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Middle East States in the Horn of Africa: Dynamics of Economic, Political and Security Engagements

M.A Research in International Relations and Diplomacy

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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Degree of Master of Arts in International Relations and Diplomacy

Advisor: Nigus Belay (PhD)
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Hawassa, Ethiopia
May, 2024

I hereby declare that this M.A research is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university, and all sources of material used for this research have been duly acknowledged.

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This is to certify that a research entitled "***Middle East States in the Horn of Africa: Dynamics of Economic, Political and Security Engagements***" is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Master of Arts in International Relations and Diplomacy**, the Graduate program of the School of Governance and Development Studies, and has been carried out by **Endale Tsegaye Mohammed**, **Id. No GPIR&DR/0009/14**, under our supervision. Therefore, we recommend that the student has fulfilled the requirements and hence hereby can submit the thesis to the department.

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We, the undersigned, members of the Board of Examiners of the final Master's degree open defense by **Endale Tsegaye Mohammed** have read and evaluated his thesis entitled **"Middle East States in the Horn of Africa: Dynamics of Economic, Political and Security Engagements"**, and examined the candidate. This is, therefore, to certify that the thesis has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree.

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May this thesis serve as a living tribute to prominent Ethio-Somali Patriot Dejazmach Omer Semeter (**ደጃዝማች ዑመር ሰመተር**)


Prominent Ethio-Somali Patriot Dejazmach Omer Semeter

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List of Abbreviations

AKP	Justice and Development Party
B	Billion
BUSD	Billion United States Dollar
ECI	Economic Complexity Index
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HoA	Horn of Africa
IPE	Global Political Economy
IR	International Relations
IS	International System
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
JV	Joint Venture
OEC	Observatory of Economic Complexity
PP	Prosperity Party
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
M	Million
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
NR	Neorealism
MUSD	Million United States Dollar
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SNA	Somali National Army
SWF	Sovereign Wealth Fund
TMC	Transitional Military Council
UAE	United Arab Emirates

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Abstract

The purpose of this research was to study the dynamics of economic, political and security interactions of Middle Eastern States with the Horn of African counties. To achieve the objectives of the study, qualitative and quantitative research methodology were employed. According to the empirical data on trade and investment, there is a strong economic connection between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Regarding the two regions' economic, political, and security ties, the results show that the Middle East is more engaged in HoA than HoA is in the Middle East. The observed result suggests that, rather than joint ventures, the investment are primarily fully owned by foreign entities and that the trade relationship exhibits consistent swings. The United Arab Emirates and Türkiye have established significant political ties throughout the Horn of Africa. The United Arab Emirates has significantly improved its political, economic, and security ties with the Horn of Africa in a way and to an extent not achieved by others. Middle Eastern nations must be a part of multinational organizations in order to positively influence the economic, political and security developments on the HoA. Furthermore, there should be transparency in political agreements, direct investment, and security cooperation between Middle Eastern and Horn countries. Diplomats of HoA are trained to negotiate with Western countries buy they are not trained to deal with Gulf countries. They always get the short end of the stick when dealing with Gulf countries. Because of their inescapable interactions with the Gulf, countries in the Horn must strengthen their diplomatic corps.

Keywords: Horn of Africa, Middle East states, economic, political and security relation

Chapter One

1. Introduction

1.1. Background of the study

Due to its historical and cultural ties as well as geographical proximity, Horn of Africa[1] (HoA) has geopolitical and geostrategic importance to the Middle East States. The physical proximity of the HoA to the oil-rich countries of the Middle East makes HoA chokepoint in an increasingly connected global order (Jenber, 2021). After the collapse of communism economic and security trajectory of the HoA region is under the influence of external actors (especially emerging powers from Middle East) and their attendant interests, alliances and agendas. The evolving interaction of Middle East States with HoA shows the pivotal role of geopolitics in shaping the short term as well as long term national interests of the countries in the HoA (Mabera, 2020; Melvin, 2019A).

Due to global impact and shifting realities in both the Middle East and the HoA, contacts between these regions have significantly increased during the past 20 years. Notably, emerging Middle East States have shown a renewed desire to forge closer ties with the HoA. These relationships have not only assumed a central role in the political and economic spheres, but they have also gained prominence in crucial of military and security domains (Feierstein, 2020). Foreign military installations in the region include land-based facilities and naval forces on regular or permanent deployment. A variety of international security actors are expanding their presence and operations in the region, including those from Europe, the US, the Middle East, the Gulf, and Asia (Melvin, 2019B). Consequently, there are problems for the future security and stability of the HoA due to the growth of foreign military outposts, the build-up of naval forces, and the growing external militarization of the region (Melvin, 2019C).

In an effort to further their expanding economic and security interests, Middle East States have also deepened their political ties to those around the HoA. Since 2015, a number of nations have

[1] Geographically speaking, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia are typically considered to be part of the Horn of Africa. However, for the purposes of this study the Horn of Africa region is defined as the four main countries plus Sudan.

intensified their political participation in Africa, mostly in the HoA, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Türkiye (Turkey[2]). For instance, in 2018, the UAE and Saudi Arabia strongly encouraged and supported the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Mabera, 2020). A number of regional and global shifts are causing the economic relationship between the ME and the HoA to change. For example, the combined economic investment of five major Middle East States-the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, and Türkiye-between 2010 and 2019 was 232.022B USD. The potential for stimulating economic growth and development in the HoA lies in the increased economic engagement between the two regions.

Despite increased interaction, the future outcomes of the intensification of economic, political, security and military ties between Middle East and HoA states is poorly understood and lack deep studies (Verhoeven, 2018). Therefore, this study will focus on the investigation of the impact of the engagement of Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and the UAE with countries in the HoA such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea. Because of its increasing presence in the HoA, Türkiye is also chosen for this study.

1.2. Statement of the problem

Empirical studies discussed in literature review section and the existing facts on the ground reveal that the HoA-Middle East States relationship is asymmetrical, driven more by the later interests (Jenber, 2021). Despite the potential for fostering economic growth and development in the HoA, the unbalanced relationship and rivalries in the Middle East present a hurdle. The influence of, and competition among, Gulf States as well as with non-Arab states such as Türkiye could reshape Horn geopolitics. Middle East States leaders can influence HoA leaders to move toward peace process. The best example is the role played by UAE and Saudi Arabia in Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement in 2018. But rivalries among Gulf powers as well as with Türkiye can also be fertile ground to sow and proliferate instability in the HoA, as their spillover into Somalia has done (Verhoeven, 2018).

[2] In response to a request from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's administration, the United Nations decided in June 2022 to rename the country known as Turkey to Türkiye.

Examining the dynamics of Middle East States' political, economic and security interactions with countries in the HoA is crucial to maximize benefits and minimize hazards in these relations. However, in this regard only few empirical researches are available. The existing researches are not recent and also do not take into account their bilateral and multilateral relation in their analysis (Mabera, 2020; Melvin, 2019A). The existing researches are limited by their preoccupation with the interests of the Middle East States, to the neglect of the HoA countries. So, this study tries to pinpoint the interest of Horn with respect to Middle East States. To find out the main factors responsible for the success of the relation, it is advisable to pursue holistic approach. Therefore, this study aimed to investigate the contemporary Middle East-HoA relations in order to increase understanding of the existing matrix of geopolitics, security, and economic. Specifically, this study seeks to reveal the dynamics of geopolitics, security, and economic engagements in the wake of relatively recent developments between HoA and the Middle East.

1.3. Objective of the study

1.3.1. General objective of the study

The general objective of this study is to analyze the dynamics of economic, political and security engagements of Middle East States (Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) with countries in the HoA (such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea).

1.3. 2. Specific objective of the study

The specific objectives of this study are to

i. explore dynamics of economic and political engagements of Middle East States and HoA (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye with Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia)
ii. investigate the dynamics of security engagements of Middle East States and HoA (the UAE and Türkiye with Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia).
iii. identify challenges related to the relations between HoA and Middle East States

1.4. Research questions

i. How do political and economic dynamics in the HoA change as a result of renewed Middle East States involvement?

ii. How does the growing presence of Middle East States in the HoA affect security dynamics?
iii. What difficulties exist in the relationships between the states of the Middle East and the HoA?

1.5. Significance of the study

Due to historical, economic and security reasons, interaction of the HoA countries with those in the Middle East States is indispensable. The interaction is expected to benefit the governments as well as millions of people living in both regions. The basic question is: how HoA countries can optimize their benefit while reducing possible risks? To answer the question, the dynamics of economic, political and security engagements needs to be investigated clearly. The remarkable changes that have happened in recent past should be included in the analysis. However, there are scanty literatures that include recent noteworthy changes in both regions. Therefore, this study can help to identify the conditions of engagements that maximize opportunities while minimizing challenges by taking into account recent notable changes in both regions.

The outcome of this study can help to identify what is fact from fiction about the interaction of the two regions. The finding of this study will discern what the HoA needs to do in order to establish robust mutually beneficial relations with the Middle East States. So, the finding of this study will add some knowledge in the HoA relations with the Middle East in general and the selected countries in particular. The finding of this study can be used as a reference for governments and policy makers to assess their foreign policy and relations in the region. It is also serves as a reference for further studies.

1.6. Scope of the study

This study examines the dynamics of the relationship of Middle East States such as Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and the UAE with the countries in the HoA, mainly Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea. To discern the opportunities and challenges of the engagements of the two regions, economic, political and security aspects were studies. The general time frame is from 2000 to 2020.

1.7. Limitations of the study

This study is aimed at identifying the impacts of Middle East States on Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea. From Middle East only countries like Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are considered in the study. Even if many interaction variables affect the relation of the two regions and worthy to study them thoroughly, this study has give due emphasis for economic, political and security dimensions. While doing this research two limitations were encountered: 1. shortage of relevant materials and data source, 2. lack of willingness for interview.

1.8. Organization of the Study

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next chapter, chapter 2 is about the review of theoretical and empirical literatures related to dynamics of economic, political and security engagements of Middle East States with the HoA. Chapter two is aimed to conceptualize international relations (IR) theories relevant to HoA-Middle East relations by reviewing appropriate and relevant literatures. The theories include complex interdependence theory, dependency theory and neorelaism or structural theory. Chapter three presents the methodology employed in this study. Chapter four presents detailed discussion on the dynamics of economic, political and security engagements of Middle East States with the HoA from 2000 to 2020. Chapter five discusses the challenges related to the relations between HoA and Middle East States. Finally, chapter six presents conclusions and recommendations.

