect for the individual. In developing economies, the distributive justice principle lacks means of enforcement because of the lack of proper indices for valuing goods for equal distribution.

The distributive justice principle could incorporate the difference principle and welfare principle. Difference principles advocate equal claim to basic rights (Harvey, 2009). The principle also implies economic and social conditions should be linked to positions and offices available for all and should serve the interest of the least advantaged by providing equality (Harvey, 2009). According to the welfare principle, people's welfare is of primary importance (Roemer, 1996).

Another distributive justice principle written by Mark B. Brown (2009) in the book Science in Democracy; is the resource-based principle, which advocates equal access to basic resources. Other distributive justice principles include the desert-based principle and the libertarian principle. The desert based principle advocates distribution is according to contribution, effort, and adequate compensation to individuals (Harvey, 2009). The libertarian principle advocates the concept of entitlement (Brown, 2009).

## **2.2 Definition of corruption**

The word corruption is derived from the Latin word ‘corrupts’ meaning to break. Its derivation emphasizes the destructive effect of corruption on the fabric of society and the fact that its popular meaning encompasses all those situations where agents and public officers break the confidence entrusted to them. The oxford English dictionary also defines corruption as the ‘perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favor; the use or existence of corrupt practices especially in state, public corporation etc. (Nicholls, 2006). Similarly, Lip set and Lenz (2000) also defined corruption as a perversion or a change from good to bad. Corruption is efforts to secure wealth or power through illegal means private gain at public expense; or a misuse of public power for private benefit.

Corruption is hard to define in a succinct manner due to its multifaceted nature. There is no single, universally accepted definition of corruption. It is a subjective concept whose meaning may not always be the same to all groups and societies at all levels. For instance, one person's bribe is another person's gift; a political leader or public official who supports friends, family members, and supporters may seem praiseworthy in some societies and corrupt in others (Nicholls, 2006; USAID, 2006).

Corruption under Ethiopian legal context also defined ‘as any offence committed in relation to a government or public interest in violation of the duties proper to a government or a public service by seeking, exacting promise, or receiving any gratification or advantage for himself or for other person or group of persons, or inflicting harm on another person, and includes corrupt practices, acceptance of undue advantage, traffic in official influence abuse of power, maladministration, appropriation and misappropriation in discharge of duties, extortion and disclosure of secret, and shall include such other similar cases (Proclamation No. 236/2001). The term “corruption” refers to the misuse of resources or power for private gain. Transparency International defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Kolstad, 2008).

## **2.3 Back ground and the nature of corruption**

The existence of corruption among public officials dates back as far as ancient civilization. Still then, this phenomenon constituted serious problems for those nation states and required the

institution of measures geared at its eradication. Corruption is a global phenomenon and remains a serious social problem which is manifest in both advanced and developing countries and it is experienced by all societies without disparity in religious or race. In developing countries, however, due to its endemic nature, it creates and fosters immense distortions in various institutional processes as a result of inherent erosion of essential checks and balances between the different centers of power (Egbue, 2006).

Nevertheless, perception and interpretation intensity and magnitude of the practice, and consequence there of differs owing to a number of factors ranging from people's awareness, to degree of government structure institutionalization, to legislation and control mechanisms to curb the practice, to a state of transparency, development of civil society, accountability and check and Balance (Svenson, 2005; Osguan, 2012).

## **2.4 Land administration system and its main components**

Land administration is the process of determining, recording, and disseminating information about ownership, value and use of land; when implementing land management policies (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1996). Access to land and land related benefits are an important factor to reduce poverty and create economic growth (World Bank (WB), 2003).

Administrative corruption is corruption that occurs in public administration and government services is a common feature in the land sector. It can take the form of small bribes that need to be paid to register property, change or forge titles, acquire land information, process cadastral surveys, and generate favorable land use plans (TI, 2011).

Land administration, whether formal or informal, comprises an extensive range of systems and processes to administer (FAO, 2002). It is the way in which the rules of land tenure are applied and made operational. According to the most accepted definition worldwide, land administration is the process of determining, recording, and disseminating information about the tenure, value and use of land when implementing land management policies (Dale & McLaughlin, 1988). An effective and efficient land administration system is of vital importance for the government to manage land related issues. Dalrymple (2008) illustrates that the typical essence of land administration system involves public land management, private land recordation and registration, land value assessment, land taxation, land use definition and development

application support. Those essences can be concluded as land registration and cadaster, land use planning, land valuation and taxation, land development and Dispute resolution& conflict management.

- a) Land Registration and Cadaster is the core component of land administration system which is aimed to record and archive land information (Williamson, 2001). The terms of land registration and cadaster has to be distinguished to avoid the confusion (Zevenbergen, 2002). McLaughlin and Nichols (1989) define land registration as “the process of recording legally recognized interests in land”, and cadaster is defined as “an official record of information about land parcels, including details of their bounds, tenure, use, and value”. The foundation of a successful land administration system is reliable land records. The important land attributes such as ownership, value, and land use has to be carefully recorded and archived. Each of the attribute of land has its own necessity. The record of land ownership is the basic evidence of protecting tenure security, which is the most important function of land registration; the record of land value can ensure the equity of land taxation and land acquisition; the record of land use can be used to guarantee the efficiency of resource administration (Feder & Nishio, 1998). Meanwhile, land registration and cadaster is meaningful to all citizens. Without official record, they are not qualified to involve in any land use planning and development project. Therefore, establishing a pro-poor land registration and cadaster system is an inevitable activity that must be done by every government.
- b) Land use Planning is the systematic evaluation of the potential of land, social economic Situation and alternate land use for the sake of optimal land use selection.(FAO, 1993)Generally speaking, land use planning is aimed at making the best use of limited and scarce land resources. Under the current context of rapid urbanization, land resource becomes very scarce.
- c) Land Development, as its name implies, is the process of converting raw land into constructed settlement. It mainly focuses on construction planning, permission, regulation, and implementation. SEMCOG (2003) describes the role of land development as protecting agricultural lands, preserving public open space, managing residential development and so on. Without the support of land development, any land policy or land

use plan is not able to be implemented. The tools of land development are various such as land readjustment, land consolidation, land pooling and land sharing. Each of the tools is adapted to different development requirement. For instance, if government wants to upgrade certain settlement, land readjustment or land sharing should be a suitable choice. And if a certain settlement has to be relocated, land pooling is qualified for the task.

- d) Land Valuation and Taxation is another important process for the owners and the state to maintain their benefit that came from the land consequently. Land taxation is an annual tax, commonly based on the capital or rental value of real property. In previous centuries, taxes on property formed the most important source of tax revenue for both national and local taxes. The potential significance of property tax is considerably higher for developing countries. Property tax remains an important source of revenue for many local governments. (FAO land tenure studies, 2007)
- e) Dispute resolution and Conflict Management Given the secular forces affecting land values, the magnitude of the resources and the vested interests at stake, and the rapid pace of social and economic change experienced by many developing countries, it may be naive to assume that conflicts over land can be avoided. What is more important from the point of view of land governance as well as social justice is to ensure that potential sources of conflict are handled in a consistent fashion rather than on an ad hoc basis and that institutions to resolve disputes and manage conflict are accessible, have clearly defined mandates, and work effectively (Deininger, Selod, & Burns, 2011). To handle the existed and potential problems, conflict resolution institutions should be legitimate, accessible to most of the population, and legally authorized to resolve conflicts. Additionally the conflicts should not be ended for a long time; they have to resolve at the beginning at locally and timely. To generalize, the processes of land administration include the transfer of rights in land from one party to another through sale, lease, loan, gift and inheritance; (FAO, 2002) the regulating of land and property development; the use and conservation of the land; the gathering of revenues from the land through sales, leasing, and taxation; and the resolving of conflicts concerning the ownership and the use of land.

In other way, land administration functions may be divided into four components: Juridical, regulatory, fiscal, and information management. These functions of land administration may be organized in terms of agencies responsible for surveying and mapping, land registration, and land valuation (Dale & McLaughlin, 1999) .The aforementioned components of land administration are the whole thing of land administration and also most of problems related to customers' service arise from the failure of executing those components properly (Feder & Nishio, 1998).

## **2.5. Good governance in land administration**

Although much has been written about the importance of good governance in achieving development goals, there is comparatively little material on good governance in land tenure and administration. Failings in governance have adverse consequences for society as a whole. By contrast, good governance can help achieve economic development and the reduction of poverty. Good governance matters (United Nation University, 2002). Land is the single greatest resource in most countries. Access to land, security of tenure and land management has significant implications for development. Land administration provides important parts of the infrastructure for an efficient economy, which means that it touches all aspects of how people earn a living. Land administration through taxes on land plays a significant role in raising revenue for public finances. Through registration and cadaster systems, land administration provides security of tenure and allows people to obtain loans through mortgages. Yet formal land administration systems commonly fail. Customary land tenure arrangements also may not adequately serve citizens—especially when those arrangements are weakened by transition and commercialization(FAO, 2007).

Experts agree that when land governance is weak, the powerful are able to dominate the competition for scarce land resources. In an extreme form, corruption can occur on a grand scale through “state capture”. State capture refers to “a situation where powerful individuals, institutions, companies or groups within or outside a country use corruption to shape a nation’s policies, legal environment and economy to benefit their own private interests” (TI, 2009). In the land sector this means that those in power may illegally transfer lands to themselves or their allies. Or they may implement land distribution policies and laws in their favor (FAO, 2002).

## **2.6. Causes of corruption**

Corruption causes are as diverse and complex as its types and features are. Economic causes, which include closely, linked factors such as increase in wants, constrained supply of public goods and essential services, and inflation impairing the quest for maintaining a given standard of living, are most frequently cited causes of corruption. Civil servants and public officials, challenged by these economic problems, usually resort to corruption. Of course, there are officials who engage in grand corruption without any economic pressure. There are some officials who are motivated to participate in corrupt behavior because of the inherently selfish desire to have an unfair advantage over their peers (Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission, 2013).

Monopoly of power, lack of transparency and accountability mechanisms, lack of punitive measures, and poor incentive structures are other major causes of corruption. In circumstances where political power is monopolized by a few persons or groups, decisions will always be made that give advantage to those groups or persons who dominate and control the political process. Bad incentives also motivate corrupt behavior as people seek to augment their official remuneration through taking bribes. A lack of incentive results not only when people are not paid well for their duties, but also when positions of power are filled through favoritisms and nepotism, which induces self-serving rather than public-serving behavior. There are also general causes of corruption such as Poverty, Illiteracy and Poor Education, Unemployment, Greed, Weak Governments, Drug Trafficking etc. (Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission, 2013).

## **2.7 Consequences of corruption**

As it indicated in the report of (UN, 2007) corruption can weaken democratic institutions both in new and in along-established democracies. Corrupt public officials fail to keep the interest of society in mind when taking decision, leading to a loss of public support for democratic institutions. In such situations, people become discouraged from exercising their civil and political rights and from demanding that these rights be respected. In countries where corruption is pervasive in the administration of justice, the implementation of a country's laws as well as efforts to reform them are impeded by corrupt judges, lawyers, prosecutors, police officers,

investigators and auditors. Such practices compromise the right to equality before the law and the right to a fair trial. They especially undermine the poor's access to justice, because they cannot afford to offer or promise bribes. Importantly, corruption contributes to a culture of impunity, since illegal actions are not consistently punished and laws are not consistently upheld (UN, 200).

## **2.8 Concepts of community participation**

There exists no consensus on a single definition of participation and participatory approaches. Some view participation as a means to an end while others view it as an end in itself (Yeraswork, 2000; Pretty and Shah, 1996). Also some pay only lip service to participation for reasons of its political usefulness (Brohman, 1996). According to Rogers (2008), participation is a process through which stakeholders can influence and share control over development initiatives and the resources used to fund them through engagement in decision making. It refers to —a situation in which two or more social actors negotiate, define and guarantee amongst themselves a fair sharing of the management functions, entitlements and responsibilities for a given territory, area or set of natural resources( Pretty and Shah, 1996).

In line with this, Borrini-Feyerabend (2000) stated that it is a pluralistic approach to natural resource management through the involvement of partners with the end goals of sustainable use and conservation of the resource and equitable sharing of benefits and responsibilities related to it. It is considered as a voluntary contribution by the people in one or another of the public programs supposed to contribute to national development. Participation affects the sustainability of development. When people are given an opportunity to take an active role in planning, implementing, and monitoring projects that affect their own development, they develop a sense of ownership of the activity and are motivated to make the necessary effort to ensure its success.

Community participation requires respect for the deep understanding of local conditions that only residents can have, a supportive institutional and policy environment that helps groups to act on decisions they make, willingness to learn and share, and skilled application of these tools. In other words, community participation is a way of harnessing the existing physical, economic and social resources of rural people in order to achieve the objectives of development programs and projects (Gebremedih, 2004).

## **2.9 Strategy of fighting corruption**

In discussing about the corruption phenomenon, what constitutes anti-corruption strategies varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the strategies are understood as approaches or measures which are initiated mostly by the government in-conjunction with other stakeholders to curb corruption. They mostly encompass an aspect of; prevention, investigation, enforcement, prosecution of the corrupt offenders, community or civic education. They also include international cooperation, institutional capacity building, improvement on the national integrity institutions and formulating of enabling legal framework to fight and reduce corruption (Man-wai, 2006).

Three-pronged anti-corruption strategies are identified in common. These are: deterrence, prevention and education. For instance, the prevention strategy could be marched with the issues of accountability and transparency in the public duties. The investigation strategy entails the work done by the anti-corruption watchdog agencies, while the civic education involves the public participation in the democratic process and the creation of the public awareness among other issues. Fighting corruption requires a well thought out and comprehensive strategic plan rather than rely on one single solution to fight corruption (Man-wai, 2006).

## **2.10 The Ethiopian policy strategy towards corruption**

Corruption is one of the burning issues and impediments to good governance and sustainable development across the globe (Alam, 2014). However, it is more common in developing countries than developed ones. Ethiopia is one of the developing countries where the prevalence of corruption has been uncontrolled (Selamu, 2010). During the Reign of Emperor Haile Selassie misadministration, excessive taxation and corruption, in general, became rampant (Korajian, 2003). Virtually, all heads of government denounce corruption and call for laws and measures to control it. Yet with few exceptions, these laws are flouted or selectively enforced (Gould, 1991). The main anti-corruption legal instrument of the day in Ethiopia was the Penal code of 1957. Enacting law is not enough. The laws have to be implemented and to serve their purpose. As Christopher Clapham stated “the measures legislated were not applied effectively except in glaring cases where it is obvious that failure to apply the law could invite public outcry” (Clapham 1969 cited in Belachew 2001). In fact, the 1957 Penal Code is not deficient by itself.

Although one does not find the widely accepted definition of corruption as is currently understood, it contains legal provisions for combating corruption here and there (Belachew, 2001).

The Dergue regime was a centrally controlled government based on communist ideology. This ideology, according to Bamidele Olowu (1996 as cited in Shimelis, 2005), forced the regime to question the basis of the accepted norms and codes of behavior in Ethiopian society and this eroded ethics and morality in the civil service in particular and society in general. During this period, the Ethiopian bureaucracy became very corrupt and parastatal firms such as the Agricultural Marketing Corporations dominated transactions in agricultural products causing total economic failure (Korajian, 2003). Still as a means of measures against corruption, the Dergue regime promulgated the Special Penal Code (SPC) from the outset in November 1974. The SPC was necessitated because the administrative and political orientation reflected in the Penal Code of 1957 permitted leniency to perpetrators of some grave offences with light punishment. The purpose of the SPC was, therefore, to facilitate the implementation of changed situations required by the revolution, which included imposition of highest penalties for grave offences caused by greedy officials and sanctioned confiscation of any property or wealth obtained by illegal means (Proclamation No. 8/74).