Chapter Two

2. Literature Review

In this chapter review of theoretical as well as empirical literatures related to the dynamics of Middle East-HoA relations are presented.

2.1. Theoretical Literature Review

This subsection reviews theories and theoretical literature which are employed for the study of the dynamics of Middle East States-HoA relations.

2.1.1. Theory of Complex Interdependence

The two famous scholars, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye are responsible for the development of theory of complex interdependence. The theory had been developed in the 1970s to describe the growing interdependence in the international political economy. All actors in the modern, globalized world, including states and non-state entities, are mutually dependent on one another, according to the notion of complex interdependence. Keohane and Nye define interdependence as mutual dependency. In international politics, circumstances wherein actors in various nations or between countries have reciprocal effects are referred to as interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 2012).

According to theory of complex interdependence in a mutually dependent relation both sides have benefit and costs. Thus, in any interdependent relation cost-benefit analysis has to be calculated. Keohane and Nye stress that interdependence should not be assumed as equal balanced mutual dependence; rather it may be asymmetrical dependence (Keohane and Nye, 2012). The basic features and assumptions of the complex interdependence theory best fit to investigate and understand the relationship between Middle East States and HoA countries.

2.1.2. Dependency Theory

Regarding the causes of global inequality and the North-South split there are competing international political economy theories. As a reaction to moderation theory, in 1950 dependency theory was developed in Latin American (Matunhu, 2011). In response to modernization theory and free trade policies, dependency theory gained interest in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s. It is a branch of the Marxist school. Raúl Prebisch, Celso Furtado, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and others are among its principal contributors. Nonetheless, DT's primary contributor is Raul Presbisch.

Dependency theory classifies the world into two poles: wealthy nations form the core of the global capitalist system, while impoverished nations make up its periphery. This classification is based on wealth and other relevant variables. Low salaries are enforced by authoritarian regimes in peripheral nations, undermining autonomous labor unions and social movements. As for the core, they take advantage of developing nations for cheaper labor, raw materials, and bigger markets in order to boost their own income. According to dependency theory, wealthier states' "core" receives resources that come from the "periphery" of impoverished and exploited states (Ahiakpor, 1985).

Dependency theory seeks to explain why some nations particularly those in Latin America have not developed to the same degree as other continents, such as Western Europe. Put differently, what accounts for the overall underdevelopment of nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America? The main premise, which is supported by both theoretical and empirical studies, holds that historical economic ties are to blame for this underdevelopment. In other words, underdevelopment results from the economic processes those central capitalist economies employ to limit the options available to peripheral nations and prevent them from pursuing independent development. From this angle, the worldwide division of labor and global capitalism are expected to place periphery nations in a subservient and dependent position (Steven, 2018; Sekhri, 2009).

Dependency theory is a theory that operates under the premise that the industrialized and developing countries have unfair and exploitative relationships within the international system. Dependency theory's tenets include that wealthy countries would not be able to support their current quality of living without the natural resources, inexpensive labor, and markets that poor countries offer (Sekhri, 2009). By the same logic, in order to grow their wealth, Middle East States depend on the HoA for cheaper labor, raw materials, and bigger markets. Consequently, Dependency theory may be able to explain the Middle East States' economic ties to nations in the HoA, despite the fact that they are not part of the core of the global capitalism system.

2.1.3. Neo-Realism or Structural Realism Theory

Thucydides' famous story of the Peloponnesian War in the fifth century B.C. is frequently cited by realists as their intellectual forebear. However, it would take almost 2,500 years for the study of international politics to become an official academic field and for the first classical realists to appear in this newly formed field in 1919. In the years following World War II, H. J. Morgenthau (1904–1980) is recognized for having developed realism into a cogent theory of international politics. Morgenthau developed an account of political realism in his 1948 masterpiece *Politics Among Nations*, which dominated the field of international politics for more than two generations (Jackson and Sorensen, 2007; Burchill et al., 2001).

However, a flurry of criticisms from various quarters coincided with the development of realism. The impact of scientific thinking on IR was evident by the early 1960s. There were academics working to improve the scientific method in the study of IR. These academics harshly condemned classical realism, calling it "wisdom literature" with no basis in science. Kenneth N. Waltz offered the defense of realism in these circumstances. Waltz revised the realism concepts in response to significant objections. Waltz revised realist theory in a significant way to bring it more in line with his views of science, while still building on some of the earlier realist concepts. Neorealism, a new school of realist thought, was born as a result of this. Waltz's writings served as the foundation for the Neorealism school. Thus, if classical realism is extended, it is redefined as NR. The aim of NR is to rephrase a few of the fundamental principles of classical realism (Fischer, 2019).

Waltz, the originator of Neorealism, overthrew Morgenthau's classical realism as the dominant intellectual theory of international relation. Realism school of thinking was split into two camps by Waltz's 1979 book *Theory of International Politics*, which attempted to build a systemic and scientific realism: classical realism and Neorealism. Thus, the late 20th century saw the emergence of Neorealism (structural realism) as a reaction to classical realism's alleged shortcomings in describing and comprehending the actions of nations within the international system. In the early 1980s, Neorealism became a prominent theory of international affairs (Brown and Ainley, 2005).

The absence of a primary international authority that directs states' actions in an international context has been the main emphasis of Neorealism. Waltz contends that anarchy is what regulates state behavior. The international system's structure becomes anarchic as a result. States are forced to take specific actions by the anarchical structure. This explains why structural realism is another name for Neorealism theory. In order to emphasize the limiting influence of the international system's structure, structural realism attempts to set aside those aspects of IR that depend on the personalities of the participants or the type of interactions between them. Thus, the foundation of international power politics is the international system (IS) itself, not the nature of humans (Brown and Ainley, 2005).

Neorealism looks at the structure of the global system in an attempt to investigate and comprehend why nations act in certain ways and interact with one another. Neorealism holds that governments behave as they do primarily because of the unregulated nature of the global system and the relative strength of each nation. States worry about their lives and safety in a system where there is no leader. They are motivated to use their authority and take probable risks as a result. States' level of influence, particularly their military strength, over a system determines a structure that can moderate their behavior (Burchill et al., 2001). Neorealism theory defines international structure in terms of two fundamental components. Anarchy serves as one of its guiding principles, while the number of big powers in the IS serves as a gauge for the distribution of capabilities. This idea suggests that a state's behavior to accomplish its objectives is determined by its standing in terms of material power.

Among the key assumptions of structural realism are the following (Jackson and Sorensen, 2007)

i. In the IS, states are rational actors. They always seek to maximize gains and minimize losses;
ii. The IS's anarchic structure is the primary factor influencing a state's behavior;
iii. There is no central authority to enforce the rules of the game in anarchic IS;
iv. States are in a security dilemma since they don't know what other states have in mind;
v. Because of the anarchic nature of the IS, survival is the most important issue;

vi. A state's whole capabilities are what determine its power, not the result;
vii. The most crucial issue for maintaining peace and stability in the IS is how to balance power in the system.

Neorealism thoroughly examines powers and their distribution throughout the global system in an attempt to explain why nations act in particular ways and how political outcomes come about. The theory attempts to provide an ordered, science-based framework for understanding IR. Thus, to analyze the security interaction between Middle East States and the HoA countries as well as the competition among ME emerging powers for regional dominance, Neorealism theory is the best candidate.

2.2. Empirical Literature Review

This section presents the review of empirical literatures related to the dynamics of Middle East States-HoA relations.

2.2.1. Historical Background of Middle East-Horn of Africa Relation

Without examining the lengthy and complex history of faltering connections between the Arabian Peninsula-Türkiye and the HoA, it is impossible to completely understand the current state of affairs between the Middle East and the HoA. Relationships across the Red Sea in terms of culture, economy, politics, and religion date back centuries. The Red Sea separates the Middle East from the HoA. The lengthy and complex history of ties, which have frequently oscillated between close partnership and prejudiced animosity, is supported by the near geographic proximity.

HoA is closely connected to the Middle East States by a number of factors including history, culture, religion, trade, migration and security. Its geographic closeness to the Red Sea is another. Even though the degree of influence varies, one region is influenced by another. This implies that they are mutually reinforcing. The societies of the Middle East have had a significant impact on the economical, political, social, and cultural environment of the HoA, and vice versa. The perceptions that present policy leaders and common inhabitants of the two regions have of one another are nevertheless shaped by historical experiences and diverse cultural interactions that have accumulated over the course of two or more centuries.

In an attempt to study Horn-Middle East relation, religious connection that has been started almost two centuries ago plays a pivotal role. The two Abrahamic religions; Islam and Christianity serves as a glue to bind the two regions. Although the monotheistic Abrahamic faiths had their birthplace in the Middle East, northeast and HoA were the site of crucial moments in their respective traditions. To further substantiate the claim it is good to cite some practical examples. The future leader of Jews enslaved in Egypt, Moses confronted the Mighty Pharaoh of Egypt in Egypt. The Holy Family: Joseph, Mary and the infant Jesus from Judea flee to Egypt to save the life of the child from killing by King Herod.

Noah's grandson Cush ruled over the famed Kingdom of Cush, which is now the country of Sudan (Holy Bible, Genesis 10:6). Moses's wife came from the Cushite people (Holy Bible, Numbers 12:1). The Sahabah, the first followers of the prophet Muhammad, sought safety in the Christian Kingdom of Aksum, modern-day Ethiopia, after fleeing the persecution of the dominant Quraish tribe in Mecca. The legend of the visit of Queen Sheba to Jewish King Solomon is often mentioned by peoples on both sides of the Red Sea. Such and similar oral traditions shared its own contributions for long lived connections.

In the Middle East, states including Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen gained independence in 1650, 1932, and 1990, respectively; Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE became independent states in 1971. Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti are countries in the HoA that became independent in 1956, 1960, and 1963, respectively (U. S. Department of State, 2024). Among HoA countries (for that matter in entire Africa) Ethiopian has unique long experience of statehood that has survived more than 3000 thousand years (Clapham, 2017). Surprisingly, in the colonial period, Ethiopian empire not only survived but expanded its own territory by defeating nearby traditional lords. Ethiopia’s being independent empire has contributed for the establishment of nationalist movements in colonized HoA countries (Clapham, 2017).

There is a lot common between the Horn and Middle East. Arabic language is spoken on both regions. Deeply religious character of Horn and ME societies has been assumed as the strong force to strengthen transnational solidarities and identities. The current brotherly relation of

Middle East States with HoA is the raiment of long time build interactions. Despite the connections between the Horn and Middle East do create a sense of cultural and religious proximity other competing political and identity markers are relevant as well, creating a considerably more complex situation in different HoA and Middle East States.