The EPRDF-led government came to power in 1991. In the post-1991 Ethiopia, “corruption remained one of the ills that undermined efforts towards societal transformation” (IER, 2001 as cited in Shimelis, 2005). Accordingly, Ethiopian Government established an independent Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission on May 24, 2001 with the aim of fighting against corruption (FEACC, Proclamation 235/2001).

## **2.11 Empirical literature review**

### **2.11.1 Empirical literature on Ethiopian Focus**

Corruption is perceived to be a serious problem in Ethiopia. It is ranked 111<sup>th</sup> out of 177 countries in Transparency International’s 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index, with a score of 33 out of an achievable 100 (TI, 2013a). On the 2013 Ibrahim Index of African Governance,

Ethiopia scores 47.9% - lower than the continental average 51.6% (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013).

Moreover, surveys also indicate that the situation may be deteriorating. A significant proportion of respondents (43%) of Transparency International's 2013 Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) think that corruption levels in Ethiopia have increased in the two years preceding the survey (Transparency International 2013b). This is also reflected in the World Economic Forum's 2013/2014 Global Competitiveness Report, which states that the assessment of Ethiopia's institutions has been falling over recent years across almost all indicators, including property rights, ethics and corruption, undue influence and government efficiency (World Economic Forum 2013).

While the number of extensive studies on corruption in land administration in Ethiopia is limited, they indicate that corruption in the land sector in Ethiopia is a significant problem. The most detailed information can be found in two World Bank studies from 2012 (the Land Governance Assessment Framework study on Ethiopia and the Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia report). The land sector has also been a key focus area of investigations by the country's Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC). In its 2007/2008 Annual Report, 28 of the 63 cases investigated during the year were in the land administration and development sector (World Bank 2012b). Corruption in the land sector can take a variety of forms, ranging from petty/bureaucratic corruption and corruption in auctioning processes, to state capture.

#### **2.11.1.1 Petty and bureaucratic corruption**

Bribery is noted to occur in many of Ethiopia's public services. Executives surveyed in the 2013/2014 Global Competitiveness Report list inefficient government bureaucracy and corruption as the second and third most problematic factors for doing business, respectively (World Economic Forum 2013).

The payment of bribery and informal fees also occurs in the land sector. For example, according to the 2010/2011 Global Corruption Barometer, 50% of respondents reported having paid a bribe to land services (Transparency International 2011). Indeed, according

to the FEACC, the institutionalization of informal fees is seen have become so commonplace in the land sector that the FEACC states it is “nearly impossible to get a plot of land without bribing city administration officials” (World Bank 2012a).

Moreover, another issue is the fraudulent activity of officials to allocate land to themselves. In fact, it is estimated that about 15,000 forged titles have been issued in Addis Ababa in the past five years (World Bank 2012a). In 2014, the Ethiopian Federal High Court handed down a three-year jail term to an offender of corruption who received 460 square meters of urban land through forged documents and in the name of a fake association, which didn't exist (FEACC 2014).

#### **2.11.1.2 Corruption in auctioning processes**

The auction processes for accessing urban land in particular are also argued to be highly susceptible to corruption. In urban areas, most allocation of public land for residential, manufacturing, commerce and construction purposes occurs through auctions. Land auctions can be lucrative, with 2014 seeing record bids from real estate development firms of ETB31,110 (USD\$1,590) per square meter for a plot of land in Addis Ababa (Addis Fortune 2014).

The efficacy of auctions in ensuring accurate pricing is argued to be questionable as there have been inexplicable fluctuations in auction prices in Addis Ababa (World Bank 2012a). Little information is publicly available about the allocation of public land, the amount allocated, and the mode of allocation, the parties involved, or the conditions of allocations (World Bank 2012a). One method to illegally allocate municipal land is to allocate it to housing cooperatives controlled by developers who then sell off the land informally (World Bank 2012a).

In addition, there have been cases of collusion and illegal speculation in the bidding and auctioning of urban land. Tekle (2012) argues that the lack of transparency in the municipal authority and land administration system has created a group of wealth collectors and land speculators that take advantage of public land resources. Under the lease system, land is allocated to private individuals and organizations with the obligation that land be developed

according to the planned use within 18 months (World Bank 2012a). However, there are numerous cases of allocated land remaining idle for long periods of time (World Bank 2012a).

### **2.11.1.3 State capture**

Experts agree that when land governance is weak, the powerful are able to dominate the competition for scarce land resources. In an extreme form, corruption can occur on a grand scale through “state capture”. State capture refers to “a situation where powerful individuals, institutions, companies or groups within or outside a country use corruption to shape a nation’s policies, legal environment and economy to benefit their own private interests” (Transparency International 2009). In the land sector this means that those in power may illegally transfer lands to themselves or their allies (Transparency International 2009). Or they may implement land distribution policies and laws in their favor (Transparency International 2009).

Ethiopia’s political institutions have been much criticized by experts, who argue that there is virtually no system of checks and balances between the different branches of government and that elections are neither free nor fair (Bertelsmann Foundation 2014). The Bertelsmann Foundation also considers the judiciary to be highly influenced by the political elite and impaired by high levels of corruption (Bertelsmann Foundation 2014). Indeed, land is allegedly often used as a political instrument by the elite and allocated based on political and private considerations (World Bank 2012a). For example, in 2005, following a post-election power vacuum, a substantial amount of land in Addis Ababa was allocated based on political allegiances (World Bank 2012a). In addition, there have been reports that officials from the ruling party tend to receive preferential access to land leases and credit (Freedom House 2013).

### **2.11.2 Empirical literature on the drivers of corruption in the land administration sector**

The main drivers of corruption have been identified as economic, political and cultural factors (Rose-Ackerman 1994, 1999, 2004 and Klitgaard 1995, 1996). These vary from country to country (Garcia-Murillo 2005). Corruption corrodes economic and social relations. It distorts markets and erodes attempts to improve quality of life. The World Bank identifies it as the key element in economic underperformance and a major obstacle to poverty alleviation and

development. In major parts of the world, the public sector has been plagued with corrupt practices. Corruption has attained serious levels in more than two-thirds of the 159 nations surveyed in Transparency International's 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). These countries have scored less than 5 out of a clean score of 10. Studies also suggest that corruption occurs together with red-tape and is the most ancient and widespread disease of bureaucracy (Guriev, 2004).

More recently the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) has developed a diagnostic tool to help identify the "international drivers of corruption" described as the "global or regional factors that influence the domestic political economy" that nations are exposed to. It is said to be intended for use "across a broad range of subject areas – including international relations, trade, investment, tax co-operation and security" using a political economy model (OECD, 2012)

The analysis from many sources acknowledges that "drivers" of corruption in fact occur at three levels: the individual, the organization and the enabling environment (OECD/DAC 2006). Part of that environment is a nation's social and community characteristics that can encourage corruption or impede anti-corruption reforms seen as complex and foreign to local traditions and values (Kauzya, 2012).

There are a number of elements in Ethiopia's current land administration system that can create potential entry points for corrupt activities to occur. These include: lack of clear policies, weak institutions, lack of transparency, and limited public participation, and capacity challenges (World Bank 2012b).

#### **2.11.2.1 Lack of clear policies**

The Ethiopian land administration system is troubled with a high degree of informality. One of the main causes of this is the absence of clear legislation as well as confusion about the applicability of legislation. Indeed, where there is legislation, implementation guidelines are oftentimes lacking, which creates confusion (World Bank 2012b).

No single document sets out Ethiopia's land policy. Instead, laws and policies must be inferred from federal laws, together with laws and directives set by regional and municipal governments (World Bank 2012b). In some cases, there is confusion on the applicability of laws. Moreover,

some land administration issues are determined by unpublished administrative directives that often change quickly and without public notice (World Bank 2012b). For example, there is no clear system of land valuation. The multiple land valuations currently in place have also created opportunities for collusion in reducing tax liabilities and can lead to inequities in the compensation for expropriated property (World Bank 2012a).

Studies estimate informal settlements to be as high as 90% of housing units in urban sectors, both among affluent sections of the population (World Bank 2012a). The lack of an effective dispute resolution in the land administration system gives officials a lot of discretion in resolving disputes (World Bank 2012b).

Rules for access to land are not clear and some have better access than others, largely due to relationships or payment of bribes (World Bank 2012a). The private sector usually cannot rely on or wait for the lease or auction process, so it looks to other means (World Bank 2012a).

#### **2.11.2.2 Weak institutions**

As with legislation and policies, there is a lack of clarity regarding the roles, responsibilities and mandates of institutions. Indeed, experts note that there is an absence of a strong national institution that gives clear policy as well as technical and financial guidance for both rural and urban lands (Belachew and Aytenu 2010).

For example, in Addis Ababa, there is a lack of clarity regarding the roles of the central administration and the 10 sub-cities in allocating land administering rights over land (World Bank 2012b). According to the FEACC this led to a case in which land allocated to successful winners of land auctions was already allocated to other individuals through negotiations for unknown reasons (World Bank 2012b).

Some institutions are responsible for both policymaking and implementation, which may lead to conflicts of interest. By assigning members of legislative councils to serve on land administration committees, there have been cases of issuances of directives that specifically target to influence the resolution of specific cases (World Bank 2012b).

Lastly, there are concerns regarding oversight and accountability. For example, there is no well-developed complaint mechanism. Presently, mechanisms to handle complaints on land registration in urban areas operate outside the registry so there is little monitoring of registry staff or proactive systems to discourage illegal activity by registry staff (World Bank 2012a). Without proper dispute resolution systems, people may be forced to consider alternative means of dispute resolution, including corruption (World Bank 2012a).

### **2.11.2.3 Lack of transparency and public participation**

Another key issue and driver of corruption is the lack of transparency and access to information. Lack of transparency is seen to permeate almost all aspects of land administration (World Bank 2012a). For example, some of the policies that govern land administration are determined on the basis of unpublished directives, as mentioned above. This creates a system of uncertainty and lack of clarity for those involved in land administration and may feed corruption.

Only about 25% of individually held urban properties have been recorded and the records are not reliable or conclusive (World Bank 2012a). About 70% of rural holdings have been registered, but the records are not being kept up to date, which reduces their usefulness (World Bank 2012a). Ethiopian land administration also lacks an inventory of public land systems (World Bank 2012a). Rural areas have no maps of registered holdings and urban areas have limited mapping of registered property (World Bank 2012a). This makes the issuing of forged documents easier.

There is also lack of transparency in the allocation of public land (World Bank 2012a). For example, due to the lack of transparency around tendering for land leaseholds, many people resort to corrupt means to gain land (World Bank 2012a). Moreover, the lack of transparency heightens the insecurity of many land users who are unaware of their rights. Experts agree that there is limited participation in the land administration process. This affects, for example, the preparation of land use plans (World Bank 2012b). Limited public consultation leads to very limited public awareness of policy and public engagement with policy implementation (World Bank 2012a).

Ethiopia's commercial leasing process to foreign investors has also been criticized for lacking transparency and public participation (USAID 2013). It is argued that the leasing process does not adequately consult with stakeholders (including current users of the land) and the terms of the leases are not transparent (USAID 2013). As such, there have been some cases large-scale agricultural projects that are not being used as intended (IFAD 2009). Similarly, it is argued that Addis Ababa's master plan was developed with little public participation of Oromo people (Geeska Afrika Online 2014).

#### **2.11.2.4 Resource challenges**

Capacity limitations are also a driver of corruption. In this case, capacity is seen to mean both human resources as well as technical and financial resources. One of the drivers of corruption has to do with staff funding. Underfunded staff with low motivation who operate in an environment of complicated procedures can have a direct impact on corrupt activities (Transparency International 2009).

In addition, capacity constraints are seen as a major hindrance for the Ethiopian government to carry out its land administration and record land rights. While computerization is being implemented in some level, it is challenged by the lack of other infrastructure, such as broadband telecom services (Belachew and Aytenfisu 2010). Non-computerized systems have cumbersome procedures that take significantly more time (World Bank 2012b). In addition, there are issues of misplacement and loss of files (World Bank 2012b).

Lastly, financial unsustainability of the land registry is noted as an area of concern. For one, there continues to be limited investment in land administration (World Bank 2012a). In addition, the fees for registering urban land are noted to be especially low and not conducive to financial sustainability (World Bank 2012b). Similarly, the lack of a clear land valuation system has led to very low rents that do not reflect economic values of properties, which results in local governments forgoing large amounts of potential revenue, which could be used to provide services and infrastructure (World Bank 2012b). According to the World Bank study, low fees can provide scope for petty corruption as higher, informal fees become routine in some contexts (World Bank 2012a).

### **2.11.3 Empirical literature on challenges of institutional arrangement in fighting land corruption**

Experts agree that when land governance is weak, the powerful are able to dominate the competition for scarce land resources. In an extreme form, corruption can occur on a grand scale through “state capture”. State capture refers to “a situation where powerful individuals, institutions, companies or groups within or outside a country use corruption to shape a nation’s policies, legal environment and economy to benefit their own private interests” (TI, 2009). In the land sector this means that those in power may illegally transfer lands to themselves or their allies. Or they may implement land distribution policies and laws in their favor (FAO, 2002).

The Institute of Surveyors of Kenya recommends re-engineering of land administration Processes with the aim of reducing the discretionary authority of officials. Computerized and well administered land information systems would help to ensuring transparency and accountability and cases of missing files, double allocations and delayed transactions would be eliminated. Professionals should be increasingly be reminded their ethical responsibility (Makathimo, 2004). Ethiopia’s legal and institutional structure with regard to land administration has been criticized for being unnecessarily complicated. While the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development is the key responsible organ for the implementation of land administration laws, existing legislation is found on a piecemeal basis in different parts of the civil code and rural and urban land laws (Belachew and Aytenfisu, 2010). Moreover, Ethiopia’s federal structure gives its regions a lot of autonomy, which, in turn, has led to a coexistence of different laws and institutions with unclear responsibilities at different levels (World Bank, 2012b).

As with legislation and policies, there is a lack of clarity regarding the roles, responsibilities and mandates of institutions. Indeed, experts note that there is an absence of a strong national institution that gives clear policy as well as technical and financial guidance for both rural and urban lands (Belachew and Aytenfisu, 2010). For example, in Addis Ababa, there is a lack of clarity regarding the roles of the central administration and the 10 sub-cities in allocating land administering rights over land (World Bank 2012b). According to the FEACC this led to a case in which land allocated to successful winners of land auctions was already allocated to other individuals through negotiations for unknown reasons (World Bank, 2012b).

#### **2.11.4 Empirical literature on the consequences of land corruption in land administration sector**

A recent survey on corruption in Vietnam showed that land management tops the list of ten fields accused of corruption. There are a multitude of land corruption crimes committed, but the three most popular are (1) taking advantage of state projects to appropriate land, share land, especially in forestation, residential areas and resettlement programs, (2) making corrupt use of power to confer land for example leasing land plots of large areas, favorable positions, low prices, quickly completing related formalities and seeking profit through land conferring, especially for investment purposes, and (3) authoritarian behavior, asking for presents and money while performing formalities related to land, such as land allocation, land lease, land rights transfer, land use certificate granting, land compensation and site clearance (Vietnam, 2005).

The prevalence of corruption in Ethiopia impaired growth and potentially entrench poverty. Despite fast and double digit economic growth over the last ten years, Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Corruption has been a potential threat to the overall country's development. During the imperial and the military regime, corruption is said to have resulted in undermining the legitimacy of the government, and weakening their structures, reducing productivity, hindering development, worsening poverty, marginalizing the poor, creating social unrest, and finally speeding up their down fall (FEACC profile, 2012). These days corruption news is aired. Big government officers are suspect in corruption crime. This hinders the step forward movement in democracy and good governance, it also believed to be factors that contribute the reduction of government revenue. It can also negatively affect the on-going poverty reduction and development program (FEACC profile, 2012).

#### **2.11.5 Empirical literature on the ways of community participation in fighting land corruption in the land administration sector**

The Corruption in South Asia report 2002 recommends (1) institutionalize user surveys in order to enhance the influence of public feed back to the policy environment, (2) strengthen accountability in order to close the 'accountability vacuum', (3) set norms and standards in order to make officials accountable for the service delivered, and (4) enhance citizen participation in

governance in order to mobilize the role of civil society as a force for improvement of services (TI, 2002c).

It is ordinary citizens who bear the brunt of corruption, have direct experience of it, and suffer from it. However they also have power and can use it to fight corruption. There are two main approaches to fight corruption: the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach. The top-down approach has to do with developing and naturalizing new rules, institutions, and norms that target the “public administrative graft”. The primary weakness of this approach, however, is that the very institutions accused of corruption are responsible for enacting change. Those benefiting from corruption are much less likely to end it than those suffering from corruption. That is why this dialogue emphasizes the importance of the bottom up, or grass-roots, approach, which requires the mobilization of ordinary citizens. A key part of the process of empowerment is education. Citizens who are better informed of the corruption within their political systems are able to fight corruption more effectively as well as develop their own strategies to do so (EIIPD, 2012).

Community participation is one of the basic issues in today’s world as it enhances the community’s practical skills and knowledge as well as boosts up their organizational skills to solve different problems. Despite Africa’s unsatisfactory track recorded in a community participation and institutional integration in the environmental rehabilitation and agricultural extension (ERAE) over the decades, it has been improving. This is due to the fact that the continent has been confronted by a number of major problems to enhance community participation in every developmental issue (Desalegn, 2007).


Community participation is also a highly fashionable term in current development practice. Until the 1990’s, development discourse emphasized the role of the state and of international agencies in delivering development to people. This blueprint approach was progressively challenged because of its various reasons to effectively address the underlying causes of poverty. The rationale behind community participation is multifold: increased participation is supposed to promote greater efficiency, more accountability and transparency, enhanced ownership and empowerment. Ultimately, participation is supposed to be the key to genuine and

sustainable poverty alleviation by shifting power to those who are “local and poor” (Nelson, 2005).

## 2.12 Conceptual framework

Based on the discussed background of the study, statement of the problem and literature review, the researcher developed the conceptual framework on the role of community participation in fighting corruption on urban land administration sector of the study area below.

**Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework**



Source: (World Bank, 2012b)

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This chapter presents the methodology which was used to conduct the study. It discusses the research design, population and sampling techniques; instruments to be used for data collection, procedures will be followed during data gathering and data analysis techniques.

#### **3.1 Description of the study area**

Arba Minch has its name after the local springs from where the city is supplied with naturally clean water. Astronomically, it is located at the geographic co-ordinates of 6°15' north latitudes and 37°38' east longitudes. It is found in the GamoGofa Zone of the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region about 500 kilometers away to the south of Addis Ababa at an elevation of 1285 meters above sea level at the base of the western side of the great rift valley and has 55.57 km<sup>2</sup> area. It is the largest town in GamoGofa Zone and the second town in SNNPR next to Hawassa. It consists of the upper town Shecha, Lower town Sikela and Limat. Since 1999 E.C/2006 G.C, the town becomes city administration with 4-sub town and 11 kebeles. These sub towns are Sikela, Shecha, Nechisar and Abaya. Arba Minch is known for its fruit, fish, and crocodile farms. Moreover, it is surrounded by natural resources, which enhanced the attraction of the town such as Lake Abaya, Kulfo River that crosses the city, A.M natural forest, and Bridge of God in the east, and Lake Chemo. The eastern side of Sikela is the gate to Nechisar National Park which covers the isthmus between Lake Abaya to the north and Lake Chamo to the south. Forty springs from where the town is supplied with naturally clean water in the west of the natural forest (GamoGofa zone Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, 2013).

##### **3.1.1 Temperature**

The monthly mean Maximum and minimum temperature records of Arab Minch in the year between 2001 to 2013 indicates that the highest mean monthly maximum temperature occurs in the months of February and March 33.5°C July 27.8°C. While the mean monthly minimum temperature range for the lowest 15.4°C in December to the highest 18.4°C in the month of

March. In Arba Minch, the temperature often exceeds 15oC. In general, the temperature is considered as hot Humid for most days with some sort of uncomfortable climatic conditions.(GamoGofa zone Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, 2013).

### 3.1.2 Demography

The data used in the article were drawn from CSA /central statistical agency and the data was, collected by CSA as part of 2007 housing and population census, and then the current data were, projected by using the growth rate of the town. Hence, population of the study area is 103,637 out of which 54195 are male and 49441 are female.

### 3.1.3 Existing land use

According to the existing situational analysis, there are thirteen land use types. Broadly categorized in to built up and none built up areas. Built up areas include residential, service, transport, administration, manufacturing and business areas. None built up areas include water bodies, green spaces and other open spaces. This gives 2177.14 ha.(GamoGofa zone Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, 2013).

**Table 3.1 Existing Land Use Area in Hectares**


Land use type	Area (ha)
Gravel Road	64.67
Cobble Road	36.67
Asphalt Road	92.02
Earth Road	103.56
Open space without vegetation	207.49
Mixed use	149.71
Pure Residence	281.02
Commerce	143.87
Administration	39.63
Service	440.82
Transportation	8.68
Manufacturing	57.17
Urban Agriculture	73.23
River Line	121.16
Recreation	23.11
Forest Informal Green	254.82
Special Function	79.51

Total area	2177.14
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**3.1.4 Infrastructure**

The study area land use is categorized broadly in to build up and none built up. Accordingly, the surface covers of the built up and none built up was analyzed and found to be 1417.82 ha (65.12 %), and 759.32 ha (34.78 %) respectively. Showing that built up land use is dominating. Further categorizing built up spaces in to grey and green infrastructures have been summarized as follows. Green infrastructures such as vegetation within plots (11.26 %), and non-built up space of 34.88% makes a total of 45.14% of the total study area. Grey infrastructures are built impervious surfaces that include CIS roof (10.53%), Cobble stone road (2%), Asphalt road (5%), and Gravel road (3%), Earth road (5%) and degraded bear land (29.33) gives 54.86 %.(GamoGofa zone Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, 2013).

Figure 3.1: Location of Arba Minch



Source: *QGIS 2.8 Version software (Quantum Geographical Information System)*

### **3.2 Research design and method**

As the main objective of this study is assessing the role of community participation in fighting urban land corruption in land administration sector in detail, description of existing problems with the aim of producing data to justify contemporary situations and practices in a given town administration of GamoGofa Zone, descriptive survey design was employed. This survey study was applied both quantitative and qualitative research methods so that the researcher can easily triangulate information from various sources.

### **3.3 Population, sample size and sampling techniques**

The study was conducted in Arba Minch Town GamoGofa Zone. What inspired the researcher to conduct this study was as he used to live in the town the researcher frequently heard complaints of land corruption cases here and there. In addition to this certain customers of the sector were complained that “they were asked to offer bribe by some officials and employees of the sector and, also friends and relatives of these individuals get priority during service delivery.” In the study area, there are 11 kebeles. From these the researcher was purposively selected three kebeles, namely: Edigetber, Gurba and Kulfo.

The populations of the study were the house holds of purposively selected, three kebeles of Arba Minch Town Administration. The total households (HH) of these selected, three kebeles were 9772. From this total number of households, 240 sample sizes were selected by using scientific statistical method from (Cochran, 1977, cited in Melaku, 2008). Using the same formula the sample size of each purposively selected kebele was determined from its total households. The formula that used for determining sample size was the following.

$$n = \frac{NZ^2PQ}{d^2(N-1) + Z^2PQ}$$

Where, n= total sample size

N= Total number of sample households

Z= Standard normal deviation at the required confidence level that corresponds to 95% confidence interval equal to 1.96

d= the level of statistical significance (allowable error) (0.05)

p= the proportion in the targeted population estimated to have characteristics being measured (from previous studies or studies in other comparable countries, that is, 0.8 (Cochran, 1977, cited in Melaku, 2008).

$$Q = 1 - p, \text{ i.e. } 1 - 0.8 = 0.2$$

For total sample size of purposively selected three kebeles residents, the formula used is:

$$n = \frac{9772(1.96)^2(0.8)(0.2)}{(0.05)^2(9772-1) + (1.96)^2(0.8)(0.2)}$$

$$n = 240.$$

Therefore, the total sample size for this study was 240.

**Table 3.2: Population and sample size**

Kebele	Total household	sampling techniques	sample size	sample in %
Edigetber	3,650	Systematic sampling	90	38
Gurba	2,874	Systematic sampling	70	29
Kulfo	3,248	Systematic sampling	80	33
total	9772	Systematic sampling	240	100

**Source:** Own formulation (2018)

As (Cochran, 1977, cited in Melaku, 2008) systematic probability sampling requires that one has a list of the population units. The list is treated as circular so that the last unit is followed by the first. After we have decided the size of the sample the formula used to employ systematic probability sampling technique was the following.

Let sample size =  $n$

Population size =  $N$

Now we select each  $N/n$ th individual from the list.

Example:  $N = 1000$  and

$$n = 100$$

$N/n$  th =  $1000/100 = 10$  is a sampling interval.

Then within 10 intervals, we draw one sample randomly using lottery method. For example the randomly selected between 1 to 10 is 5, then from the next 10 interval we take the 5<sup>th</sup> one. Therefore the samples are: 5th, 10th, 15th, 25th, 30th, and 35th ... (Cochran, 1977, cited in Melaku, 2008). From each sample size individual respondents were selected using the formula above.

### **3.4 Data sources**

In order to achieve the objective of the study already stated, both primary and secondary data obtained from different sources were employed.

#### **3.4.1 Primary data sources**

The primary data was collected through different data collection instruments like questionnaire, FGD and key informants' interview.

#### **3.4.2 Secondary data sources**

Secondary data was obtained from documents such as: minutes, annual reports, proclamations, regulations and directives and anticorruption laws related to the problems under study.

### **3.5. Data collection instruments**

#### **3.5.1 Questionnaires**

Primary data was collected mainly using questionnaires for households selected by systematic sampling techniques from purposively selected three kebele. Most questions in the questionnaire were closed-ended questions and contain different parts like: demographic characteristics of the respondents, questions related to the drivers of urbanland corruption in land administration sector, challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector in fighting urbanland corruption, the ways of community participation in fighting urban land corruption in land administration sector and consequences of urban land corruption in land administration sector of the study area. However, opportunities were given to the respondents to say more through open-ended questions. The questionnaires were prepared in English language and translated in to Amharic.

### **3.5.2 Focus Group Discussion (FGDs)**

FGD was held with eight (8) individuals from purposively selected kebeles and employees' from Arba Minch town land administration sector. They were selected based on their expert knowledge, life experience and perception of the researcher. However, open-ended questions were prepared for discussion on the topics such as: the ways of community participation in fighting land corruption in land administration sector, the drives of land corruption in land administration sector, challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector in fighting land corruption and consequences of land corruption in land administration sector. The discussion was conducted face to face by arranging appropriate time place and condition through discussion with the discussant.

### **3.5.3 Key Informants Interviews (KIIs)**

Key informant interview was conducted to collect primary data from: purposively selected kebeles officers, members of youth association, officer and employees from Arba Minch town land administration sector. They were selected based on their expert knowledge, life experience and perception of the researcher. With regard to this primary data collection instrument, semi-structured interview questions were prepared before the due session of the interview on the topics such as: whether they have an idea about corrupt practices in land administration sector of the study area or not, their perception about the drivers of urban land corruption in land administration sector of the study area, about the challenges of institutional arrangement in fighting urban land corruption in land administration sector of the study area, about the consequences of urban land corruption in land administration sector of the study area and finally how did they see the ways of community participation in fighting urban land corruption in land administration sector of the study area. Key informants were interviewed face to face by arranging appropriate time place and condition through discussion with the respondents.

**Table 3.3: Key informant interviewee**

No.	Interviewee	Number of interviewee	Sampling techniques
1	Officers from Edigetberkebele	2	purposively
2	Officers from Gurbakebele	2	purposively
3	Officers from Kulfokebele	2	purposively
4	Members of youth association from Edigetberkebele	1	Purposively
5	Members of youth association from Gurbakebele	1	Purposively
6	Members of youth association from Kulfokebele	1	Purposively
7	Officer from Arba Minch town land administration sector.	1	Purposively
8	Employees from Arba Minch town land administration sector.	1	Purposively
	Total	11	

**Source:** Own formulation (2018)

### **3.6. Reliability and Validity Test**

#### **3.6.1. Reliability**

Before applying statistical tools, testing of the reliability of the scale is very much important as it shows the extent to which a scale produces consistent result if measurements are made repeatedly. According to Davidson and Tolich (2003), “reliability refers to consistency”. This means that the same result was achieved when repeated at a different time, situation or place. Cronbach’s alpha is most widely used method. It has mentioned that its value varies from 0 to 1 but satisfactory value is required to be more than 0.6 for the scale to be reliable. Several authors such as Alwadaei (2010) and Kothari (2004), state that an instrument that provides a reliability coefficient of 0.7 is usually considered as a reliable instrument and acceptable. As to Cohen, L. and Manion, L. (1994), the Cronbach’s Alpha result, > 0.9 excellent, > 0.8 good, > 0.7 acceptable,  $\alpha < 0.6$  questionable, and < 0.5 poor. To ensure reliability, pilot surveys instruments was developed and applied. Here, the questionnaire was distributed for ten randomly selected

households in which they are not included in the main data gathering process and the results indicated that it is accepted as shown in the table below.

**Table 3.4: Reliability Test**

No	Variables	N <sup>o</sup> items	Cronbach's Alpha
1	Role of community participation	10	.893
2	Drives of land corruption	10	.901
3	Challenges of institutional arrangement	11	.886
4	Consequences of land corruption	11	.894
Total/Average reliability results		42	.894

**Source:** Own formulation (2018)

### 3.6.2. Validity

According to Amin (2005) construct validity is determined by expert judgment. After developing the questionnaire and interview question, the first draft will be given to the advisor for its clarity and simplicity. Based on the feedback obtained, some items of the instrument were changed and modified.

The validity and reliability of instruments developed by the researcher were checked before data collection through pilot testing from outside sample Kebeles, namely doysa among 11 kebeles of Arba Minch Town.

### 3.7. Data analysis and presentation method

After the data were obtained via the questionnaire containing open and close-ended items, interview, FGDs and document analyses were done using different types of statistical techniques and qualitative analyses through narration. The presentation, analysis and interpretation of the data gathered from respondents on the drivers of urban land corruption in land administration sector, challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector in fighting urban land corruption, ways of community participation in fighting urban land corruption in land

administration sector and consequences of urban land corruption in land administration sector of the study area was dedicated in this part of study. With respect to this, the closed-ended items across sub-categories were analyzed and described using descriptive statistics such as percentage, mean scores and standard deviation. One sample t-test was used to make inferences. Besides, data from interviews, FGDs and secondary sources were triangulated to validate the findings. All returned survey questionnaires were coded on Statistical Package for Social Sciences version 20.0 (SPSS), while answers to open-ended items were transcribed verbatim.