A robust alliance was anticipated by numerous scholars and keen observers of the two areas following their independence, owing to their common cultural heritage and shared historical background. Sometimes, complex ethnic ties—like the Somali identities shared by Djibouti and Ethiopia—and religious identities—like those of Ethiopia, where Christianity is the predominant religion—can cause rifts between nations in the HoA and the ME. In spite of ethnic, religious and cultural ties, geopolitics played a critical role in the Middle East States-HoA relations. After Second World War (WWII), the Cold War between the USA and the Soviet Union and divided the ME and the HoA countries and forced them to align themselves into either USA or the Soviet Union camp.

The unexpected rise in the price of oil in 1973 was another major large-scale global development that influenced how nations interacted with one another and with the GPE. Following the startling spike in oil prices, the Red Sea's eastern shore emerged as a major worldwide economic force, taking over as the primary creditor of the western shore. The overnight economic mighty made Middle East States the make-or-break patron of regimes and rebel movements in the HoA. For instance, Saudi Arabia was engaged in the internal affairs of Horn states primarily through soft diplomacy rather than direct military means (Melvin, 2019A; Lefebvre, 1996).

2.2.2. Gulf States, Horn of Africa and Oil Price

After crude Oil price hike of above $11.20 per barrel of the 1974, the symmetry of interaction between the Horn and the Gulf states changed in dramatic way. In short it changed everything. It radically boosted the significance of the Gulf States in international politics and shocked the trade balance between the Gulf and the Horn. Since almost all states on the Western coast of the Red Sea were and still net importers of oil, oil price hike triggered balance-of-payments crises that coincided with growing domestic economic and political difficulties.

During the Cold War, the alignment of African rulers upon independence was a well-known example of extraversion. The extraversion hypothesis holds that African governing elites use their reliance on the outside world to seize power and resources and build or strengthen their dominance over internal rivals (Bayart, 2012). In agreement with the hypothesis of extraversion, HoA political leaders were deliberately leveraging of limited assets-crucial resources and minerals, military bases and superficial loyalty to Moscow or Washington to attract external assistance that would help crush internal rivals and ensure continuity of their being on power (Clapham, 1996).

2.2.3. Relation of Horn and Middle East States in the 1990s

The end of the bipolar world and global competition between the US and the Soviet Union has rifted the geopolitics of the Red Sea shores. In 1990s the interferences of Gulf States in the affairs of Horn African countries were limited by global economic and political changes. The shrinking of oil price bubble that had already been manifested in 1986 limited how much hard currency the Gulf States could donate to their clients, such as governments in Somalia or Sudan or rebel movements in Ethiopia. The collapse of the Socialist bloc also destroyed the logic behind the assistance of Gulf States to the Horn. For instance, Saudi Arabia lost its appetite for the Horn because of success of its foreign policy goals. The fall down of the Marxist-Leninist Derg government in Ethiopia (1991) and the decay of the People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen (1990), independence of Eritrea (1991/1993) reveals the achievements of the foreign policy goals of Saudi Arabia.

Due to global and regional dynamics, the 1990s were a decade of disengagement between HoA and Gulf actors. The decay of the Somali state entailed that pursuing any activity in the country became more complex and highly risky. Young independent state of Eritrea was too small and the economic policy of the government is not conducive for private-sector activity to attract of Gulf aid, investment or trade. The worst problem for Saudi Arabia was Sudan, where the army staged what appeared to be a conventional coup d'état in 1989 but soon turned out to be a front for an Islamic Revolution. Sudan's location on the Red Sea means that Saudi Arabia has a geopolitical interest in keeping the nation out of the hands of hostile forces.

2.2.4. Evolving Cooperation between Horn of Africa and Middle East since 2000s

External security players first became involved in the Horn as a result of non-traditional security threats such as local civil wars, counterterrorism, and counterpiracy. However, currently, a number of profound and connected changes in trade, commerce, and security that are occurring outside of the region are changing how foreign military interact with the countries in the Horn. The Horn's security advancements are being incorporated into geopolitical and geoeconomic objectives that go much beyond the borders of the immediate area. In this regard, the foreign military presence in the HoA is functioning more and more as a component of much larger military networks that span the Indian and Pacific oceans, as well as the Middle East and the Gulf.

The HoA's security agenda started to change in the first ten years of the twenty-first century as foreign security actors prioritized fighting terrorism and pirates. Most importantly, through bilateral and multilateral institutions led by the US, the US and its main allies resumed direct security participation in the region. The HoA has thus emerged as a crucial theater for US counterterrorism activities, particularly in Somalia and as a springboard for operations throughout Africa and the Middle East. Also, the USA has assumed the initiative in the HoA in the fight against maritime crime and piracy. Other nations' military missions and ally state deployments have helped to bolster the US military build-up.

In addition to the United States' bilateral security measures, several nations have provided assistance in the fight against Islamist organizations in Somalia. For instance, military personnel from Turkey, UAE, and European nations have been stationed in Somalia to provide training to the country's armed forces. In 2017, Türkiye established a military training base in Mogadishu, and the UAE kept up a military training center in the capital of Somalia until 2018, at which point it was shut down due to a disagreement with the Somali government. Since January 2017, the UK has run a bilateral Security Training Center in Somalia that offers training to the Somali National Army (SNA) and the African Union Mission in Somalia, which is mandated by the UN (British Ministry of Defense, August 29, 2018). In order to train the Somali National Army (SNA), the EU has sponsored a military training mission since 2010. This effort is known as the EU Training Mission (EUTM-Somali, November 23, 2022). The SNA has armored trucks thanks to Qatar (Reuters, January 17, 2019). Significant efforts have also been made by the USA, the EU, and other international community members to finance and support AMISOM, the reconstruction of the SNA, and the fight against the extremist Islamist organization al-Shabab.

Over the past ten years, there has been a continuous evolution in the Middle East States' security engagement in the HoA. The security concerns of the Gulf States in the Horn were first centered on impeding Iranian aspirations in the area. Later on, the Horn gained significance as a location for military installations necessary to support activities in the Yemeni civil war (Lawson, 2017). With Türkiye's growing influence in the area and divisions emerging within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC[3]), the Horn emerged as a crucial arena for proxy conflicts between Gulf and Middle East States.

The Horn region is becoming more and more important strategically for Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Türkiye, and Qatar. States in the Middle East and the Gulf have created comprehensive commercial and security plans for the area in order to maintain a dominant position when the East-West trade route crosses the Red Sea. The Gulf countries' overall goals to take a more active role in the western and northern Indian Ocean and in their relations with major Asian powers, particularly in light of the perceived waning US involvement in the region, are also reflected in their security engagement in the Horn.

Before 2000, Turkish foreign policy directions disregarded Africa south of the Sahara and had only few connections with countries in North Africa, Nigeria, and South Africa. Since 2000 Turkish engagement with the HoA has strengthened significantly. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) was founded in 2000. Turkish opening towards Africa is much related with foreign policy of AKP (Mosley, 2021). In 1998 ruling out of Turkish from the list of candidate countries for EU membership was among the fundamental reason for the turn of Türkiye towards Africa. In the event of 1998, due to their past colonial experience African states showed sympathy for

[3] Six oil-producing Gulf nations—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates—make up the GCC, a regional organization. It was founded in 1981 with the goal of fostering more collaboration between the member nations and their citizens as well as the establishment of comparable systems in a number of areas, including economics, finance, education, technology, law, and administration.

Türkiye. AKP leaders were highly infuriated with the determination of EU not to entertain Türkiye application and diverted their policy towards Africa. Since the rejection of its request, Türkiye has followed a wider agenda of establishing its own economic and political influence in Africa[4].

As an indicator of the commitment of Türkiye towards Africa, AKP government declared the Year of Africa in 2005 and revised Turkish foreign policy guidelines. Until 2005, the Turkish tie with Africa was rare. Among the revision was formulation of Africa Action Plan (AAP). The aim of AAP was to draw up a diplomatic framework that would speed up the commencement of economic and cultural accords with increasing number of African states. In the strategic framework, the HoA is among the key regions where the Turkish state has the strong determination to enhance its existence. AAP emphasized the huge potential of Türkiye in Africa and its key objective were expanding political allies and broadening of markets for Turkish made products[5].

In its bid to expand its sphere of influence in HoA, Türkiye established diplomatic and economic relations with HoA countries, through the use of various instruments of public and economic diplomacy. In the HoA, Türkiye first strengthened the existing bilateral relations with its key regional ally Ethiopia, and applied the acquired experience to Djibouti, Uganda, Sudan, Kenya and Eritrea. The genuine defining moment of Turkish commitment to the HoA is the responsibility it played in Somalia famine in 2011. Since 2011, Somalia turned out to be the spin of Turkish policy in HoA. Until the humanitarian intervention in Somalia, Türkiye were kept outsider to the political and security issues of HoA, participating only through multilateral program such as anti-piracy and counter-terrorism operations. However, after humanitarian intervention in Somalia, Türkiye pursued practical unilateral ways to regional political issues. Thus, the humanitarian intervention of 2011 in Somalia has had a considerable effect on the policy approach of Türkiye in HoA.

[4] Interview with councilor, Türkiye desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, July 2023.
[5] Interview with councilor, Türkiye desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, July 2023.

2.2.5. Determinants of Middle East States investment and trade in the Horn of Africa

2.2.5.1. Economic determinants

It is known that Middle East has traded with HoA countries for centuries. However, the global financial crisis of 2007/08 and international food price hike of 2009 motivated Middle East States to intensify their economic relation with HoA. Slowing down economies of the West made HoA's fast-growing economies and expanding middle classes highly eye-catching factors to attract investors from the Middle East (Todman, 2018). The 2007/08 global financial crisis forced the Middle East States to look for safe countries to invest their foreign direct investment and maintain their economic interests. In their search, they found HoA less impacted by the financial collapse and determined to begin meaningful relation. Intensifying economic and trade relations of Middle East States with HoA countries have allowed Gulf (Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emiratis) countries to more broaden their SWF' portfolio and to lessen dependence on oil incomes. The Gulf States envisioned rewarding long-term investment in Africa's fast-growing economies of the Horn. Türkiye found HoA as a suitable alternative candidate market for its export products and decided to improve trade ties and enhancing economic and political relations (Donelli, 2018).