Before this study went to provide analysis, it had made a discussion on to how to interpret the result of the Likert scale items by using Mean Score Interpretations. With reference to Likert scale of rating mean scores, Al-Sayaad, J. Rabea, A. and Samrah, A. (2006) on their book statistics for economics and administration studies revealed that rating mean score on Likert scale items was indicators of ones attitudes. Therefore, the researcher make an interpretation based on Al-yasaad, *et al.*, (2006) mean score value rating system, that is, 1–1.8 “very low or strongly disagree”, 1.8-2.6 “low or disagree”, 2.6-3.4 “medium or moderately agree”, 3.4-4.2 “high or agree” and 4.2-5.00 “very high or strongly agree”. The summary of Mean Score interpretation was presented in Table 3.5 below.

**Table 3.5: Summary of Mean Score Interpretation**

No.	Mean scores	Mean score interpretation
1	1-1.8	Very low
2	1.8-2.6	Low
3	2.6-3.4	Medium
4	3.4-4.2	High
5	4.2-5.00	Very high

Source: Al-Sayaad, *et al.*, 2006

### **3.8. Ethical considerations**

This research was undertaken on the bases of basic principles of ethics in research. The principles such as safety of the research participants, willingness on voluntary basis, privacy and confidentiality of respondents’ response was considered. To minimize misleading results, the researcher also planned the research process before it was undertaken. In order to avoid plagiarism the researcher tried to make his work original and acknowledge the citations.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS**

This chapter presents the analysis and interpretations of the sample population based on the major issues related to the research questions and specific objectives. It consists of two parts. The first part is concerned with the description of characteristics of the respondents whereas; the second part deals with the analysis and interpretation of the data and then summarises the key findings of the study. The purpose of this data was to explore the role of community participation in fighting corruption in land administration sector of Arba Minch Town Administration.

Different tools used in order to come up with the data presented were namely questionnaires, KIIs, FGDs and secondary sources. The data gathered from the interview, FGDs and secondary sources were analyzed relating each with the responses of the questionnaires. 240 questionnaires were distributed to the respondents of purposively selected kebeles of Arba Minch town. From them 235 questionnaires were returned which is 97.92% response rate. Therefore, the analysis of this study was based on the number of questionnaires collected.

#### **4.1 characteristics of the respondents**

Characteristics of the respondents enabled the researcher to observe the composition in terms of sex, age, educational qualification, religion, marital status, kebele they live, and house ownership using descriptive analysis. The data collected on the characteristics of the respondents are presented in Table 4.1 below.

**Table 4.1: Background characteristics of the respondents**

Respondents Background	Items	Frequency	Percentage
Sex	1.M	170	72.3
	2.F	65	27.7
	Total	235	100
Age	1.18-35	35	14.9
	2.36-49	150	63.8
	3.50 and above	50	21.3
	Total	235	100
Educational qualification	1.Uneducated(illiterate)	12	5.2
	2.Primary(grade 1-8)	32	13.6
	3.Secondary(grade 9-12)	50	21.3
	4. Diploma (TVET)	76	32.3
	5. Degree	52	22.1
	6.Masters and above	13	5.5
	Total	235	100
Religion	1.Orthodox	109	46.4
	2.Protestant	102	43.4
	3.Islam	24	10.2
	4.Chatolic	-	-
	5.Other	-	-
	Total	235	100
Marital status	1. Unmarried	26	11.1
	2. Married	204	86.8
	3. Divorced	5	2.1
	4.Widows	-	-
	Total	235	100
Residence Kebele	1.Edigetber	88	37.4
	2.Gurba	69	29.4
	3.Kulfo	78	33.2
	Total	235	100
House ownership	1. private house	141	60
	2. Rented kebele house	19	8.1
	3. rented house from private owner	75	31.9

	Total	235	100
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Source: Own formulation (2018)

As Table 4.1 above showed from the total respondents about 72.3% male and 27.7% female households were participated in the study. Here, even though the majority of the respondents were male, there is no difference in the participation of fighting against urban land corruption which means all the members of the community are expected to take part in the fight against urban land corruption. Concerning age, about 14.9% were age between 18 and 35 years, 63.8% were age between 36 and 49years and 21.3% of them were 50 and above years old. This item was included in the study with the assumption of the researcher that responses obtained from the respondents might have a relationship with the problem under the study. From such ground one can understand that the majority of sample was almost adult group who can understand the effect of urbanland corruption. Regarding educational qualification, among total respondents about 5.2% of them were uneducated (illiterate), 13.6% of them were primary education (grade 1-8), 21.3% of them were secondary (grade 9-12), 32.3 % of them were diploma (TVET), 22.1 % of them were degree and 5.5% of them were masters and above. All householders were expected to participate in the fight against urban land corruption regardless of their educational level. Religious wise, 46.4% were orthodox, 43.4% were protestant and 10.2% were Muslim. The assumption is made with respect of religion that individuals' attitudes towards fighting urban land corruption might vary across the religious institution were the religious doctrine may be against the evil side of corruption, and therefore, individual might take the same position in fighting corruption. Among total respondents, about 86.8% of them were married, 11.1% were single and 2.1% were divorced. All householders were expected to participate in the fight against urban land corruption regardless of their marital status. Regarding residence, 37.4% werefrom Edigetber, 29.4% were from Gurba and 33.2% were from Kulfokebele and concerning house ownership, 60% were private house owners, 8.1% were rented kebele house owners and 31.9% were rented house from private owners. Finally all householders were expected to participate in the fight against urban land corruption regardless of their residence and house ownership. In general, presenting the information of different demographic variables in this section above helps

the researcher to identify the nature of different demographic variables there by obtaining information on how to suggest and what has to be done accordingly.

## **4.2 Analysis and interpretation of the data and key findings**

This part of the study was dedicated to the presentation, analysis and interpretation of the data gathered from respondents on the drivers of urban land corruption in land administration sector, challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector in fighting urban land corruption, ways of community participation in fighting urban land corruption in land administration sector and consequences of urban land corruption in land administration sector.

### **4.2.1 Drivers of urban land corruption in land administration sector**

This section deals with the items related to the drives of urban land corruption in land administration sector of Arba Minch town .Each item is analyzed based on the data obtained through questionnaires responded by households of purposively selected kebeles and further backed by the data obtained from KIIs, FGDs and secondary data sources. Accordingly; ten items were interpreted as indicated in the table below.

As indicated in the Table 4.2 below house holders were requested whether the items listed were drivers of urban land corruption or not in the study area. Accordingly to the first item: absence of land records, about 37.9% of total respondents were said agree, 32.3% of respondent were replied strongly agree and 10.2% were in neutral level. While 10.6% of respondents answered disagree and 8.9% said strongly disagree on the requested issues. Moreover, the mean score and the standard deviation of the item were 3.74 and1.26, respectively. Further, the t-value for the item was 8.99 and it is significantly above the test value. Secondary sources, KIIs and FGDs disclosed that: there was lack of organized land recording system in the study area. Therefore; the researcher concluded that the absence of land record was drives of land corruption in the study area since the mean value was high as seen table 4.2 below.

**Table 4.2: Drivers of urban land corruption**

No	Items	SA		A		N		DA	SDA		Mea	St.D	t-value	
		F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F				%
1	Absence of land records	76	32.3	89	37.9	24	10.2	25	10.6	21	8.9	3.74	1.26	8.99*
2	Greediness of officials and lack of public concern	99	42.1	79	33.6	5	2.1	30	12.8	22	9.4	3.86	1.34	9.91*
3	Inability to maintain a given standard of living	86	36.6	90	38.3	18	7.7	21	8.9	20	8.5	3.86	1.25	10.53*
4	An underdeveloped and non-transparent land registration system	105	44.7	96	40.9	-	-	24	10.2	10	4.3	4.12	1.11	15.41*
5	Inadequate land laws and procedures	88	37.4	90	38.3	10	4.3	36	15.3	11	4.7	3.89	1.20	11.29*
6	Lack of punitive measures	71	30.2	79	33.6	23	9.8	39	16.6	23	9.8	3.58	1.33	6.66*
7	Unclear delineation of state and private land.	78	33.2	93	39.6	16	6.8	31	13.2	17	7.2	3.78	1.24	9.68*
8	The weakness of justice system.	71	30.2	99	42.1	12	5.1	15	6.4	38	16.2	3.64	1.39	7.02*
9	poor incentive to employees	66	28.1	88	37.4	26	11.1	34	14.5	21	8.9	3.61	1.28	7.35*
10	lack of awareness about anti-corruption laws	60	25.5	92	39.1	18	7.7	47	20.0	18	7.7	3.55	1.27	6.60*

Note: SA= strongly agree, A=Agree, N=Neutral, D=Disagree and SD=strongly disagree  
Std.D=Standard deviations, \* Significant at the level of agreement

**Source:** Own formulation (2018)

With regard to the second item greediness of officials and lack of public concern of the same table 4.2 above, 42.1% and 33.6% of respondents showed their strong agreement and agreement, respectively. Similarly, 12.8% and 9.4% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively whereas 2.1% respondents were neutral to the item that greediness of

officials and lack of public concern as drives of land corruption in the study area. The mean score and the standard deviation were 3.86 and 1.34 respectively. Further, the t-value for the item was 9.91 and it is significantly above the test value. Secondary sources, KIIs and FGDs boldly disclosed that greediness of officials and lack of public concern was one of the major drives of land corruption in the study area. Therefore, this study inferred that greediness of officials and lack of public concern was one of the major drives of land sector corruption in the study area. Furthermore, the researcher concluded that greediness of officials and lack of public concern was one of the major drives of land corruption in the study area since the mean value was high as observed in Table 4.2 above.

Concerning the third item of Table 4.2 above, 38.3% and 36.6% of respondents showed their agreement and strong agreement, respectively. Likewise, 8.9% and 8.5% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively whereas 7.7% respondents were neutral to the item that citizens inability to maintain a given standard of living as drives of land sector corruption in the study area. The mean score and the standard deviation were 3.86 and 1.25, respectively. Additional, the t-value for the item is 10.53 and it is significantly above the test value. In line with these Secondary sources, KIIs and FGDs indicated that citizen's inability to maintain a given standard of living was drives of land corruption in the study area. Therefore the researcher concluded that citizen's inability to maintain a given standard of living was drives of land corruption in the study area since the mean value was high.

With regard to the fourth item of Table 4.2 above, about 40.9% and 44.7% of respondents showed their agreement and strong agreement, respectively. 10.2% and 4.3% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement respectively whereas none of the respondents were neutral to the item that an underdeveloped and non-transparent land registration system as drives of land sector corruption in the study area. The mean score and the standard deviation were 4.12 and 1.11, respectively. More, the t-value for the item is 15.41 and it was significantly above the test value. During focused group discussion and interview, the respondents largely mentioned that an underdeveloped and non-transparent land registration system as drives of land corruption in the study area. Therefore, the study confirmed that an underdeveloped and non-transparent land registration system is one of the major drives of land corruption in the study area.

With regard to the fifth item of the same Table 4.2 above, about 38.3% and 37.4% of respondents showed their agreement and strong agreement respectively. Whereas 15.3% and 4.7% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively while 4.3% of the respondents were neutral to the item that inadequate land laws and procedures as drives of land corruption in the study area. The mean score and the standard deviation were 3.89 and 1.20, respectively. Further, the t-value for the item is 11.29 and it was significantly above the test value. Secondary sources and respondents from FGDs and KIIs described that inadequate land laws and procedures in the land administration sector in the study area was drives of land corruption. Therefore, the researcher concluded that an inadequate land law and procedures in the land administration sector was drives of land corruption in the study area since the mean value was high.

With regard to the sixth item of Table 4.2 above, about 33.6% and 30.2% of respondents showed that their agreement and strong agreement, respectively. While 16.6% and 9.8% of respondents indicated that their disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively whereas 29.8% of the respondents were neutral to the item that lack of punitive measures was drives of land sector corruption in the study area. The mean score and the standard deviation were 3.58 and 1.33, respectively. In addition, the t-value for the item was 6.66 and it was significantly above the test value. In addition to these secondary sources, respondents from FGDs and KIIs disclosed that lack of punitive measures were one of the major drives of land corruption in the study area. Therefore, from these the researcher inferred that an underdeveloped and non-transparent land registration system was one of the major drives of land corruption in the study area.

With reference to the seventh item of Table 4.2 above, about 39.6% and 33.2% of respondents showed that their agreement and strong agreement, respectively. Furthermore, 31.2% and 7.2% of respondents indicated that their disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively whereas 6.8% respondents were neutral to the item that unclear delineation of state and private land as drives of land administration corruption in the study area. The mean score and the standard deviation were 3.78 and 1.24, respectively. Correspondingly, the t-value for the item was 9.68 and it was significantly above the test value. Also secondary sources, respondents from FGDs and KIIs disclosed that unclear delineation of state and private land as drives of land corruption

in the study area. Therefore, the researcher can say that there was an unclear delineation of state and private land and it was taken as one of the drives of land corruption in the study area. He further concluded that unclear delineation of state and private land was drives of land corruption in the study area since the mean value were high.

Regarding in response to the eighth item in the Table 4.2 above, about 42.1% and 30.2% of respondents indicated that the level of agreement and strongly agreement respectively. Equally, 5.1% of respondent disclosed the level of neutral. The remaining 6.4% and 38(16.2%) of respondents replied the level of disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively. On the other hand, the mean score and the standard deviation were 3.64 and 1.39, respectively. This implied that the weakness of justice system was one of drives of land sector corruption in the study area since the mean value was high (see Table 4.2) above. In addition, the t-value showed that the respondents' agreement level was significantly above the test value, that is, 3. In line with these secondary sources, respondents from FGDs and KIIs disclosed that weakness of justice system was one of drives of land sector corruption in the study area. Therefore, this study can boldly infer that the weakness of justice system was one of drives of land sector corruption in the study area.

In connection with the ninth item of Table 4.2 above, about 37.4% and 28.1% of respondents showed their agreement and strong agreement, respectively. Likewise, 14.5% and 8.9% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively, whereas 11.1% respondents were neutral to the item that poor incentive in the land administration sector as drives of land administration sector corruption in the study area. The mean score and the standard deviation were 3.61 and 1.28, respectively. As well, the t-value for the item was 7.35 and it was significantly above the test value. In addition to these secondary sources, respondents from FGDs and KIIs disclosed that poor incentive in the land administration sector was one of the major drives of land corruption. Therefore; the researcher can say that poor incentive to employees in the land administration sector was drives of land corruption in the study area since the mean value was high.

At last, concerning tenth item in the Table 4.2 above, respondents were also asked to provide on the issues that whether lack of awareness about anti-corruption laws was drives of land corruption in the land administration sector of the study area or not. The results of the study in

Table 4.2 above indicated that 39.1% and 25.5% of respondents showed their agreement and strong agreement, respectively. By the same token, 20.0% and 17.7% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively, whereas 17.7% respondents were neutral to the item that lack of knowledge to the consequences of corruption was drives of land corruption in the study area. The mean score and the standard deviation were 3.55 and 1.27, respectively. Additionally, the t-value for the item was 6.60 and it was significantly above the test value. In addition to these responses from key individual interviews and FGDs conducted with purposively selected individuals were boldly disclosed that lack of knowledge was drives of land corruption in the study area. Therefore, this researcher work can say that lack of awareness about anti-corruption laws was drives of land corruption in the study area. This work also concluded that lack of knowledge was drives of land corruption in the study area since the mean value was high.

From the analysis therefore, the researcher infer that items listed on the table 4.2 above were drivers of land corruption in land administration sector of the study area. In connection with this World Bank survey (2012b) pointed out that there are a number of elements in Ethiopia's current land administration system that can create potential entry points for corrupt activities to occur. These include: lack of clear policies, weak institutions, lack of transparency, and limited public participation, and capacity challenges. These points relate to both urban and rural land (World Bank 2012b).

#### **4.2.2 Challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector in fighting urban land corruption**

The second specific objective or basic question of the research was about challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector in fighting urban land corruption. This part of analysis examined whether the items listed under Table 4.3 below were challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector in fighting urban land corruption or not.

As indicated in the Table 4.3 below house holders were requested whether the items listed were challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector or not in the study area. Accordingly, for the first item about 37.4% of respondents displayed their agreement, while 28.9% of total respondents replied strongly agree and 11.1% of them were in neutral level.

While 13.2 respondents showed their disagreement and 9.4% of the respondents were said strongly disagree on the requested issues. Moreover, the mean score and the standard deviation of the item were 3.63 and 1.28, respectively. Further, the t-value for the item was 7.58 and it was significantly above the test value. During focus group discussion and interview, the respondents said that:

*“Lack of clear objective in the sector as challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector in fighting land corruption in their area.”*

Therefore, this research could say that there was great lack of clear objective in the land administration sector of study area. It also concluded that lack of clear objective in the land administration sector of study area was challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector since the mean value was high.

**Table 4.3: Challenges of institutional arrangement of the urban land administration sector**

No	Items	SA		A		N		DA		SDA		Mean	Std. D	t-value
		F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%			
1	Lack of clear objective	68	28.9	88	37.4	26	11.1	31	13.2	22	9.4	3.63	1.28	7.58*
2	Availability of partiality.	74	31.5	81	34.5	19	8.1	43	18.3	18	7.7	3.64	1.30	7.52*
3	Transparency is vague in the institution.	69	29.4	87	37.0	13	5.5	38	16.2	28	11.9	3.56	1.37	6.23*
4	Employee’s readiness is in adequate to be against corruption	91	38.7	83	35.3	16	6.8	25	10.6	20	8.5	3.85	1.28	10.21*
5	Lack Of good governance within the institution	101	43.0	90	38.3	8	3.4	19	8.1	17	7.2	4.02	1.20	12.97*
6	Conflicts arise during sharing of incentives.	54	23.0	70	29.8	46	19.6	39	16.6	26	11.1	3.37	1.30	4.36*
7	Lack of common understanding towards the goal of institution.	70	29.8	84	35.7	26	11.1	23	9.8	32	13.6	3.58	1.36	6.55*
8	No incentives have been experienced for better performances of the workers.	61	26.0	74	31.5	20	8.5	47	20.0	33	14.0	3.35	1.41	3.83*
9	Lack of regular follow up of performance	80	34.0	69	29.4	27	11.5	38	16.2	21	8.9	3.62	1.33	7.29*
10	There is no norms of the institution in which performers are responsible and accountable on their duty.	53	22.6	99	42.1	18	7.7	31	13.2	34	14.5	3.45	1.36	5.10*
11	Sense of guilt feeling when missing incentives and peaceful when reciprocity is maintained.	71	30.2	86	36.6	21	8.9	40	17.0	17	7.2	3.66	1.27	7.91*

Source: Own formulation (2018)

With regard to the second item of the Table 4.3 above, about 34.5% and 31.5% of respondents showed their agreement and strong agreement, respectively. Also, 18.3% and 7.7% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively whereas 8.1% respondents were neutral to the item that availability of partiality in the land administration sector as challenges of institutional arrangement in fighting land corruption in the study area. The mean score and the standard deviation were 3.64 and 1.30, respectively. Likewise, the t-value for the item was 7.52 and it was significantly above the test value. Secondary sources and respondents from FGDs and KIIs were boldly mentioned that:

*“Partiality in the land administration sector as challenges of institutional arrangement in fighting urban land corruption in the study area.”*

Therefore, the researcher could say that partiality in the land administration sector was one of the challenges of institutional arrangement in fighting land corruption in the study area. He concluded that partiality in the land administration sector was a challenge of institutional arrangement in fighting land corruption in the study area since the mean value was high.

Concerning the third item of the Table 4.3 above, about 37% and 29.4% of respondents showed their agreement and strong agreement, respectively. As well, 16.2% and 11.9% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively whereas 5.5% respondents were neutral to the item that vagueness of transparency in the land administration sector as challenges of institutional arrangement of the study area. The mean score and the standard deviation were 3.56 and 1.37, respectively. Additionally, the t-value for the item was 6.23 and it was significantly above the test value. Also secondary sources and respondents from FGDs and KIIs were boldly mentioned that:

*“Vagueness of transparency in the land administration sector was challenges of institutional arrangement of the study area.”*

Therefore, this research work could state that vagueness of transparency in the land administration sector was challenges of institutional arrangement of the study area. Thus, it concluded that vagueness of transparency in the land administration sector was challenges of institutional

arrangement in fighting land corruption of the study area since the mean value was high as seen on the table 4.3 above.

With regard to the fourth item of the Table 4.3 above, 35.3% and 38.7% of respondents showed their agreement and strong agreement respectively. Furthermore, 10.6% and 8.5% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement respectively whereas 6.8% respondents were neutral to the item that employee's readiness is inadequate to be against corruption in the study area. The mean score and the standard deviation were 3.85 and 1.28, respectively. Moreover, the t-value for the item was 10.21 and it was significantly above the test value. During focused group discussion and interview, the respondents boldly described that:

*“Inadequate readiness of employees of the land administration sector to be against land corruption was one of the challenges of institutional arrangement of the study area.”*

Therefore, this study work could speak that employee's readiness was inadequate to be against corruption in the study area. It also concluded that inadequate readiness of employees of the land administration sector to be against corruption was challenges of institutional arrangement of the study area in fighting land corruption since the mean value was high.

With regard to the fifth item of the Table 4.3 above, 38.3% and 43.0% of respondents showed their agreement and strong agreement respectively. Also, 8.1% and 7.2% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement respectively whereas 3.4% of the respondents were neutral to the item that lack of good governance within the institution was challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector of the study area in fight against land corruption. The mean score and the standard deviation were 4.02 and 1.20, respectively. Likewise, the t-value for the item was 12.97 and it was significantly above the test value. In the focused group discussion and interview, the respondents described that:

*“Lack of good governance within the institution was challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector of the study area in the fight against land corruption.”*

Therefore, the researcher could pronounce that lack of good governance within the institution was challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector of the study area in the fight against land corruption since the mean value was high.

With regard to the sixth item of the same Table 4.3 above, about 29.8% and 23.0% of respondents showed their agreement and strong agreement respectively. As well, 16.6% and 11.1% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement; respectively whereas 19.6% of the respondents were neutral to the item that conflicts arise during sharing of incentives was a challenge of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector of the study area in the fight against land corruption. The mean score and the standard deviation were 3.37 and 1.30, respectively. Moreover, the t-value for the item was 4.36 and it was significantly above the test value. In addition to these secondary sources and results from KIIs and FGDs mentioned that:

*“Sharing of incentives was challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector of the study area.”*

Therefore, this study could say that conflicts arise during sharing of incentives was challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector of the study area in the fight against land corruption. It also concluded that conflicts arise during sharing of incentives was challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector of the study area in the fight against land corruption since the mean value was high.

With respect to the seventh item of the Table 4.3 above, about 35.7% and 29.8% of respondents showed their agreement and strongly agreement, respectively. Equally, 9.8% and 13.6% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively whereas 11.1% respondents were neutral to the item that lack of common understanding towards the goal of institution. The mean score and the standard deviation were 3.58 and 1.36, respectively. The same, the t-value for the item was 6.55 and it was significantly above the test value. Therefore, the researcher could be stated that lack of common understanding towards the goal of institution was a challenge of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector of the study area in the fight against land corruption. The researcher also concluded that lack of common understanding towards the goal of institution was a challenge of institutional

arrangement of the land administration sector of the study area in the fight against urban land corruption since the mean value was high as observed in Table 4.3 above.

Regarding in response of the eighth item in the table 4.3above, this item requested the respondents to provide response on lack of incentives for better performances of the workers. In this sense, about 31.5% and 26% of respondents indicated the level of agreement and strongly agreement, respectively. About 8.5% of respondent disclosed the level of neutral. The remaining 20% and 14% of respondents replied the level of disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively. On the other hand, the mean score and the standard deviation were 3.35 and 1.41, respectively. This implied that lack incentives for better performances of the workers of the land administration sector of the study area. In addition, the t-value showed that the respondents' agreement level was significantly above the test value, that is, 3. Therefore, we could be deduced that the absence of incentives for better performances of the workers of the land administration sector of the study area was one of the challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector of the study area in the fight against land corruption since the mean value was high.

With regard to the ninth item of Table 4.3 above, about 29.4% and 34.0% of respondents showed their agreement and strong agreement respectively. Also, 16.2% and 8.9% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively; whereas 11.5% of respondents were neutral to the item that lack of regular follow up of performance. The mean score and the standard deviation were 3.62 and 1.33, respectively. Similarly, the t-value for the item is 7.29 and it was significantly above the test value. In addition to these secondary sources and results from KIIs and FGDs boldly mentioned that:

*“Lack of regular follow up of performance was a challenge of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector of the study area.”*

Therefore, this study could say that lack of regular follow up of performance was a challenge of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector of the study area .It also concluded that lack of regular follow up of performance was a challenge of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector of the study area in the fight against land corruption since the mean value was high as seen Table 4.3 above.

Regarding the response of the tenth item in the Table 4.3 above, this item raised that whether there is norms of the institution in which performers are responsible and accountable on their duty or not. About 42.1% and 22.6% of respondents indicated the level of agreement and strongly agreement respectively. Furthermore, 7.7% of respondent disclosed the level of neutral. The remaining 13.2% and 14.5% of respondents replied the level of disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively. On the other hand, the mean score and the standard deviation were 3.45 and 1.36, respectively. This meant that there were no norms of the institution in which performers were responsible and accountable on their duty in the land administration sector of the study area. In addition, the t-value showed that the respondents' agreement level was significantly above the test value, that is, 3. Also secondary sources and results from KIIs and FGDs boldly mentioned that:

*“There was absence of norms in which performers was responsible and accountable on their duty in the land sector of the study area.”*

Therefore, the researcher could boldly infer that there was absence of norms in which performers was responsible and accountable on their duty in the land administration sector of the study area. This was one of the challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector of the study area in the fight against land corruption since the mean value was high as indicated in Table 4.3 above.

Finally, concerning the eleventh item in the same Table 4.3 above, respondents were also asked to provide information on the issues that whether sense of guilt feeling when missing incentives and peaceful when reciprocity is maintained was challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector of the study area or not. The results of the study in Table 4.3 above indicated that 36.6% and 30.2% of respondents showed their agreement and strong agreement, respectively. Besides, 17% and 7.2% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement respectively, whereas 8.9% of respondents were neutral to the item that sense of guilt feeling when missing incentives and peaceful when reciprocity was maintained. The mean score and the standard deviation were 3.66 and 1.27, respectively. Additionally, the t-value for the item was 7.91 and it is significantly above the test value. In addition secondary sources and responses from KIIs and FGDs disclosed that:

*“Sense of guilt feeling when missing incentives and peaceful when reciprocity was maintained was one of the challenges of land administration sector in fighting land corruption in the study area.”*

Therefore, this study work could be stated that sense of guilt feeling when missing incentives and peaceful when reciprocity was maintained and it was taken as one of the challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector of the study area. It also inferred that sense of guilt feeling when missing incentives and peaceful when reciprocity is maintained was challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector of the study area in the fight against land corruption since the mean value was high.

From the analysis therefore, the researcher infer that items listed on the table 4.3 above were challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector of the study area in the fight against urban land corruption. In connection with this Transparency International (2009) pointed out that experts agree that when land governance is weak, the powerful are able to dominate the competition for scarce land resources. In an extreme form, urban land corruption can occur on a grand scale through “state capture”. State capture refers to “a situation where powerful individuals, institutions, companies or groups within or outside a country use corruption to shape a nation’s policies, legal environment and economy to benefit their own private interests” (Transparency International 2009).

#### **4.2.3 Consequences of urban land corruption inland administration sector**

This section dealt with the items related to the consequences of urban land corruption in land administration sector of the study area. As indicated in the Table 4.4 below respondents were requested whether the items listed were consequences of land corruption or not in the study area. Accordingly, for the first item, among total respondents about 35.7% of respondents displayed their agreement, whereas, 29.8% strongly agree and 8.5% were in neutral level. While 15.3% respondents showed their disagreement and 10.6% strongly disagree on the requested issues. Moreover, the mean score and the standard deviation of the item were 3.59 and 1.34, respectively. More to the point, the t-value for the item was 6.73 and it was significantly above the test value. In addition to that secondary sources, KIIs and FGDs boldly displayed that:

*“Failing to keep the interest of society was consequences of land administration sector corruption in their area.”*

Therefore, this study could say that there was great failing to keep the interest of society in the study areas. It also concluded that failing to keep the interest of society was consequences of land administration sector corruption in their area since the mean value was high.

With regard to the second item of the Table 4.4 below, about 37.0% and 29.4% of respondents showed their strong agreement and agreement, respectively. While 13.6% and 14.9% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement respectively and 5.1% respondents were neutral to the item that illegal transfer of land as consequences of land corruption in their area. The mean score and the standard deviation were 3.52 and 1.42, respectively. As well, the t-value for the item was 5.66 and it was significantly above the test value. Secondary sources, results from focused group discussion and KIIS mentioned that:“illegal transfer of land as consequences of land corruption in their area.” Therefore, we can say that illegal transfer of land was consequences of land corruption in the study area since the mean value was high.

**Table 4.4: Consequences of urban land corruption**

No	Items	SA		A		N		DA		SDA		Mean	Std.D	t-value
		F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%			
1	Failing to keep the interest of society.	70	29.8	84	35.7	20	8.5	36	15.3	25	10.6	3.59	1.34	6.73*
2	Illegal transfer of land.	69	29.4	87	37.0	12	5.1	32	13.6	35	14.9	3.52	1.42	5.66*
3	Illegally taking advantage of state projects.	68	28.9	90	38.3	20	8.5	20	8.5	37	15.7	3.56	1.40	6.17*
4	Undermining the poor's access to justice.	62	26.4	70	29.8	10	4.3	59	25.1	34	14.5	3.29	1.45	3.01*
5	Affect the on-going poverty reduction and development program.	92	39.1	105	44.7	8	3.4	20	8.5	10	4.3	4.10	1.07	15.15*
6	Lack of quality in services.	82	34.9	78	33.2	15	6.4	39	16.6	21	8.9	3.69	1.34	7.85*
7	Lack of faith and trust on the government.	91	38.7	80	34.0	16	6.8	17	7.2	31	13.2	3.79	1.38	8.68*
8	Disregard for officials.	70	29.8	69	29.4	26	11.1	41	17.4	29	12.3	3.47	1.39	5.15*
9	Illegal land use certificate granting.	84	35.7	68	28.9	21	8.9	36	15.3	26	11.1	3.63	1.39	6.96*
10	Inadequate land compensation.	60	25.5	114	48.5	29	12.3	11	4.7	21	8.9	3.77	1.15	10.27*
11	Displacement of citizens	71	30.2	83	35.3	20	8.5	29	12.3	32	13.6	3.56	1.39	6.21*

Source: Own formulation (2018)

Regarding the third item of the Table 4.4 above, about 38.3% and 28.9% of respondents showed their agreement and strong agreement respectively. Further, 8.5% and 15.7% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively whereas 8.5% respondents were neutral to the item that illegally taking advantage of state projects. The mean score and the standard deviation were 3.56 and 1.40, respectively. Besides, the t-value for the item was 6.17 and it was significantly above the test value. In addition to these secondary sources, KIIs and FGDs boldly displayed that:“illegally taking advantage of state projects were consequences of land corruption in the study.” Therefore, this researcher work said that illegally taking

advantage of state projects were consequences of land corruption in the study. It also concluded that illegally taking advantage of state projects were consequences of land corruption in the study since the mean value was high.