The Gulf countries produce little food on their own and are not well suited for agriculture because of their dry climate and lack of arable land. This, along with a fast expanding urban population, made the Gulf States more reliant on food imports as a result of their investments in foreign agriculture. In consequence of high international food price of 2009, many Gulf States initiated investment projects in agriculture sector to tackle food insecurity and realize food self-sufficiency. Because of Africa's possession of 60% of the world's total uncultivated arable lands, Gulf States assumed Africa as a strategic prospect to increase their food security (Hodder and Migwalla, July 12, 2023).

For Saudi Arabia, Sudan is the main target country in the HoA and the dominant economic interest is food production through investment in agriculture. For Emirates, Eritrea and Somaliland are the main target country and the dominant economic interest is regional trade and Ports' expansion. Deradicalising and bringing Sudan back into the Saudi-led club of GCC states and fears of food and water insecurity were determinants of increased Gulf investments in the

HoA in addition to obvious commercial intentions. In addition to abovementioned factors, improved macroeconomic management and performance in many African countries and reduced exchange rate instability and inflation attracted many Middle Eastern companies. They have invested in sectors like telecoms, banking, profit schools, mining operations and real estate.

Gulf hard currency was invaluable in stabilizing exchange rates of Ethiopian birr and the Sudanese pound. The higher return on FDI in Africa than anywhere else in the developing world and rapidly rising middle class (urbanization) with greater purchasing power in countries such as Ethiopia was among the foundational reasons for blooming Gulf businesses. Rapid urbanization creates a permanent consumer with elevated appetite for foreign and African-made goods. Expanding, small but meaningful middle classes in Addis Ababa, Hargeisa, Khartoum, Mogadishu and Nairobi with higher disposable income charmed Gulf companies (McKinsey Global Institute, 2010; Mahajan, 2011).

2.2.5.2. Geopolitical determinants

At present geopolitical is the most critical factor that brings Middle East capital to the HoA. Rising rivalries between Middle East States and their struggle to be the winner of competition forced them to seek the support of HoA states. As Horn countries are in shortage of investment finance, they are mostly willing to cooperate with anyone who has the capital to be invested. Thus, geopolitics is the principal driving force in Middle East investment in the HoA. Geopolitics largely determines Middle East investments in the HoA. The competition and political ties in the Middle East are largely determined by the proxy war raging between Saudi Arabia and Iran (Mason, 2015). In the antagonistic completion between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the UAE is sided with Saud Arabia. Saudi Arabia is assured that Iran tries to destabilize the Arabian Peninsula and encircle Saudi Arabia with Shia or pro-Iranian governments in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen (Cordesman and Obaid, 2005).

Both Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman of Saudi Arabia and President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan of the UAE are convinced that Tehran has continued to pursue the revolutionary foreign policy that it began in 1979, the year the Islamic Revolution[6] led by Ayatollah Khomeini overthrew the shah. In addition to nuclear issue the revolutionary foreign policy of Iran is the main reason for the country to be isolated from the international community particularly from Western counties and their allies.

HoA became offshore battleground for the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. They have projected their rivalries in to the soil of the Horn. Tehran and Riyadh each are condemning the other of trying to use African partners to carry out assault against the other. Since the Saudi ruling family strongly believes that Iran is an existential threat for their survival and continuity, they are willing to do anything at any cost to counteract any Iranian attempt. Thus, to weaken Iran, bringing together Gulf Cooperation Council countries (including Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the UAE) to assist the Saudi-led war in Yemen was not enough and convincing Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia through investments, loans and central bank to central bank transfers to line up to the pro-Saudi camp and pushing Iranian ships out of the Red Sea was necessary.

Despite having previously maintained close political and military ties, Sudan has severed its ties with Tehran[7] in an effort to win Saudi support for being removed from the list of countries that sponsor terrorism and for the US sanctions to be partially lifted. The president of Sudan is reportedly acting in his country's best interest to protect his fragile economy (Feteha and Gunn, March 27, 2015). For Saudi Arabia, Sudan is the main target country in the HoA and the dominant political objective is isolation of Iran. For Emirates, Eritrea and Somaliland are the main target country in the HoA and the dominant political objective like Saudi is isolation of Iran from the region.

In previous years the Iranian ships frequently dock in port of Assab, Eritrea but in 2015 started hosting Saudi and Emirati military presences. In Eritrea, Afwerki regime is extremely flexible

[6] To the amazement of both Saudi Arabia and the United States, Iran's Islamic revolution of 1979 overthrew the pro-American Pahlavi monarchy and installed a radical Islamic administration in its place. Once in power, the Iranian revolutionaries rapidly made a name for themselves as fierce opponents of the pro-American foreign policy of Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf Arab governments, as well as the institution of monarchy, which they had just overthrown in their own nation (Terrill, 2011).

[7] Both countries were formerly considered "State Sponsors of Terrorism" by the US, although Sudan was taken off the list in December 2020 after it joined the Abraham Accords.

and wants to survive at all expenses. It frequently switches allegiances in order to survive. By calculating its financial and resource benefits Afwerki supported Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. Eritrea allowed the Gulf countries to use the port of Assab and its airspace to take part in the fight. Eritrean fighters also joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. In exchange for its involvement, Eritrea is received money and fuel. The other critical geopolitical factor is the hostility amongst the Gulf Arabs themselves. Saudi Arabia maintains assuming itself as the irrefutable regional hegemony and the advocate of Sunni Islam internationally whose policies cannot be questioned by other actors in the Gulf. However, the UAE and Qatar maintain that they are free to pursue an autonomous foreign policy that serves their own national interests as well as their ideological perspectives of the Middle East, North Africa, and the HoA (Ulrichsen, 2017).

Although Doha and Abu Dhabi are aware that they cannot match the size and might of the Saudi armed forces, their abundance in oil and gas combined with agile financial management has put them in the same league as Riyadh. Thus, Saudi Arabia's and Emirati and Qatari investment and assistance to the HoA are driven by similar geopolitical goals. Like in Saudi Arabia, the goal of economic initiatives between Qatar and the Emiratis is to improve political ties and gain greater clout in regional affairs. Any profit the commercial projects might yield is additional benefit but not major concern. Thus, internal competition for regional hegemony within the Gulf Arab countries forced them to look for the support from Horn countries by presenting them with their highly demanded investment capital. The shortage of investment capital is Achilles' heel of Africa in general and horn of Africa in particular.

Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed persuaded Saudi Arabia, a close ally, to persuade the UAE not to build a military facility in Somaliland (All Africa, February 24, 2017). The call for mediation from Mogadishu suggests that, despite the coalition's seeming strength at the moment, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not always had the same underlying interests, as seen by their disagreements during the Yemen War and their disagreements over the HoA (Salisbury, June 28, 2016). Consequently, geopolitics is the primary driving force behind Saudi Arabia and UAE investments in the HoA.

2.2.6. Middle East States-Horn of Africa Dynamics of Political Relations

2.2.6.1. Significance of the Political Relations

Geopolitical position of HoA's made the region vital for Middle East States to accomplish their foreign policy objectives and regional interest. Middle East and HoA States need each other to achieve their domestic and regional political interests. In the HoA, strategically located countries such as Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia are doorway to East Africa. On the other hand, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emiratis are entrance to Europe, Asia and the Middle East. In the last decade Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emiratis are among the countries that have broadened the extent of their foreign relation using a multi-directional approach. In line with their foreign policy strategy, the HoA is one of the key regions in which the Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emiratis have amplified their presence.

2.2.6.2. Determinant of Middle Eastern States-Horn of Africa Political Relations

Since the beginning of the new millennium the long history of contacts between Middle East States and HoA become more structured and serious due to changes in Middle East, HoA and global level. To advance their national interests, Middle East States such as the Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel have been active in the affairs of HoA since the 1970s. Saudi's petrodollars were behind liberation movements in Northern part of Ethiopia. Egypt is so active in the HoA due to Nile issue. Others, such as Türkiye, Iran, the UAE and Qatar have been in close connect since 2000. In recent years as result of regional and domestic changes in both Middle East and HoA, the involvement of Gulf countries and Türkiye has been intensifying.

Between 2000 and 2020, regional and global factors played a significant role in directing the Middle East actors towards the HoA. For example, the 2008 global financial crisis forced the MES to look for safe countries to invest their foreign direct investment and maintain their economic interests. In their search, they found HoA less impacted by the financial collapse and determined to begin meaningful relation. Although global economic factors encouraged the growing engagement of Middle East with the Horn, regional power balances in the Middle East have compelled Middle East States to strengthen their relations with HoA on a political and security level.

2.2.6.2.1. Competition for Ideological Dominance

Middle East States have displayed a strong interest in HoA political affairs and established several new embassies in Africa since the 2011 Arab Spring. Iran was forced to downplay the HoA's strategic importance in its security agenda due to the overshadowing of other crises including the nuclear negotiations and the Syrian crisis. This allowed Saudi Arabia and the UAE to increase their intervention in the political, security, and economic affairs of the HoA.

The driving force for Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and United Arab Emiratis to be involved in the affairs of HoA may be different, but their recent past ties have origins in 2011 Arab spring. The long-lasting effects of the 2011 Arab spring were seen both in Middle East and HoA (Hazbun, 2018). Although some Gulf policymakers, mostly Saudi Arabia, have frequently assumed the North and East African countries bordering the Red Sea as their natural strategic allies, the HoA region became more significant in Middle East States' strategies in the post-2011 circumstances.

The ascendance of political Islamic[8] movements stimulated Türkiye's and Qatar's to activate their regional aspirations. Both states discarded their previous pragmatic positions and jumped on the uprising train to assume new regional importance. Therefore, cross-sectarian similarity in Türkiye and Qatar resulted in overlap of their strategic interests. Qatar used its enormous oil wealth for supporting diverse political agendas across the Middle East. Qatar activity in the region aligned with Ankara's support of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt. Despite early alliance between Turkish-Qatari bloc with the stance of the Saudi-led alliance in some crisis condition of the uprising, reciprocal doubt developed.

On the other hand, in the aftermath of uprisings, UAE leaned toward Saudi Arabia to sustain and enhance the power and role of the region's conservative monarchies (Ragab, 2017). Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emiratis considers political Islam movements as existential threat and they

[8] Any view of Islam as a source of social and political identity is known as political Islam, and it is made up of a wide range of people and/or organizations that support the creation of a state and society based on their interpretation of Islamic law. The Muslim Brotherhood, the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the Jamaat-e-Islami, the United Malays National Organization, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party and the Justice and Development Party (Türkiye) are some examples from today's society (Al-Khazendar, 2009).

understood Türkiye’s political Islam pro-active policy as a main threat to their stability and government survival. The struggle for role and influence in the region between Saudi-Emirates and Türkiye-Qatar alliance has continued further than the boundaries of the Middle East States into the HoA, initially by strengthening diplomatic-economic relations and subsequently by securitizing the Red Sea through the establishment of military based along the Red sea.

Subsequent to the coming to power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Saudi-Emirates perceived the ideology of moderate political Islam as existential threat and have gone against Turkish and Qatari role from Egypt to Somalia. The threat of political Islamic movements and Iran compelled Saudi and Emirates to confront Türkiye and Qatar in the HoA. The Saudi and Emirates have used their financial influence and their relative power in the region to force HoA states, such as Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia, to line up with their regional policies and to sever their relations with Iran and opposing the spread of MB related movements.

2.2.6.2.2. Competition for Regional Dominance and National Security

After Cold War is over, the gradual disengagement of United States and its allies from the wider HoA region has persuaded Middle East policy-makers to commence foreign policies that can enhance their engagement in the HoA. They understood the decline of United States engagement as a threat in terms of security issues but also chance to increase their international positions by exerting their influence in HoA. Regarding security issue due to its close proximity any insecurity in HoA propagate itself into Gulf countries. Undoubtedly, Middle East States have endeavored to enhance their global prominence by engaging in specialized areas like aid, arbitration, peacekeeping, and marine transportation, which can yield benefits in the form of increased global public awareness at a minimal political expense. The Middle East States assumed the HoA as a region in which they could experiment their capacity as international political player.

Two major events-the GCC crisis (2017) and the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen (2015), have changed Middle East States' ambitions for influence in the HoA since 2015. In order to combat various national dangers originating in the Middle East, these two circumstances changed the scope, character, and objectives of Saudi Arabia's and the UAE' engagement in HoA events. Saudi Arabia and the UAE forced state and non-state entities in the HoA to realign with their policies in order to combat numerous threats. In other words, they have begun meddling in the internal affairs of states around the HoA. Saudi Arabia was motivated to expand its rivalry with Teheran beyond regional borders by Iran's dominant position in post-Saddam Iraq and the strong ties it had established with several HoA nations, including Sudan and Eritrea. Iran has been using the Horn for logistical support to send munitions to the Houthi rebels.

The involvement of Iran in Yemen civil war[9] served as red light for Saudi leaders to think of the possible threats of Iran for Saudi's national security. To curb the role of Iran in the Horn, Saudi leaders convinced that elevating HoA to their top agenda is vital as the region is decisive area for maintaining regional power balances and national security. Saudi Arabia united GCC states in support its interventionist policy in the HoA. In an attempt to keep Iranian ships out of the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia and GCC tried to convince Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia to sign up to the pro-Saudi camp through investments, loans, and central bank transfers (Brendon and Donelli, 2020).

Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar on March 5, 2014, alleging that Qatar was in violation of a GCC agreement prohibiting meddling in one another's domestic affairs. The three nations clarified that taking this action was necessary to safeguard the stability and security of their respective countries. The tension that has been started in 2014 within the GCC escalated, and in 2017 the so-called Arab Quartet determined to enforce a trade and diplomatic sanctions on Qatar for helping Islamist organizations and retaining ties with Iran. The split within GCC and isolation and embargo on Qatar convinced Qatar to look for alliance and that were served as driving force for Qatar to move toward Türkiye and establish closer relation.

The improved collaboration between Türkiye and Qatar became apparent with the establishment of a Qatar-Türkiye Combined Joint Force Command military base in Doha in December 2017. In a reaction, just like they had made on Iran, Saudi Arabia and UAE commenced forcing the HoA

[9] Yemen's civil conflict began in 2014 when Houthi rebels, who have ties to Iran and a history of toppling Sunni governments, took over the capital city of Sana'a and called for the installation of a new government. The coalition led by Saudi Arabia entered the country in 2015 and launched a protracted campaign of catastrophic bombardment in an attempt to restore that regime.

countries to suspend relationships with Qatar. Because of their lengthy established well economic and economic connections with Qatar and Türkiye, except Eritrea, HoA countries determined not to be on either side. Eritrea's Esayas Afewerk is always ready to change sides as far as better opportunities are given. Sudan has tried to play mediation role. Since 2017, militarization of HoA region has increased with establishments of military bases and stations (Verhoeven, 2018; Rossiter and Cannon, 2019).

The hidden role of the two Gulf monarchies in overthrow of Omar al-Bashir of Sudan shows the interference and dominant influence of Gulf monarchies in political and security dynamics of HoA. The two Gulf monarchies efforts to force HoA countries to decide their alliance has encouraged Türkiye and Qatar to enlarge their occurrence in HoA region to offset the pressure of their rivals. As a practical response, Türkiye opened military training base in Mogadishu and leased Sudanese island Suakin to establish a navy stations. In collaboration with Türkiye, Qatar is functioning in the Red Sea and the western Indian Ocean to lessen the impact of diplomatic isolation imposed by Gulf monarchies and to ensure its own geopolitical and economic interests.

Though their main covert goal seems to be the establishment of regional domination and a specific power structure among the Sunni states, Saudi Arabia and the UAE openly share the desire to impede Iran's rise in the HoA. By now is seems clear that there are two types of intra-GCC rivalries among the three main players (Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar): the first is a Gulf competition based on soft power projection, and the second concerning the latest attempts of Gulf monarchies to compete in geo-economic diversification.

Saud Arabia has been investing enormous capital in infrastructure and civil engineering mega-projects in expecting that its approach in the Red Sea will be valuable to its economic diversification policy and able to buy allies' loyalty through affiliation and favorable agreements. On the other hand, the UAE focused on development of trade and ports (geopolitics of ports). There are indications of disagreement and hostility regarding the post-crisis political agenda between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Even though it goes against Saudi Arabian policy, the UAE seems to be prioritizing its own interests and positioning itself as the most capable player to stabilize the HoA.

Chapter Three

3. Geographical Description of the study Area and Methodology of the study

3.1. Description of study area

3.1.1. Horn of Africa

East Africa's HoA is a sizable peninsula and geopolitical area. It is the fourth largest peninsula in the world and is situated on the easternmost portion of the African continent. Its people are sometimes referred to as HoA; however it is more often just called "the Horn". HoA composed of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti. However, the more expansive definitions include all or portions of Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda (Britannica, May 02, 2024). It is situated at the southernmost point of the Red Sea and shares a maritime boundary with the Arabian Peninsula in Western Asia. It extends for several hundred kilometers into the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, and the Guardafui Channel.

Ethiopia is landlocked country in the HoA. Ethiopia is the most populous nation in the HoA and became a landlocked country after Eritrea, its former province bordering the Red Sea, seceded in 1993. Ethiopia's borders are as follows: Kenya to the south, South Sudan and Sudan to the west, Djibouti to the northeast, Somalia to the east, and Eritrea to the north. Ethiopia's agricultural land is its most potential resource. Approximately 50% of Ethiopia's GDP comes from its agricultural sector (Marcus et al., April 09, 2024).

Somalia is Africa's easternmost nation. The Indian Ocean borders Somalia to the east, the Gulf of Aden to the north, Kenya and Ethiopia to the west, and Djibouti to the northwest. Agriculture makes up around three-fifths of Somalia's GDP, however raising cattle rather than growing crops is the primary economic activity (Lewis and Janzen, March 14, 2024). Sudan is a nation in northern Africa. Egypt borders Sudan on the north; Red Sea, Ethiopia, and Eritrea border it on the east; South Sudan borders it on the south; Central African Republic, Chad, and Libya border it on the west (Spaulding, et al., May 04, 2024).

Eritrea is country located in the HoA. After fighting for independence for almost thirty years, Eritrea gained its independence in 1993. Ethiopia borders the nation to the south, Sudan to the west, and Djibouti to the southeast. Agriculture supports around four fifths of the population and generates a sizable amount of Eritrea's export revenue (Markakis and Last, May 07, 2024). Djibouti is a small nation on the northeastern coast of Africa that is strategically positioned. Djibouti is situated on the Bab el Mandeb Strait, which lies to the east, dividing the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden. Ethiopia borders Djibouti to the west and southwest, Somalia to the south, and Eritrea to the north (Schraeder and Cutbill, April 30, 2024).

3.1.2. Middle East

Middle East refers to the region that surrounds the eastern and southern coasts of the Mediterranean Sea. Arab nations make up thirteen of the eighteen Middle East States. Egypt, Türkiye, and Iran have the highest populations in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia having the greatest area. The Middle East has a rich historical background, and its strategic importance has been recognized for millennia. Numerous major religions, including Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, originated in the Middle East (Britannica, May 04, 2024).

Saudi Arabia is little-populated Middle East States. Saudi Arabia is bordered to the north by Iraq, Jordan, and Kuwait; to the east by the Gulf of Aqaba, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman; to the southeast by a part of Oman; to the south and southwest by Yemen; and to the west by the Red Sea and the Gulf of Oman. Saudi Arabia's economy is dominated by petroleum industry and related sectors (Philby, et al., May 04, 2024). Türkiye is a country located partially in Asia and Europe. Türkiye is bordered the Black Sea to the north; Georgia and Armenia to the northeast; Azerbaijan and Iran to the east; Iraq and Syria to the southeast; the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas to the southwest and west; and Greece and Bulgaria to the northwest. Istanbul is the largest city and seaport, while Ankara serves as the capital. The economy has shifted from being primarily agrarian to one where the most productive and quickly growing sectors are industry and services (Yapp and Dewdney, May 06, 2024). United Arab Emirates is a federation of seven emirates situated on the Arabian Peninsula's eastern coast. Oman borders UAE to the east and northeast, and Saudi Arabia borders to the west and south. The petroleum generated mostly in the Abu Dhabi emirate drives the federation's economy (Crystal and Peterson, May 02, 2024).

Figure 3.1: Map of the Middle East and the Horn of Africa

3.2. Research design

This study's research design comprised fieldwork, desk research, and qualitative and quantitative research. A review of previous studies, news, reports, and publications on the subject were all part of the desk research, which also included preliminary investigations into the motivations and drivers behind investment initiatives of the Middle East in the HoA. Field research was done in Ethiopia's capital city of Addis Ababa. Thirteen persons in all were interviewed. Experts, councilor, economist, scholars, investors and journalists were among the people who participated in the interviews. For economic analysis 21 years data from 2000 to 2020 were used.