With regard to the fourth item of the Table 4.4 above, about 29.8% and 26.4% of respondents showed their agreement and strong agreement, respectively. Moreover, 25.1% and 14.5% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement respectively whereas 4.3% of the respondents were neutral to the item that undermining the poor's access to justice. As it was indicated in the table, the mean score and the standard deviation were 3.29 and 1.45, respectively. Also, the t-value for the item was 3.01 and it was significantly above the test value. Secondary sources and responses from focused group discussion and interviews boldly mentioned that: "undermining the poor's access to justice was the consequences of land corruption in the study area." Therefore, the researcher could be highlighted that undermining the poor's access to justice was the consequences of land corruption in the study area. He also concluded that undermining the poor's access to justice was the consequences of land corruption in the study area since the mean value was high.

With regard to the fifth item of the same Table 4.4 above, about 44.7% and 39.1% of respondents showed their agreement and strong agreement, respectively. Furthermore, 8.5% and 4.3% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively whereas 3.4% of the respondents were neutral to the item that affecting the on-going poverty reduction and development program. The mean score and the standard deviation were 4.10 and 1.07, respectively. Additionally, the t-value for the item was 15.15 and it was significantly above the test value. In the FGDs and interviews, the respondents described that:

*"Affecting the on-going poverty reduction and development program was the consequences of land corruption in the study."*

Therefore, the researcher could say that affecting the on-going poverty reduction and development program was consequences of land corruption since the mean value was high.

With regard to the sixth item of the same table 4.4 above, about 33.2% and 34.9% of respondents showed their agreement and strong agreement respectively. Also, 16.6% and 8.9% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement respectively whereas 6.4% of the

respondents were neutral to the item that lack of quality in services was consequences of land corruption in the study. The mean score and the standard deviation were 3.69 and 1.34 respectively. Further, the t-value for the item was 7.85 and it was significantly above the test value. Therefore, this research work could articulate that lack of quality in services were consequences of land corruption in the study area. It also approved that lack of quality in services were consequences of land corruption in the study area since the mean value was high.

With respect to the seventh item of the same table 4.4 above, about 34.0% and 38.7% of respondents showed their agreement and strong agreement, respectively. Plus, 7.2% and 13.2% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively whereas 6.8% respondents were neutral to the item that whether lack of faith and trust on the government was consequences of land corruption or not in the study area. The mean score and the standard deviation were 3.79 and 1.38 respectively. Further, the t-value for the item was 8.68 and it was significantly above the test value. Therefore, the researcher stated that lack of faith and trust on the government was consequences of land corruption in the study area. He also concluded that lack of faith and trust on the government was consequences of land corruption in the study area since the mean value was high.

On the subject of the eighth item in the Table 4.4 above, respondents were requested to rate their opinion level on the disregard for officials as consequences of land corruption in the study area or not. In view of that, about 29.4% and 29.8% of respondents indicated the level of agreement and strongly agreement, respectively. About 11.1% of respondent disclosed the level of neutral. The remaining 17.4% and 12.3% of respondents replied the level of disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively. Then again, the mean score and the standard deviation were 3.47 and 1.39, respectively. This meant that disregard for officials were consequences of land corruption in the study area. In addition, the t-value showed that the respondents' agreement level was significantly above the test value, that is, 3. Therefore, the researcher could boldly infer that disregard for officials were consequences of land corruption in the land administration sector of the study area.

On the topic of the ninth item in Table 4.4 above, about 28.9% and 35.7% of respondents showed their agreement and strong agreement, respectively. In addition, 15.3% and 11.1% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively, whereas 8.9% respondents were neutral to the item that illegal land use certificate granting as consequences of land corruption in the study area. The mean score and the standard deviation were 3.63 and 1.39, respectively. Also, the t-value for the item was 6.96 and it was significantly above the test value. In addition to these secondary sources and results from key individual interviews and FGDs mentioned that: "illegal land use certificate granting was consequences of land corruption in the study area." Therefore, this study stated that an illegal land use certificate granting was consequences of land corruption in the study area. It also asserted that an illegal land use certificate granting was consequences of land corruption in the study area since the mean value was high.

The tenth item in the Table 4.4 raised that inadequate land compensation as consequences of land sector corruption in the study area or not. Accordingly, 48.5% and 25.5% of respondents indicated the level of agreement and strongly agreement, respectively. Also, about 12.3% of respondent disclosed the level of neutral. The remaining 4.7% and 8.9% of respondents replied the level of disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively. Conversely, the mean score and the standard deviation were 3.77 and 1.15, respectively. This implied that inadequate land compensation was consequences of land corruption in the study area. In addition, the t-value showed that the respondents' agreement level was significantly above the test value, that is, 3. From these, this study inferred that inadequate land compensation was consequences of land corruption in the study area since the mean value was high as seen in Table 4.4 above.

Lastly, concerning eleventh item in Table 4.4 above, respondents were also asked to provide opinion on the issues that whether displacement of citizens was consequences of land corruption in the study area or not. The results of the study in Table 4.4 above indicated that 35.3% and 30.2% of respondents showed their agreement and strong agreement, respectively. Moreover, about 12.3% and 13.6% of respondents indicated their disagreement and strongly disagreement, respectively; whereas 8.5% respondents were neutral to the item that displacement of citizens was consequences of land corruption in the study area. The mean score and the standard deviation were 3.56 and 1.39, respectively. Besides, the t-value for the item was 6.21 and it was

significantly above the test value. In addition to these secondary sources and responses from key individual interviews and FGDs conducted with purposively selected individuals were boldly disclosed that: “displacement of citizens was consequences of land corruption in the study area.” From these, this research could say that displacement of citizens was consequences of land corruption in the study area. It also concluded that displacement of citizens was consequences of land corruption in the study area since the mean value was high.

From the analysis therefore, the researcher infer that items listed on the able 4.4 above were consequences of land corruption in the study area. In connection with this UN survey (2007) pointed out that corrupt public officials fail to keep the interest of society in mind when taking decision, leading to a loss of public support for democratic institutions. In such situations, people become discouraged from exercising their civil and political rights and from demanding that these rights be respected. In countries where corruption is pervasive in the administration of justice, the implementation of a country’s laws as well as efforts to reform them are impeded by corrupt judges, lawyers, prosecutors, police officers, investigators and auditors. Such practices compromise the right to equality before the law and the right to a fair trial. They especially undermine the poor’s access to justice, because they cannot afford to offer or promise bribes. Importantly, corruption contributes to a culture of impunity, since illegal actions are not consistently punished and laws are not consistently upheld (UN, 2007).

#### **4.2.4 Ways of community participation in fighting urban land corruption in land administration sector**

This section displayed information about ways of community participation in fighting urban land corruption in land administration sector of the study area. Each item is analyzed based on the data obtained through questionnaires responded by households of purposively selected kebeles and further backed by the data obtained from KIIs, FGDs and secondary data sources.

In response of the first item of Table 4.5 below, 45.1% and 34.0% respondents strongly disagree and disagree, respectively. While 6.4% and 5.1% respondents showed their agreement and strongly agreement, respectively and 9.4% respondents were neutral to the item giving information secretly about corrupt practices to the anti-corruption officers of land sector. Therefore, the level of the respondents in the study area disclosed that the majority of the

respondents were not agreed. Moreover, the mean score and the standard deviation were 1.92 and 1.12, respectively. In addition, the t-value showed that the respondents' agreement level was significantly below the test value, that is, 3. In line with this secondary sources and FGD conducted with purposively selected individuals disclosed that:

*“There was lack of strong support from the concerned bodies to the community in order to participate actively to minimize the corrupt practice in the land sector of the study area by giving information secretly about corrupt practices to the anti-corruption officers of land sector.”*

Therefore, the researcher could boldly infer that the respondents were not actively participated by giving information secretly to concerned bodies.

**Table 4.5: Ways of community participation in fighting urban land corruption**

No	To minimize land corruption, I participated by:	SA		A		N		DA		SDA		Mean	Std. D	t-value
		F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%			
1	Giving information secretly about corrupt practices to the anti-corruption officers of land sector.	12	5.1	15	6.4	22	9.4	80	34.0	106	45.1	1.92	1.12	-14.71*
2	Coaching so as to minimize the corrupt practice.	17	7.2	28	11.9	49	20.9	80	34.0	61	26.0	2.40	1.20	-7.62*
3	Giving priorities to common goods rather than private.	28	11.9	27	11.5	20	8.5	98	41.7	62	26.4	2.41	1.31	-6.91*
4	Participating in anti-corruption public meetings	27	11.5	31	13.2	5	2.1	102	43.4	70	29.8	2.33	1.33	-7.68*
5	requesting public officials to guarantee transparency	21	8.9	13	5.5	36	15.3	80	34.0	85	36.2	2.17	1.23	-10.33*
6	Requesting for decentralizing government power	19	8.1	23	9.8	21	8.9	89	37.9	83	35.3	2.18	1.24	-10.21*
7	Feeling a sense of ownership	21	8.9	32	13.6	12	5.1	105	44.7	65	27.7	2.32	1.26	-8.34*
8	Taking an active role in planning implementing and monitoring projects that affect community development.	12	5.1	22	9.4	38	16.2	93	39.6	70	29.8	2.20	1.12	-10.88*
9	Revealing corrupt activities by officials	18	7.7	26	11.1	16	6.8	102	43.4	73	31.1	2.21	1.21	-10.00*
10	Requesting for the prevalence of rule of law	16	6.8	24	10.2	42	17.9	91	38.7	62	26.4	2.32	1.17	-8.88*

Note: SA= strongly agree, A=Agree, N=Neutral, D=Disagree and SD=strongly disagree  
Std.D=Standard deviations, \* Significant at the level of disagreement

**Source:** Own formulation (2018)

With regard to the second item above coaching so as to minimize the corrupt practice of the same Table 4.5 above, 26.0% and 34.2% of respondents showed their strong disagreement and disagreement, respectively. About 11.9% and 7.2% of respondents indicated their agreement and strongly agreement, respectively whereas 29.9% respondents were neutral to the item, by coaching so as to minimize the corrupt practice. The mean score and the standard deviation were 2.40 and 1.20, respectively. This showed that the respondents were not participated in this way to minimize the corrupt practice in the land sector. Therefore, from this figure the researcher concluded that the level of respondents participation to minimize land sector corruption by coaching so as to minimize the corrupt practice in the study area was low since the mean value is in between 1.8-2.6 (see table 4.3) above. In addition, the t-value showed that the respondents' agreement level is significantly below the test value, that is, 3. Also secondary sources and results from FGDs and KIIs disclosed that:

*“The community’s participation by coaching so as to minimize the corrupt practice in land sector was insufficient.”*

Therefore, the researcher could infer that the respondents were not participated by coaching so as to minimize the land sector corrupt practice in the study area.

From the same Table 4.5 in response of the third item giving priorities to common goods rather than private the respondents were asked whether they were participated in fighting land corruption by this way or not. As the response of respondents indicated that 26.4% of respondents were rated as strongly disagree, 41.7% of respondents were rated as disagree, 8.5% of respondents were rated as neutral, 11.5% of participants were rated as agree and 11.9% of the respondents has rating for strongly agree. The mean score and the standard deviation indicated that 2.41 and 1.31, respectively. Therefore, from this figure the researcher infer that the level of the respondents participation in fighting corruption in land administration sector by giving priorities to common goods rather than private was low in the study area since the mean value is below 2.6 (see table 3). Moreover, the t-value shows that the respondents' agreement level is significantly below the test value, i.e., 3. In addition secondary sources and results from FGDs and KIIs indicated that:

*“The community was not boldly participated by giving priorities to common goods rather than private.”*

Thus, the researcher could deduce that the respondents were not actively participated by giving priorities to common goods rather than private in the study area.

Moreover, the results of the above table 4.5, in response of the fourth item showed that majority of the respondents strongly disagree on the item that whether they actively participated in fighting corruption in land administration sector by participating in anti-corruption public meetings 29.8% while 43.4% disagree, 2.1% respondents were neutral, 13.2% agree and 11.5% of the respondents strongly agree. The overall mean score and standard deviation were (M= 2.33 SD= 1.33). Therefore, one can conclude that the respondents were not participated by this way to minimize the corrupt practice in the land sector. Thus from this figure the researcher concluded that the level of respondents participation to minimize land sector corruption by participating in anti-corruption public meetings in the study area was low since the mean value is in between 1.8-2.6. In addition, the t-value revealed that the respondents' agreement level is significantly below the test value, that is, 3. In line with this secondary sources and KIIs and FGDs conducted with purposively selected individuals disclosed that: "the community's participation in anti-corruption public meetings was not sufficient." Therefore, the researcher could infer that the respondents were not actively participated in anti-corruption public meetings in the study area.

With regard to the fifth item of the same table 4.5 above 27.7% and 29.8% of respondents showed their strong disagreement and disagreement respectively. Whereas 9.8% and 17.4% of respondents indicated there, agreement and strongly agreement respectively, whereas 15.3%, respondents were neutral by their response to the item whether they were participated in fighting land corruption by requesting public officials to guarantee transparency or not. The mean score and the standard deviation were 2.17 and 1.23, respectively. This shows that the community was not boldly participated in this way to minimize the corrupt practice in the land sector. Therefore, from this figure the researcher infers that the level of the respondent's participation in fighting corruption in land administration sector by requesting public officials to guarantee transparency was low in the study area since the mean value is below 2.6. Moreover, the t-value shows that the respondents' agreement level is significantly below the test value, that is, 3. Therefore, the researcher could boldly infer that the respondents were not actively participated by requesting public officials to insure transparency in the study area.

In response of the sixth item of table 4.5 above, 26.8% and 29.4% respondents strongly disagree and disagree respectively. While 18.3% and 16.6% respondents showed their agreement and strongly agreement respectively and 8.9% respondents moderately agree. Therefore, the level of the respondents in the study area disclosed that the majority of the respondents were not agreed. Moreover, the mean score and the standard deviation were 2.18 and 1.24, respectively. Therefore, from this figure the researcher inferred that the majority of the respondents were not actively participated in fighting corruption in land administration sector by requesting for decentralizing government power in the study area since the mean value is in between 1.8-2.6 as seen in above table. Moreover, the t-value shows that the respondents' agreement level is significantly below the test value, that is, 3. Therefore, the researcher concluded that the respondents were not actively participated in fighting land corruption by requesting for decentralizing government power in the study area.