3.3. Research Methodology

Numerical data is gathered and analyzed in quantitative research in order to characterize features and identify correlations. Qualitative research collects the views, behaviors, and experiences of people. Thus, both qualitative and quantitative research approaches were used to meet the study's aims. The qualitative method used in this study is part of the constructivist paradigm. The paradigm of constructivism serves as the theoretical foundation for qualitative approaches, which are advised in order to comprehend the interpretations that individuals make of particular occurrences (Creswell, 2009). The constructivist paradigm places a strong emphasis on how participants construct, describe, and narrate their lived experiences. It also promotes the idea that participants and researchers co-create knowledge. In order to gain a deeper understanding of people's perceptions of the dynamics of the interaction between the Middle East States and the HoA, a qualitative technique utilizing the constructivist paradigm was employed.

3.4. Data type, source and collection method

To conduct this study, both primary and secondary sources of data were used. To examine the Middle East-HoA economic (trade and investments), political and security relation unstructured interview (Appendix 2) were conducted with key informants from Ministry of Foreign Affair of Ethiopia, journalist (from Fana Broadcasting Corporation (FBC), Ethiopian News Agency (ENA)), Ethiopian Investment Commission, Ministry of Trade & Regional Integration, Addis Ababa University and National Bank of Ethiopia. Purposive and snowball sampling methods were used to perform in-depth interviews.

To realize the objectives of this study, secondary sources of data from books, book chapters, policy documents, journal articles, research papers, newspapers and other documents and sources were also used. For trade analysis import-export data were taken from observatory of economic complexity, https://oec.world/en/ and investment data were obtained from Ethiopian Investment Commission. Lastly, discourse and theme analysis were used to examine the gathered data.

3.5. Ethical Consideration

Ethical considerations were taken into account when conducting the interview. Prior to the interview, consent was acquired, and when invited to participate in the study, the respondents were informed of the objectives of the study (Appendix 1).

Chapter Four

4. Middle East States-Horn of Africa: Dynamics of Economic, Political and Security Relations

In this chapter, the dynamics of Middle East States-HoA economic, political and security relations are analyzed with focus on the selected countries from Middle East and HoA from 2000 to 2020.

4.1. Middle East States-Horn of Africa Dynamics of Economic Relations

The dynamics of Middle East States-HoA economic relations are analyzed using factors that determine investment and trade as well as examining the pattern of investment and trade in both regions from 2000 to 2020 and distribution of Middle East States investments in different sectors and countries in the HoA.

4.1.1. Middle East States-Horn of Africa Trade Relations

The trade relations between Middle East States and HoA have been started long ago. Despite the long history of interaction, due to political and other factors, the trade exchange was very limited until the early 2000s. Currently, the Middle East States such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye have become among the main trading partners of Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. The following sections discuss the trade relation of Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye.

4.1.1.1. Trade Relation of United Arab Emirates with Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia

The UAE began its presence in the HoA to increase its economic activity and security in the Red Sea shore. The UAE has evolving trade links with neighboring Middle East States as well as with HoA countries. To achieve its broader regional and national interest, as a strategy it needs partners in the HoA. Since, Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia are the key players of the region, establishing strategic partnerships with them helps UAE to realize its national and regional objectives. In this section the dynamics of trade relation of UAE with Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia are examined.

Economic growth and development of countries are influenced by productive capabilities. According to Hausmann et al., productive capabilities are factors which can affect production frontiers of an economy of a given country such as inputs, technologies, infrastructure, ideas, laws and collective knowledge. Because of its diversity and complexity measuring productive capabilities is hard (Hausmann et al., 2014). As a result, Hausmann et al., proposed measuring productive capabilities using a proxy, called the Economic Complexity Index (ECI). ECI tries to measure productive capabilities indirectly using the mix of products that countries export. They argue that productive capabilities decide the quantity and quality of products a given country can produce and export. Hence, export diversification gives valuable information about the productive capabilities of country's economy.

Higher value of ECI implies higher rank and it shows the country having the most complex economy in a given year. In general, at the bottom of the ECI rank, are countries which export products not diversified and produced and exported by many other countries. For example in 2021, Japan was on the top in ECI rank (1.99) and Liberia was at the bottom (ECI -2.44)[10]. An ECI ranking also shows level of GDP per capita. Richer countries have higher rank in the ECI where as countries which are poor are on the lower rank on the ECI.

According to Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) database, the UAE ranked 18 in total exports ($402B) and 54 in the economic complexity index (0.15) in 2022[11]. In the same year, Ethiopia ranked 97 in the ECI (-0.86) and 134 in total exports ($4.24B)[12]; Sudan ranked 112 in the ECI (-1.21) and 123 in total exports ($5.52B)[13]; Somalia ranked 167 in total exports ($569M)[14] and lacks information regarding the economic complexity index. The above data shows that UAE is richer relative to Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia and its export products are relatively diversified. Ethiopia's export is diversified (ECI -0.86) relative to Sudan (ECI -1.21). Generally, in the ECI ranking HoA countries are tend to be in the bottom and this implies lack of diversification and uniqueness in their export product. Thus, HoA countries policymakers should

[10] https://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/rankings, March 17, 2024.
[11] https://oec.world/en/profile/country/are, March 17, 2024.
[12] https://oec.world/en/profile/country/eth, March 17, 2024.
[13] https://oec.world/en/profile/country/sdn, March 17, 2024.
[14] https://oec.world/en/profile/country/som, March 17, 2024.

try to focus on reducing specific productivity constraints in key and strategic economic sectors so as to increase diversification and uniqueness of export products.

As Ethiopian National Bank: Annual Report of 2020/21 indicates that, Asia had a 31.0% share in Ethiopia's total export of goods and from total export to Asia, exports to Saudi Arabia accounting for 18.7%, followed by UAE (14.7%) in 2019/20. Regarding Ethiopian import goods in 2019/20, Asia accounted for 61.3% of the total imports of Ethiopia. The major imports from Asia originated from China (37.3%), India (20.1%), UAE (10.7%), Malaysia (7.0%), Saudi-Arabia (5.6%), Kuwait (5.3%). As the data reveals, from Ethiopia's exports to Asia, export to UAE ranked second and Ethiopia's imports from UAE ranked third relative to Asian countries. Thus, it is clear that UAE is among the major Ethiopian export and import destinations.

Since Ethiopia's main export products are agricultural commodities[15], the geographical proximity and high agricultural potentiality of Ethiopia is an opportunity compared to other Horn countries[16]. To attract foreign trade and to utilize the available market potential, the Ethiopian government has taken measures and formulated foreign trade oriented policies such as the reduction of import tariff and sales tax, adoption of export oriented economy and encouragement of private sector export[17]. Market-based reforms undertaken during the 1990s and 2000s removed the most horrible forms of anti-export bias and this facilitated the establishment and progress of good trade relation with UAE over the last two decades (Figure 4.1).

In this section the dynamics of trade exchange: import and export of products that take place between UAE and Ethiopia from 2000 to 2020 are discussed. Figure 4.1 shows the progress of export of products between UAE and Ethiopia from 2000 to 2020[18]. As Figure 4.1 indicates observable change in export of both countries were seen starting from 2005 and it implies that the trade relation between Ethiopia and the UAE is significantly increasing. Sustained rise of export has contributed for Ethiopia's fast economic growth. Before 2005 the trade relation was low and almost sluggish. According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FDRE (2007),

[15] https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/ethiopia-market-overview, March 18, 2023.
[16] Interview with expert, Ethiopian Investment Commission, Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, March, 2023.
[17] Interview with expert, National Bank of Ethiopia, Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, March, 2023.
[18] https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/are/partner/eth, March 19, 2023.

enhanced productive and supply capacity as well as that of human and institutional capacity of the country, stable macroeconomic environment, free-market economic system and liberalization of external trade; and stable political environment laid a strong foundation for the growth of export trade (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FDRE, 2007). Thus, economic policy and foreign trade policies pursued by Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government and currently by Prosperity Party (PP) is at the heart of improved trade relation between UAE and Ethiopia from 2000 to 2020[19].

Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1 shows the value of exports between UAE and Ethiopia from 2000 to 2020. The products that UAE exported to Ethiopia include refined petroleum, nitrogenous fertilizers, cars, copper wire, jewellery, computers, other vegetable oils, paper containers, iron pipes, plastic pipes, palm oils, delivery trucks, raw sugar and ethylene polymers etc. Generally, from 2005 onward the export of UAE to Ethiopia is increasing except minor fluctuations (Figure 4.1). Since 2006, refined petroleum is the main product UAE exported to Ethiopia. For example, in 2008, from total export of UAE to Ethiopia the share of refined petroleum was 79.2%. Export of significant amount of refined petroleum was started in 2006[20]. Generally, Figure 4.1 shows that the export of UAE to Ethiopia shows fluctuation in export value and this may be related with economic and political situations in both countries as well as at global level. The fluctuation in export trade may indicate the weak relations between the two countries and hurts the export oriented manufacturing sector of UAE as well as Ethiopia. Therefore, UAE should work in issues that can improve its relation with Ethiopia.

The products that Ethiopia exported to UAE include other oily seeds, gold, sheep and goat meat, pepper, spice seeds, coffee, fruits, buckwheat, cut flowers, dried legumes, insect resins, precious metal scraps, raw sugar etc[21]. Gold, dried legumes, precious metal scraps, other oily seeds, and sheep and goat meat were the major export products[22] (National Bank of Ethiopia, 2020/21 Annual Report). The exceptional increase in gold exports was facilitated by policy reforms at the

[19] Interview with expert, Ministry of Trade & Regional Integration, Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, March, 2023.
[20] https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/are/partner/eth, March 20, 2023.
[21] https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/are/partner/eth, March 22, 2023.
[22] https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/are/partner/eth, March 22, 2023.

central bank, whereas the rise in flowers exports is a very positive reflection of the well established air cargo services (Cepheus Research and Analytics, 2020).

The Ministry of Trade and Industry and Ethiopian National Bank's Annual Report of 2018/19 both note that among the manufactured value-added exports include items like leather, textiles, wooden furniture, and leather goods. Not only export of primary products mainly agricultural products, but also the value of manufactured products is increasing with encouraging value. The commencement of export of manufactured products with a positive growth rate is possible indicator for Ethiopia’s possible transformation to manufacturing economy. However, Ethiopia’s exports of both primary products and manufactured goods to UAE are not diversified and not unique. Thus, economic policy makers should give sufficient attention on factors that improve export of manufactured products and their diversification.