From the same Table 4.5, in response of the seventh item the respondents were asked whether they actively participated in fighting corruption in land sector by feeling a sense of ownership. The respondents replied that 27.7% of respondents were rated as strongly disagree, 44.7% of respondents were rated as disagree, 5.1% of respondents were rated as neutral, 13.6% of participants were rated as agree and 8.9% of the respondents has rating for strongly agree. The mean score and the standard deviation indicated that 2.32 and 1.26, respectively. In line with this secondary sources and KIIs and FGDs conducted with purposively selected individuals disclosed that: "the community's was not confidently feeling a sense of ownership." Moreover, the results of the above Table 4.5, in response of the eighth item showed that majority of the respondents, 29.8% strongly disagree on the item that whether they actively participated in fighting corruption in land administration sector by taking an active role in planning, implementing and monitoring projects that affect community development, while 39.6% disagree, 16.2% neutral, 9.4% agree and 5.1% of the respondents were strongly agree. The overall mean score and standard deviation were (M= 2.20, SD= 1.12). Therefore, one can conclude that by this way the community was not participated boldly to minimize the corrupt practice in the land sector in the study area since the mean value is below 2.6. Moreover, the t-value showed that the respondents' agreement level was significantly below the test value, that is, 3 to the items seven and eight respectively. In

addition secondary sources, KIIs and FGDs conducted with purposively selected individuals disclosed that:

*“The community’s was not actively participated in planning, implementing and monitoring projects that affect community development.”*

Thus, the researcher could boldly infer that the respondents were not actively participating by feeling a sense of ownership and by taking an active role in planning, implementing and monitoring projects that affect community development in the study area.

Regarding in response of the ninth item in the table 4.5, above in the item that whether the respondents actively play their role by revealing corrupt activities by official, about 31.1% and 43.4% of respondents indicated the level of strongly disagreement and disagreement, respectively. About 6.8% of respondent disclosed the level of neutral. The remaining 11.1% and 7.7% of respondents replied the level of agreement and strong agreement, respectively. On the other hand, the mean score and the standard deviation were 2.21 and 1.21, respectively. This implied that the respondents were not playing actively their role to minimize the corrupt practice in the land sector by revealing corrupt activities by officials in the study area since the mean value is in between 1.8-2.6 as indicated in Table 4.3 above. In addition, the t-value shows that the respondents’ agreement level is significantly below the test value, that is, 3. Therefore, this study could boldly infer that the respondents were not actively participated in fighting land corruption by revealing corrupt activities by officials in the study area.

Finally, of the tenth item respondents were also asked to provide on the issues that whether they were actively played their role by requesting for the prevalence of rule of law or not. The results of the study in Table 4.5 above indicated that 26.4%, of respondents strongly disagree and 38.7% of participants disagree for the item that whether they were participated in fighting land corruption by requesting for the prevalence of rule of law or nt. Of the total respondents 17.9% neutral whilst 10.2% agree and 6.8% of the participants strongly agree for the item that whether they were actively play their role by requesting for the prevalence of rule of law or not. The overall mean score and standard deviation of the item were (M= 2.32SD= 1.17). In addition, the t-value showed that the respondents’ agreement level is significantly below the test value, i.e., 3.

In line with these secondary sources, KIIs and FGDs conducted with purposively selected individuals disclosed that:

*“The community’s was not confidently played their role by requesting for the prevalence of rule of law.”*

Thus, it could be generalized that the respondents were not encouraged in fighting land corruption by requesting for the prevalence of rule of law in the study area.

From the analysis therefore, the researcher inferred that communities were inefficient in fighting land corruption in land administration sector. In connection with this man-wai(2006) pointed out that in discussing about the corruption phenomenon, what constitutes anti-corruption strategies varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the strategies are understood as approaches or measures which are initiated mostly by the government in-conjunction with other stakeholders to curb corruption. They mostly encompass an aspect of; prevention, investigation, enforcement, prosecution of the corrupt offenders, community or civic education. They also include international cooperation, institutional capacity building, improvement on the national integrity institutions and formulating of enabling legal framework to fight and reduce corruption (man-wai, 2006:41).

## CHAPTER FIVE

### 5. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter had three sub sections. Section one dealt with summary of major findings of the study and followed by providing conclusion of the study. Finally, the presentation of this chapter ended up with forwarding important recommendations to minimize the problem of urban land corruption in land administration sector of the study area.

#### **5.1. Summary of major finding of the study**

This study aimed at examining the role of community participation in fighting urban land corruption in land administration sector in GamoGofa Zone Arba Minch Town Administration. Accordingly, the study investigated: drivers of urban land corruption in land administration sector, challenges of institutional arrangement of the land administration sector in fighting urban land corruption, the ways of community participation in fighting urban land corruption in land administration sector of the study area and consequences of urban land corruption in land administration sector of the study area. To address these issues, this study used both qualitative and quantitative data collection instruments. Furthermore, the data were analysed using both descriptive and inferential statistics.

The study found that:regarding drivers of land corruption: absence of land records, greediness of officials and lack of public concern, inability to maintain a given standard of living, an underdeveloped and non-transparent land registration system, inadequate land laws and procedures, lack of punitive measures, unclear delineation of state and private land, the weakness of justice system, poor incentive to employees and lack of awareness about anti-corruption laws were identified. Concerning challenges of institutional arrangement of land administration sector in fighting land corruption: lack of clear objective, availability of partiality, vagueness of transparency in the institution, inadequate employees readiness to be against corruption, lack of good governance within the institution, conflicts arise during sharing of incentives, lack of common understanding towards the goal of institution, lack incentives for better performances of the workers, lack of regular follow up of performance, absence of norms of the institution in which performers were responsible and accountable on their duty, sense of guilt feeling when missing incentives and peaceful when reciprocity is maintained were identified. Regarding

consequences of land administration sector corruption: failing to keep the interest of society, illegal transfer of land, illegally taking advantage of state projects, undermining the poor's access to justice, affection of the on-going poverty reduction and development program, lack of quality in services, disregard for officials, illegal land use certificate granting, inadequate land compensation, displacement of citizens were identified. Finally, concerning ways of community participation the community was not effectively participated in fighting land corruption in land administration sector in the study area.

## **5.2 CONCLUSIONS**

The findings clearly revealed: absence of land records, greediness of officials and lack of public concern, inability to maintain a given standard of living, an underdeveloped and non-transparent land registration system, inadequate land laws and procedures, lack of punitive measures, unclear delineation of state and private land, the weakness of justice system, poor incentive to employees and lack of awareness about anti-corruption laws as drivers of land corruption in the study area. Concerning challenges of institutional arrangement: lack of clear objective, availability of partiality, vagueness of transparency in the institution, inadequate employees readiness to be against corruption, lack of good governance within the institution, conflicts during sharing of incentives, lack of common understanding towards the goal of institution, lack of incentives for better performances of the workers, lack of regular follow up of performance, absence of norms of the institution in which performers are responsible and accountable on their duty, sense of guilt feeling when missing incentives and peaceful when reciprocity was maintained were identified as challenges of institutional arrangement of land sector of the study area.

Regarding consequences of land corruption: failing to keep the interest of society, illegal transfer of land, illegally taking advantage of state projects, undermining the poor's access to justice, affection of the on-going poverty reduction and development program, lack of quality in services, disregard for officials, illegal land use certificate granting, inadequate land compensation, displacement of citizens were identified as consequences of land corruption in the study area. Finally concerning ways of community participation the community was not effectively participated in fighting urban land corruption in land administration sector of the study area. Because of these incidences urban land corruption in the town administration of the study area was not significantly reduced.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

Based on the results of the analysis, the following recommendations were given to Arba Minch town administration and land administration sector of the town which are helpful in their fight against land corruption and service delivery in order to reduce urban land corruption and to increase customers/ public satisfaction.

1. In order to reduce the extent of drivers of land corruption identified in this study Arba Minch town land administration sector shall work hard in collaboration with Arba Minch town Municipality anti- corruption office.
2. The SNNPRS should reshape the organizational structure of land sector administration by giving full power to town administration in order to take immediate action on reducing the challenges of institutional arrangements that hinders the fight against urban land corruption in the study area.
3. Arba Minch town administration and land administration sector of the town should work hard in order to minimize consequences of land corruption in the study area.
4. The analysis of ways of community participation in fighting urban land corruption implies that the community in the study area was not effectively participated in fighting land corruption. In order to improve community participation in fighting urban land corruption collaborative efforts of Arba Minch town administration and Arba Minch town Municipality anti- corruption office is critical. In every activity that should help to disseminate ethics and anticorruption education progressively among the members of community to promote zero-tolerance on urban land corruption.
5. More than all, communities of the study area ,they should need to bring their efforts together, so that they could question for unfairness or lack of good governance in leadership positions, in land administration sectors and elsewhere social service hierarchies. For this effort, they need to build themselves with education so that they can have all the needed knowledge, skills and attitudes. Because no society should tolerate those who are not capable to withstand challenges with mindful analysis. Moreover, to this effort, Arba Minch town anti-corruption office could play a significant role.
6. Finally, to widen the perspective of communities at large towards the need of fighting urban land corruption, further studies need to be undertaken in the study area.

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## **Appendix I: English version of Questionnaires for Householders**

**HAWASSA UNIVERSITY**

**COLLEGE OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE**

**SCHOOL OF GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES**

GENERAL DIRECTION: This questionnaire is prepared to collect data that will be used for writing my master's thesis as partial fulfillment of the graduate studies in the Hawassa University regarding "The Role of Community participation in fighting urban land Corruption: The Case of ArbaMinch Town in GamoGofa Zone SNNPRS." The final paper that will be written based on the information you have provided is intended to serve for research and development purpose. Therefore, you are kindly requested to provide accurate information as much as possible. I confirm you that all data will be treated confidentially and only aggregated and average information will be published.

**Thank you in advance for your Kind cooperation!!!**

### **PART I: BACKGROUND DATA**

Please answer the following questions by providing the appropriate response by putting an "X" where needed.

1. Sex: 1. Male  2. Female

2. Age: 1. 18-35  2. 36-49  3. 50 and above

3. Educational Qualification: 1. Uneducated (illiterate)  2. Primary (grade 1-8)  3. Secondary (grade 9-12)  4. Diploma or TVET  5. Degree  6. Masters and above

4. Religion: 1. Orthodox  2. Protestant  3. Islam  4. Catholic  5. Other.....

5. Marital status: 1. Unmarried  2. Married  3. Divorce  4. Widow

6. Kebele you live: 1. Edigetber  2. Gurba  3. Kulfo

7. House ownership: 1. private house  2. Rented kebele house  3. Rented house from private owner

**PART II: Questions Related to the Drivers of Urban Land Corruption in the Land Administration Sector**

**Direction:** Drivers of corruption in the land administration sector are enumerated below. Please read each item separately and indicate your degree of agreement by putting “X” on SA: strongly agree, A: Agree; N: Neutral, DA: Disagree, SDA: Strongly disagree.

No	Items	Strongly agree(SA)	Agree(A)	Neutral (N)	Disagree(DA)	Strongly disagree(SDA)
1	Absence of land records					
2	Greediness of officials and lack of public concern					
3	Inability to maintain a given standard of living					
4	An underdeveloped and non-transparent land registration system					
5	Inadequate land laws and procedures					
6	Lack of punitive measures					
7	Unclear delineation of state and private land.					
8	The weakness of justice system.					
9	poor incentives to employees					
10	lack of awareness about anti-corruption laws					

11. If there is any other rather than mentioned above please mention

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**PART III:Challenges of Institutional Arrangement of the Land Administration Sector in fighting urban LandCorruption**

**Direction:** Challenges related to institutional arrangement of the land administration sector in fighting urban land corruption were enumerated below. Please read each item separately and indicate your degree of agreement by putting “X” on SA: strongly agree, A: Agree; N: Neutral, DA: Disagree, SDA: Strongly disagree.

No	Items	Strongly agree(SA)	Agree(A)	Neutral(N)	Disagree(DA)	Strongly disagree(SDA)
1	Lack of clear objective					
2	Availability of partiality.					
3	Transparency is vague in the institution.					
4	Employee’s readiness is in adequate to be against corruption					
5	Lack Of good governance within the institution					
6	Conflicts arise during sharing of incentives.					
7	Lack of common understanding towards the goal of institution.					
8	No incentives have been experienced for better performances of the workers.					
9	Lack of regular follow up of performance					
10	There is no norms of the institution in which performers are responsible and accountable on their duty.					
11	Sense of guilt feeling when missing incentives and peaceful when reciprocity is maintained.					

12. If there is any other rather than mentioned above please mention

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**PART IV: Questions related to the consequences of urban land corruption in land administration sector**

**Direction:** consequences of urban land corruption in land administration sector were enumerated below. Please read each item separately and indicate your degree of agreement by putting “X” on SA: strongly agree, A: Agree; N: Neutral, DA: Disagree, SDA: Strongly disagree.

No	Items	Strongly agree(SA)	Agree(A)	Neutral(N)	Disagree(DA)	Strongly Disagree(SDA)
1	Failing to keep the interest of society.					
2	Illegal transfer of land.					
3	Illegally taking advantage of state projects.					
4	Undermining the poor’s access to justice.					
5	Affect the on-going poverty reduction and development program.					
6	Lack of quality in services.					
7	Lack of faith and trust on the government.					
8	Disregard for officials.					
9	Illegal land use certificate granting.					
10	Inadequate land compensation.					
11	Displacement of citizens					

12. If there is any other rather than mentioned above please mention

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**PART V: Questions Related To the ways of Community Participation in fighting urban Land Corruption in the Land Administration Sector**

**Direction:** Questions related to the ways of community participation in fighting urban land corruption in the land administration sector are enumerated below. Please read each item separately and indicate your degree of agreement by putting “X” on SA: strongly agree, A: agree, N: neutral, DA: disagree, SDA: Strongly disagree

No	To minimize land corruption, I participated by:	<i>Strongly agree(SA)</i>	Agree (A)	Neutral (N)	Disagree (DA)	Strongly disagree (SDA)
1	Giving information secretly about corrupt practices to the anti-corruption officers of land sector.					
2	Coaching so as to minimize the corrupt practice.					
3	Giving priorities to common goods rather than private.					
4	Participating in anti-corruption public meetings					
5	requesting public officials to insure transparency					
6	Requesting for decentralizing government power					
7	Feeling a sense of ownership					
8	Taking an active role in planning implementing and monitoring projects that affect community development.					
9	Revealing corrupt activities by officials					
10	Requesting for the prevalence of rule of law					

11. If you participated in any other means rather than mentioned above please mention

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## **Appendix II: English version of Questions for Focus Group Discussions**

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**SCHOOL OF GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES**

### **Questions for focus Group Discussions**

1. What is your perception about the drivers of urban land corruption in land administration sector of Arba Minch Town?
2. What do you suggest about the challenges of institutional arrangement in fighting urban land corruption in land administration sector of the study area?
3. What are the consequences of urban land corruption in land administration sector of the study area?
4. How did you see the ways of community participation in fighting urban land corruption in land administration sector of Arba Minch Town?

## **Appendix III: English Version Questionsfor Key Informant Interviews**

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### **Leading Interview Questions Prepared to Key Informants Interview**

1. Do you have an idea about corrupt practices in land administration sector of the study area?  
Explain please?
2. What is your perception about the drivers of urban land corruption in land administration sector of the study area?
3. What do you suggest about the challenges of institutional arrangement in fighting urban land corruption in land administration sector of the study area?
4. What are the consequences of urban land corruption in land administration sector of the study area?
5. How do you see the ways of community participation in fighting urban land corruption in land administration sector of the study area?