The above analysis indicates that the export of Ethiopia to UAE mainly includes primary products and only very few manufactured products. The contribution of exporting primary products to foreign exchange earnings is low relative to manufactured products. Thus, Ethiopia should strive toward exporting value added manufactured products to earn higher foreign exchange that could be used for investment in different sectors. Currently, Ethiopian economy is mainly agricultural and to embark on fast economic growth and development, the country should formulate and implement economic policies that can transform agriculture based economy to manufacturing industries.

At this point it may be necessary to comment the theories of international political economy. According to theory of comparative advantage, countries should focus their economic activities on sectors that can give them a comparative advantage. According to this theory because of their vast arable land and high number of unskilled labor, African countries should concentrate their economic activity on agriculture sector and Western countries continue with export of value added manufacturing economy. The theory of comparative advantage may be applicable for short term but for long term economic growth and development, African countries particularly Horn countries have to device an economic policies that can transform their agricultural economy to manufacturing and possible to service economy.

Figure 4.1: Exports between UAE and Ethiopia from 2000 to 2020



Source: Author's computation based on raw data obtained from https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/are/partner/eth, March 15, 2023.

Table 4.1 presents the export; trade balance[23] and total trade turnover[24] between UAE and Ethiopia from 2000 to 2020. Figure 4.1 above indicates that trading between UAE and Ethiopia is increasing particularly since 2005, even though trade balance is in favor of UAE (Table 4.1). Ethiopia's total export to the UAE was around $1.973B between the years 2000 and 2020 while Ethiopia's total import from the UAE was more than $7.82B. Between the years 2000 and 2020 total trade turnover is around $9.8B. The value of trade turnover (Table 4.1) between Ethiopia and UAE signifies the fact that the potential of trade between the two countries is enormous. Geographical proximity between UAE and Ethiopia has enormous contribution for increasing trading between the two countries. Because of proximity, Ethiopia can export perishable agricultural products with no much compromise on quality and can import refined petroleum with lower transportation cost[25].

[23] trade balance is the difference between the total value of exports and imports of a country
[24] trade turnover is the sum of total value of exports and imports of a country
[25] Interview with councilor, United Arab Emirates desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, July, 2023.

Table 4.1 reveals that the trade deficit of Ethiopia is rising. Consequently, Ethiopia's growing deficit of trade balance with its major trading partners such as UAE needs sufficient attention. Trade deficits can affect domestic industry, employment, and economic growth. They are influenced by a range of factors, such as currency rates, trade laws, and global economic conditions. As the value in Table 4.1 indicates the total trade turnover has changed from $30.5M in 2000 to $1045M in 2020 indicating more than thirty-fold enhancement in the trade relation between the two countries. Generally, total trade turnover growth rate is large and positive except the major decline in 2009 (-52.40%) and minor decrease in 2007, 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2019. International experience shows that fluctuations in trade value are unavoidable due to political, financial and other factors. However, the two countries should improve their political and economic relations to sustain the evolving total trade turnover growth rate.

Table 4.1: Exports, Trade balance and Total Trade turn over between UAE and Ethiopia from 2000 to 2020

Year	Exports from UAE to Ethiopia (MUSD)	Exports from Ethiopia to UAE (MUSD)	Trade Balance (MUSD)	Total Trade Turnover (MUSD)	Total Trade Turnover growth rate (%)
2000	27.7	2.8	-24.9	30.5	
2001	44.5	6.02	-38.48	50.52	65.64
2002	NDA*	8.59	--	--	
2003	34.3	10.8	-23.5	45.1	
2004	54.5	11.9	-42.6	66.4	47.23
2005	187	25.4	-161.6	212.4	219.88
2006	387	0.438	-386.562	387.438	82.41
2007	217	141	-76	358	-7.60
2008	514	187	-327	701	95.81
2009	283	50.7	-232.3	333.7	-52.40
2010	448	94.6	-353.4	542.6	62.60
2011	446	75.4	-370.6	521.4	-3.91
2012	516	84.9	-431.1	600.9	15.25
2013	362	112	-250	474	-21.12
2014	592	111	-481	703	48.31
2015	470	119	-351	589	-16.22
2016	477	185	-292	662	12.39

2017	533	150	-383	683	3.17
2018	738	174	-564	912	33.53
2019	652	176	-476	828	-9.21
2020	798	247	-551	1045	26.21
total	**7820.4**	**1973.55**		**9793.95**	

NDA= No data available

Source: https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/are/partner/eth, March 15, 2023.

Due to their close proximity and associated political, social, and cultural exchanges, Sudan and the Middle East have long and strong economic ties. This is evident in both historical and modern trade and commercial relationships. In the past, the HoA in particular Sudan has been seen as a supply of resources, food, and other goods for the people living in the Middle East. Due to their close location, shared religious beliefs, language, and culture, Sudan and the UAE have close trading relations

.

The products UAE exports to Sudan include refined petroleum, computers, telephones, cars, raw sugar, jewellery, broadcasting equipment, inorganic chemicals, precious metal compound, dairy products, eggs, honey, edible products, rubbers, iron and steel and ceramic products[26]. Refined petroleum takes the lions share in export of UAE to Sudan. Figure 4.2 and Table 4.2 shows the pattern of export of UAE to Sudan from 2000 to 2020[27]. As Figure 4.2 and Table 4.2 indicate that from 2000 to 2010 the exports of both countries were increasing continuously reaching the maximum in 2010, however, after 2010 the export was relatively low and almost constant except in 2017.

Figure 4.2 and Table 4.2 shows the export of Sudan to UAE from 2000 to 2020. The products Sudan exported to UAE includes gold, other oily seeds, forage crops, crude petroleum, pearls, oleagic fruits, grain, seed, meat and edible meat offal, lac, gums, resins, residues, lead, cereals, aluminum, plastics, cotton, edible fruits, nuts, zinc, coffee, tea, mate and spices[28]. Since 2010, gold is the major export product with average share of 89% from total export. In 2012, 2013, 2019 and 2020 the share of gold export was more than 95% of the total export to UAE.

[26] https://tradingeconomics.com/sudan/imports/united-arab-emirates, March 25, 2023.
[27] https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/are/partner/sdn, March 25, 2023.
[28] https://tradingeconomics.com/sudan/exports/united-arab-emirates, March 25, 2023.

As Figure 4.2 reveals since 2000, the export of Sudan to UAE was rising with abrupt increase in 2013 (10.20B). Figure 4.2 exposes two patterns of growth in export. The first one is slowly rising export from 2000 to 2009 and the second pattern is relatively higher increase in export since 2010. In spectacular way the export reached 10.20B in 2013 with 266% growth rate compared to the previous year. Since 2010 on average gold covered 89% of the export of Sudan to UAE, thus gold export is the main reason for higher growth of Sudan export to UAE. For example, in 2013 the share of gold export reached 97.3%.

Sudan benefited from the discovery of abundant oil resources between 1999 and 2011 (World Bank, 2015). However, the government of Sudan has paid due attention to precious minerals as part of a policy to diversify the oil-dependent economy and to fill the void left by the loss of oil revenues as a result of South Sudan's secession, following the loss of oil resources as a result of South Sudan's independence. Thus, the Sudanese government has taken strong steps to stimulate gold mining and divert illicit gold flows into the official export market since 2011 as part of its effort to ease challenges resulting from the loss of oil revenues and to foster the development of the mineral sector.

As a result of government measures gold export begun to increase since the wake of secession and finally substituted the role formerly played by oil exports. To substantiate the critical role of gold for Sudan’s economy, in 2011 the Minister of Mines stated that “[t]he gap in the budget from the loss of oil revenues is about $4 billion. If our gold is not smuggled, it can provide this amount of money (...). So our policy now is to concentrate on closing the gate through which the gold is smuggled” (Martelli, October 04, 2011). In general, Figure 4.2 shows that the export of Sudan to UAE has fluctuation since 2010 and it happens as a result of political and other factors. Since fluctuations in export may have strong negative impact on economic growth and development the government of Sudan should focus on devising economic policies and maintaining domestic political stability that can create convenient setting for export to increase continuously.

Figure 4.2: Exports between UAE and Sudan from 2000 to 2020



Source: Author's computation based on raw data obtained from https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/are/partner/sdn, April 10, 2023.

Table 4.2 shows the export; trade balance and total trade turnover between UAE and Sudan from 2000 to 2020. Figure 4.2 above indicates that trading (export) between UAE and Sudan is increasing particularly since 2010, even though trade balance is in favor of Sudan since 2010 (Table 4.2). Since 2010 on average gold has 89% share from total products exported to UAE. Sudan's export to the UAE was around \$27.93B between the years 2000 and 2020 while Sudan's import from the UAE was around \$13.94B. Between the years 2000 and 2020 total trade turnover is around \$41.9B. The value of trade turnover (Table 4.2) between Sudan and UAE signifies the fact that the potential of trade between the two countries is enormous. Geographical proximity, religious, language and cultural similarities between UAE and Sudan has huge role for increasing trade between the two countries.

As Table 4.2 reveals that the trade deficit of UAE is rising since 2010. As the value in Table 4.2 shows the total trade turnover has changed from \$132.3M in 2000 to \$3000M in 2020 signifying 2167.6% increase in the trade relation between the two countries. Generally, total trade turnover growth rate is positive except the major decline in 2014 (-75.23%), 2015 (-45.05) and 2018 (-

46.56%). Minor decrease in trade turnover growth rate was seen in 2006, 2009 and 2011. International experience shows that fluctuations in trade value are unavoidable due to political, financial and other factors. To maintain the changing rate of growth in total trade turnover, the two nations should strengthen their political and economic ties.

Table 4.2: Exports, Trade balance and Total Trade turnover between UAE and Sudan from 2000 to 2020

Year	Exports from UAE to Sudan (MUSD)	Exports from Sudan to UAE (MUSD)	Trade Balance (MUSD)	Total Trade Turnover (MUSD)	Total Trade Turnover growth rate (%)
2000	93.7	38.6	-55.1	132.3	
2001	125	23.3	-101.7	148.3	12.09
2002	172	60.5	-111.5	232.5	56.78
2003	202	85.8	-116.2	287.8	23.78
2004	280	78	-202	358	24.39
2005	485	173	-312	658	83.80
2006	414	200	-214	614	-6.69
2007	568	308	-260	876	42.67
2008	794	465	-329	1259	43.72
2009	583	337	-246	920	-26.93
2010	1340	1430	90	2770	201.09
2011	798	943	145	1741	-37.15
2012	648	2790	2142	3438	97.47
2013	456	10200	9744	10656	209.95
2014	809	1830	1021	2639	-75.23
2015	607	843	236	1450	-45.05
2016	924	1710	786	2634	81.66
2017	1660	2230	570	3890	47.68
2018	989	1090	101	2079	-46.56
2019	846	1230	384	2076	-0.14
2020	1140	1860	720	3000	44.51
total	**13,933.7**	**27,925.20**		**41,858.90**	

Source: https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/are/partner/sdn, April 10, 2023.