**Appendix IV: Amharic version of Questions for House Holders**

**በሀዋሳዩኒቨርሲቲ**

**በሕግኮሌጅ በገብርኝ ስናል ማትጥናት/ቤት**

**ድህረ-ምረቃ ፕሮግራም**

**ለአባወራዎች/አማካኝዎች የቀረበ መጠይቅ**

የመጠይቁ ዓላማ፤ ይህ መጠይቅ በሀዋሳዩኒቨርሲቲ በገብርኝ ስናል ማትጥናት/ቤት የድህረ-

ምረቃ ፕሮግራም የመመረቅ ደጋፊ ስራ ለማዘጋጀት ታስቦ የተቀናበረ ነው። መጠይቁ አምስት ክፍሎች ያሉት ሲሆን በእያንዳንዱ ክፍል በሚጠየቁት መሠረት መልስ ይሰጣሉ። በክፍል አንድ የራስዎን ህይወት የሚጠይቁ ጥያቄዎች ቀርበዋል። በጥያቄዎቹ መሠረት መልስ ይሰጣሉ፡  
: በክፍል ሁለት፣ ሦስት፣ አራት እና አምስት ለቀረቡት ዐረፍተ-

ነገሮች የሚሰጡ ትኩረት መልሶች በሀሳብ ላይ ያለውን የራስዎን አመለካከት የሚገልጹ እንጂ ትክክል ወይም ስህተት የሚያሰጡ አይደሉም። ስለ ዚህ ዐረፍተነገሮቹ አመለካከትዎን የሚያንፀባርቁበት ደረጃ ከለዩ በኋላ በጣም እስማማለሁ፣ እስማማለሁ፣ መወሰን አልቻልኩም፣ አልሰማ ማም፣ ወይም በጣም አልሰማም ተብለው ከተሰጡ አማራጮች ይመርጣሉ።

ማሳሰቢያ፤ የሚሰጡት መረጃ ለትምህርት ታዲያ ጥናት ብቻ ከመዋል ውጭ ለሌላ ዓላማ የማይውል መሆኑን እያረጋገጥኩኝ የሮስዎት ከክለፍ አ መለካከትዎን ማንፀባረቅ ትክክለኛ የጥናት ወጤት ላይ ለመድረስ ተቸኛ ወጥኛ ወጥኛ መንገድ ነው። እባክዎን ሁሉንም መረጃ አሟልተው እንዲሰጡ በአክብሮት እጠይቃለሁ። ጊዜዎን ሰውተው ስለተባበሩኝ ከልብ አመሰግናለሁ!!

**ክፍል አንድ፡ ጠቅላላ መረጃ**

ከዚህ ቀጥለው ለቀረቡት ጥያቄዎች በሰጥኑ ውስጥ የ”X”

ምልክት በማድረግ ወይም አስፈላጊውን መረጃ በተሰጥዎ ክፍት ቦታ በመሙላት ይመልሱ፡፡

1. ጾታ፡ 1. ወንድ  2. ሴት
2. ዕድሜ፡ 1. 18-35  2. 36-49  3. 50 እና ከዚያ በላይ
3. የትምህርት ደረጃ፡ 1. ያልተማረ  2. ከ 1ኛ እስከ 8ኛ  3. ከ 9ኛ እስከ 12ኛ  4. ድጥሎማ/ተክሙ  5. ድግሪ  6. ሁለተኛ ድግሪ እና ከዚያ በላይ
4. ኃይማኖት፡ 1. ኦርቶዶክስ  2. ፕሮቴስታንት  3. እስላም  4. ካቶሊክ  5. ሌላ ካለ ይገለጹ \_\_\_\_\_
5. የጋብቻ ሁኔታ፡ 1. ያላገባ/ች  2. ያገባ/ች  3. ፈት  4. ባልየሞተ ባት
6. የምኖሩ ቦታ ቀበሌ፡ 1. እድገት በር  2. ጉርባ  3. ኩልፎ
7. አሁን ያሉ ቦታ ሌት፡ 1. የግል  2. የቀበሌ  3. ከግለሰብ በከራይ

**ክፍል ሁለት፡ በመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ ለመስጠት መንስኤ ልሆኑ ከምችሉ ሀሳቦች ጋር ተዛማጅ የሆኑ ጥያቄዎች፤**

ከዚህ በታች በመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ ለመስጠት መንስኤ ልሆኑ የምችሉ ሀሳቦች በዝርዝር ቀርቦ ዋል፤ እያንዳንዱን በጥሞና ካነበቡ በኋላ የሚያስተላልፉት መልእክት በእርስዎ አመለካከት የሚያስማማዎትን ደረጃ ለይተው ከተሰጡ አማራጮች ስር የመስማማት ደረጃዎን ይህንን ”X” ምልክት በማድረግ ይግለጹ፡፡

(5) በጣም እስማማለሁ (4) እስማማለሁ (3) መወሰን አልችልም (2) አልስማማም (1) በፍፁም አልስማማም

ተ.ቁ	ዝርዝር ህሳቦች	በጣም እስማማለሁ	እስማማለሁ	መወሰን አልችልም	አልስማማም	በፍፁም አልስማማም
1	የመሬት ይዘታን በተመለከተ ዝርዝር መረጃዎች እጦት					
2	የመንግስት ባለስልጣናት ስግብግብ መሆንና ለህዝብ ጥቅም ቅድም ያለ መስጠት					
3	ኑሮን ለማሸነፍና የራስን ህወት መምራት አለመቻል (ድህነት)					
4	ያልገለበተና ግልጽ ኝንት የጎደለው የመሬት ይዘታ አመዘጋገብ ህደት መኖር					
5	በቂ ያይደሉ የመሬት አስተዳደር ህጎችና ህደቶች መኖር					
6	አጥፊዎች ተጠያቂ የሚሆኑ በተህደት በበቂ መልኩ አለመኖር					
7	በመንግስትና በግለሰብ የተያዘ መሬት በሚገባ ተለይቶ አለመቀመጥ					
8	የፍትህ ሥርዓቱ ደካማ መሆን					
9	አርአያ ለሆኑ ተገብ የሆነ ማበራተኛ እና ማትጊያ አለመስጠት					
10	ስለ ሙስና ወንጀል ጉዳዮች በቂ የሆነ ዕውቀት አለመኖር					

11. ከላይ በሰንጠረዥ ከተገለጹት በተጨማሪ እርስዎም ሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ ለሙስና መከሰት ምክንያት ልሆን ይችላል የምሉት ሌላ ነገር ካለ ይግለጹ

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**ክፍል ሶስት:** ሙስናን በመከላከል ረገድ የመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ የአደረጃጀት ችግሮች፤

ከዚህ በታች ሙስናን በመከላከል ረገድ የመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ የአደረጃጀት ችግሮች በዝርዝር ቀርቦ ዋል። እያንዳንዱን በጥሞና ካነበቡ በኋላ የሚያስተላልፉት መልእክት በእርስዎ አመለካከት የሚያስማማዎትን ደረጃ ለይተው ከተሰጡ አማራጮች ስር የመስማማት ደረጃዎን የሚያሳዩውን አማራጭ ይህንን "X" ምልክት በማድረግ ይግለጹ።

(5) በጣም እስማማለሁ (4) እስማማለሁ (3) መወሰን አልችልም 2) አልስማማም (1)

**በፍፁም አልስማማም**

ተ.ቁ	የመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ	በጣም እስማማለሁ	እስማማለሁ	መወሰን አልችልም	አልስማማም	በፍፁም አልስማማም
1	ግልጽ የሆነ ዓላማ አለመኖር					
2	አደሎ አዋቂ አሠራር መኖሩ					
3	የአሰራር ግልፅኝነት በመ/ቤቱ ያለመኖር					
4	የመሥሪያ ቤቱ ሠራተኛ ወ.ሰናን ለመዋጋት ተነሳሽነት ማነስ					
5	በተቋሙ የመልካም አስተዳደር እጦት መኖር					
6	በመሥሪያ ቤቱ ሠራተኛ ወ.ና አመራሩ ባልተገባ ጥቅም ጥቅም ምክንያት መጋጨት					
7	ስለተቋሙ ዓላማዎች የጋራ የሆነ ግንዛቤ አለመኖር					
8	በሥራቸው የተሻለ አፈጻጸም ላሳዩት ግልጽ የሆነ የማበረታቻ ሥርዓት ያለመኖር					
9	የየዕለት የተግባር ክትትል ማነስ					
10	ኃላፊነቱን በአገባቡ ያልተወጣሰራተኛ ወይም አመራር ተጠያቂ የሚሆንበት ግልጽ የሆነ የአሰራር ሥርዓት ያለመኖር					
11	የኔን ጥቅም እስካልተነካ ድረስ የሚል አስተሳሰብ መኖር					

12. ከላይ በሰንጠረዥ ከተገለጹት በተጨማሪ እርስዎ ለመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ ለሙስና መከሰት ምክንያት ልሆን ይችላል የምሉት ሌላ የአደራጃጀት ችግር ካለዎት ግለጹ

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**ከፍልራት** ብመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ የምከሰት ሙስና የምያስከትላቸው ችግሮች ወይም ወጤቶች እንደሚከተለው በዝርዝር ቀርቦ በዋል፤ እያንዳንዱን በጥምና ካነበቡ በኋላ የሚያስተላልፉት መልእክት በእርስዎ አመለካከት የሚያስማማዎትን ደረጃ ከለዩ በኋላ ከተሰጡት ሥራ ጭነት ስር የመስማማት ደረጃዎን ይህንን 'X' ምልክት በማድረግ ይግለጹ፡፡

(5) በጣም እስማማለሁ (4) እስማማለሁ (3) መወሰን አልችልም 2) አልስማማም (1) በፍፁም አልስማማም

ተ.ቁ	ሙስና የሚያስከትላቸው ችግሮች፤	በጣም እስማማለሁ	እስማማለሁ	መወሰን አልችልም	አልስማማም	በፍፁም አልስማማም
1	የሕዝብን ጥቅም ለግለሰቦች አሳልፎ መስጠት					
2	ህገወጥ በሆነ መንገድ መራትን ማስተላለፍ					
3	ህጋዊ ባልሆነ መንገድ በመንግስት ፕሮጀክቶች ተጠቃም መሆን					
4	ፍትሐዊ የሆነ የሕብረተሰብ ተጠቃሚነት እንዳይኖር ማድረግ					
5	የድህነት ቅንጣትና የልማት ፕሮግራሞችን ማደናቀፍ					
6	የአገልግሎት ጥራት መቀነስ					
7	ዜጎች በመንግስት ላይ ያላቸው እምነት እንዲቀንስ ያደርጋል					
8	ህዝቡ ባለስልጣናትን እንዳያከብር ያደርጋል					
9	ህገወጥ በሆነ መንገድ የመራት ባለቤትነት ማረጋገጫ መስጠት					
10	በቂ ያይደለ ወይም ከበቂ በላይ ካሳመስጠት					
11	የግለሰቦች ከይዘታቸው ያለ አግባብ መፈናቀል					

12. ከላይ በሰንጠረዥ ከተገለጹት በተጨማሪ ሌላ በመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ የሚከሰት ሙስና የሚያስከትላቸው ችግሮች ካሉ ይግለጹ

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**ክፍል አምስት: በመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ ሙስናን በመከላከል ረገድ ከተከሰተ ሰነድ ማረጋገጫ ላይ የሆኑ ጥያቄዎች**

ከዚህ በታች በመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ ሙስናን በመከላከል ረገድ ከተከሰተ ሰነድ ማረጋገጫ ላይ የሆኑ ጥያቄዎች በዝርዝር ቀርቦ ይጻፉ፡፡ እያንዳንዱን በጥቅም ካነበቡ በኋላ የሚያስተላልፉት መልእክት በእርስዎ አካል ከተሞላ ስማዎን ያስጠቅሙት፡፡  
 ችሰር የመስማማት ደረጃዎን ይህንን "X" ምልክት በማድረግ ይግለጹ፡፡

(5) በጣም አስማማለሁ (4) አስማማለሁ (3) መወሰን አልችልም 2) አልሰማማም (1) በፍፁም አልሰማማም

ተ.ቁ	በመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ ሙስና ለመከላከል የምሳተፍ ባቸው መንገዶች	በጣም አስማማለሁ	አስማማለሁ	መወሰን አልችልም	አልሰማማም	በፍፁም አልሰማማም
1	ችግሮች ስኖሩ መረጃዎችን በምስጢር ለመለከታቸው የፀረ-ሙስና ክፍል ኃላፊዎች በመስጠት					
2	ሙስናን መታገል የሚያስችል ግንዛቤን በመፍጠር					
3	ከግል ጥቅም ይልቅ ለብዙ ጎን ጥቅም ቅድሚያ በመስጠት					
4	የሙስና መታገያ መድረኮች ላይ በመሳተፍ					
5	የመንግስት ባለስልጣናትን የአሠራር ግልጽ ንገር እንድያሰፍኑ በመጠየቅ					
6	ሥልጣንን ጥገና ጋራ ሥርዓት እንዲሰፍን በመጠየቅ					
7	በባለቤትነት ስሜት በመታገል					
8	ማኅበረሰብ ተኮር የሆኑ ፕሮጀክቶች ዕቅድ አፈፃፀም ለከትል ላይ በንቃት በመሳተፍ					
9	በመንግስት ባለስልጣናት የምፈፀሙ የሙስና ወንጀሎችን በማጋለጥ					
10	የህግ የበላይነት እንድሰፍን በመጠየቅ					

ii. ከላይ በሰንጠረዥ ከተገለጹት በተጨማሪ እርስዎ በመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ ሙስና ለመከላከል ያደረጉት የተለየ ተሳትፎ ካለዎት፡

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**Appendix V: Amharic version of Questions for Focus Group Discussions**

**ለ ቡድን ወይ ይ ት የ ተ ዘ ጋ ጁ መጠይቆች**

1. በእርስዎ እይታ በመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ ለምክሮች የሙስና ወንጀሎች መንስኤ ምን ድንገት ስለው ያስባሉ?
2. ሙስናን በመከላከል የመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ የአደረጃጀት ግጥም አሉ ስለው ያምናሉ? በምን መልክ ይገለጻሉ?  
መፍትሔው ስ?
3. በመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ የሚከሰት ሙስናን ምን ጉዳት አስከትሏል?
4. በመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ ሙስናን በመከላከል ለገደብ ለሚጠቀሙት ጉዳት ፎክ ሎጂስቲክስ ያሉ?

## Appendix VI: Amharic version of Questions for key Informant Interview

### ለቃሌ መጠይቅ የተዘጋጁ ጠቋሚ ጥያቄዎች፡

1. በመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ የሙስና ወንጀሎች ይከሰታሉ ብለው ያስባሉ? ከሆነ ስለ እንዴት ይገልጻሉ?
2. በእርስዎ እይታ በመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ ለምክሰት የሙስና ወንጀሎች መንስኤ ምን ድካሙ ብለው ያስባሉ?
3. ሙስናን በመከላከል የመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ የአደረጃጀት ግሮች አሉ ብለው ያምናሉ? በምን መልክ ይገለጻሉ?  
መፍትሔው ስ?
4. . በመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ የሚከሰት ሙስናን ምን ጉዳት አስከትሏል?
5. በመሬት አስተዳደር ዘርፍ ሙስናን በመከላከል ረገድ የህብረተሰብን ተሳትፎ እንዴት ያያሉ?