Somalia and the UAE have long and solid commercial links because of their near geographic vicinity and the related cultural, social, and political exchanges. The people of the UAE received food, commodities, and resources from Somalia. Since Somalia and the UAE have a common geography, language, religion, and cultural heritage, they have close trading ties.

The major products UAE exports to Somalia include rolled tobacco, broadcasting equipment, concentrated milk, cars, rubber tires, sawn wood, raw sugar, jewellery and processed fish. The export of diversified manufactured products shows the productive capabilities of UAE's economy. Figure 4.3 presents the pattern of export of UAE to Somalia in 2005 and from 2014 to 2020[29]. As Figure 4.3 shows the UAE export is increasing with significant positive growth rate except minor decrease in 2016 (-2.38%). The main products Somalia exported to UAE include gold, sheep and goats, bovine, crustaceans etc. Figure 4.3 shows the pattern of export of Somalia to UAE in 2005 and from 2014 to 2020. Visual inspection of Figure 4.3 reveals that there is change in export of Somalia to UAE since 2016 except the minor decrease in 2020. The export growth rate is positive except in 2016 and 2020. Since 2016, on average gold has more than 82% share from the total export of Somalia to UAE.

The export sector of Somalia is mainly dominated by a few primary products and gold is the highest foreign exchange earner for the country. Instead of exporting primary products, it is better to export value added products such as leather and leather products. To export value added products the manufacturing sector should be given due attention through formulation and implementation of economic policies that encourages manufacturing sector. Through transparent and less bureaucratic investment policies it may be possible to attract local and foreign direct investment.

The other key issue in Somalia that hinders any economic activity and investment is the political instability. Particularly, lack of cooperation between federal states and federal government is creating sustained tension and damaging the image of Somalia regionally and globally. Both local and foreign investor prefers safe heaven for their capital and they are not willing to invest in politically turbulent environment. Thus, to realize economic growth and development by

[29] https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/are/partner/som, April 10, 2023.

boosting investment and trade, the people of Somalia, the local and federal governments should resolve their political difference through dialogue and implementation of democratic values.

Figure 4.3: Exports between UAE and Somalia in 2005 and from 2014 to 2020



Source: Author's computation based on raw data obtained from https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/are/partner/som, April15, 2023.

Table 4.3 shows the export; trade balance and total trade turnover between UAE and Somalia in 2005 and from 2014 to 2020. Figure 4.3 above indicates that export of products between UAE and Somalia is increasing even though trade balance is in favor of UAE (Table 4.3). Somalia's export to the UAE was around $894.2M in 2005 and between 2014 and 2020 while Somalia's import from the UAE was around $5624M. The total trade balance for Somalia is around -$4729.8M. The negative trade balance may hinder the economic growth prospects of Somalia. International experience shows that fluctuations in trade value are unavoidable due to political, financial and other factors.

In 2005 and between 2014 and 2020 total trade turnover is around $6518.2M. As the value in Table 4.3 shows the total trade turnover has changed from $267.8M in 2005 to $1426M in 2020 signifying 432.5% increase in the trade relation between the two countries. Generally, total trade turnover growth rate is positive except the minor decline in 2016 (-9.12%). The value of trade turnover (Table 4.3) between Somalia and UAE implies the fact that the potential of trade between the two countries is huge. Therefore, in order to maintain the current pace of increase in total trade turnover, the two countries need strengthen their political and economic ties. The UAE and Somalia's close proximity, shared language, religion, and culture all significantly contribute to the expansion of trade between the two nations.

Table 4.3: Exports, Trade balance and Total Trade turn over between UAE and Somalia in 2005 and from 2014 to 2020

Year	Exports from UAE to Somalia (MUSD)	Exports from Somalia to UAE (MUSD)	Trade Balance (MUSD)	Total Trade Turnover (MUSD)	Total Trade Turnover growth rate (%)
2005	206	61.8	-144.2	267.8	
2014	432	86	-346	518	
2015	546	121	-425	667	28.76
2016	533	73.2	-459.8	606.2	-9.12
2017	643	126	-517	769	26.86
2018	1030	147	-883	1177	53.06
2019	1160	195	-965	1355	15.12
2020	1280	146	-1134	1426	5.24
Total	**5624**	**894.2**		**6518.2**	

Source: https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/are/partner/som, April 15, 2023.

4.1.1.2. Trade Relation of Saudi Arabia with Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia

Asia, Europe, and Africa were the main destinations for Ethiopian merchandise exports in 2019/20, according to the Ethiopian National Bank's Annual Report (2020/21). In 2019/20 Asia had 61.3% share in Ethiopia’s total imports. The data (61.3%) point out that Ethiopia’s import largely originated from Asia. The Ethiopian National Bank: Annual Report (2020/21) indicate that Saudi Arabia was the largest market for Ethiopia’s export with a 18.7% share in total export earnings from Asia and it is fifth origin with 5.6% for Ethiopia’s import from Asia in 2019/2020.

Figure 4.4 and Table 4.4 presents exports of Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia that took place among themselves from 2000 to 2020[30]. As Figure 4.4 reveals, Ethiopia's import and export with Saudi Arabia showed continuous enhancement except the diminishing of Saudi Arabia's export to Ethiopia after 2014. Ethiopia's export showed significant improvement since 2007. Based on the trend in Figure 4.4 it is plausible that the trade relation between the two countries further grows as both countries have plenty market opportunity. Since 2000 Ethiopia's major export product to Saudi Arabia was coffee and Saudi Arabia's main export to Ethiopia was refined petroleum.

Refined petroleum, propylene polymers, and ethylene polymers were Saudi Arabia's top exports to Ethiopia. Since 2000, the export of refined petroleum has 76% share of total Saudi's export to Ethiopia. However, the export of refined petroleum to Ethiopia was decreasing since 2015 with the lowest value in 2018 (22.4%). The exports of Saudi Arabia to Ethiopia were highest between 2005 and 2014, however, diminished dramatically after 2014. The export value that was $1450M in 2014 reduced to $288M in 2020 (Table 4.4).

Coffee, Sheep and Goat Meat, and Cut Flowers were Ethiopia's top exports to Saudi Arabia. Since 2000, coffee is the dominant export product to Saudi Arabia covering 70% of Ethiopia's total export to Saudi. Since 2000, Ethiopia's major export product to Saudi Arabia is coffee (70% of export to Saudi), therefore, the government and other stakeholders should focus on research and building human capacity that can enhance the quality and quantity of coffee produced in Ethiopia. Ethiopia is exporting raw coffee beans, so instead of exporting raw coffee beans it is better to export value added processed coffee.

Generally, emerging economies that fail to expand their manufacturing sector are susceptible to face lower economic growth rate in medium to long term, because manufacturing industries are fundamental to productivity growth because of their increasing return to scale. The key factor that contributes for the failure of attainment of sustained economic growth in many developing countries particularly in Africa is their inability to transform their economy from agriculture to manufacturing industries. Thus, to realize sustained economic growth and development, African

[30] https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/sau/partner/eth, April 27, 2023.

economic policy makers should discern factors that hinder and boost structural transformation and have to implement necessary measures[31].

Figure 4.4: Exports between Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia from 2000 to 2020



Source: Author's computation based on raw data obtained from https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/sau/partner/eth, May 08, 2023.

Table 4.4 presents the export; trade balance and total trade turnover between Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia from 2000 to 2020. Figure 4.4 above indicates that trading (export) between Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia is increasing particularly between 2005 and 2014, even though trade balance is highly in favor of Saudi Arabia (Table 4.4). According to trade data in Table 4.4, the largest amount of Ethiopian import from Saudi Arabia recorded in 2012 with a value of about $1510M and the highest Ethiopian export to Saudi Arabia was seen in 2019 and it was about $219M. Ethiopia's total export to the Saudi Arabia was around $2414M between the years 2000 and 2020 while Ethiopia's total import from the Saudi Arabia was $12533.1M.

As Table 4.4 reveals that the trade deficit of Ethiopia is rising. From the trade statistics in Table 4.4 it is evident that the trade balance was exceedingly in favor of Saudi Arabia due to heavy

[31] Interview with expert, Ethiopian Investment Commission, Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, May, 2023

imports of refined petroleum, chemicals, intermediate and manufactured goods. Ethiopia's growing deficit of trade balance with its major trading partners Saudi Arabia calls for attention. The total trade turnover has changed from $68.1M in 2000 to $491M in 2020 indicating more than six-fold enhancement in the trade relation between the two countries. Between the years 2000 and 2020 total trade turnover was around $14947.1M. Generally, total trade turnover growth rate is large and positive except the major decline in 2015 (-59.22%) and 2018 (-48.50) and minor decrease in 2002, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2013 and 2020.

Table 4.4: Exports, Trade balance and Total Trade turnover between Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia from 2000 to 2020

Year	Exports from Saudi Arabia to Ethiopia (MUSD)	Exports from Ethiopia to Saudi Arabia (MUSD)	Trade Balance (MUSD)	Total Trade Turnover (MUSD)	Total Trade Turnover growth rate (%)
2000	18.1	50	31.9	68.1	
2001	184	38.6	-145.4	222.6	226.87
2002	97	34.1	-62.9	131.1	-41.11
2003	44	43.5	-0.5	87.5	-33.26
2004	156	51.4	-104.6	207.4	137.03
2005	607	40	-567	647	211.96
2006	904	24.8	-879.2	928.8	43.55
2007	613	75.1	-537.9	688.1	-25.92
2008	1130	105	-1025	1235	79.48
2009	844	82.5	-761.5	926.5	-24.98
2010	941	113	-828	1054	13.76
2011	837	155	-682	992	-5.88
2012	1510	163	-1347	1673	68.65
2013	1120	154	-966	1274	-23.85
2014	1450	183	-1267	1633	28.18
2015	486	180	-306	666	-59.22
2016	341	161	-180	502	-24.62
2017	412	190	-222	602	19.92
2018	162	148	-14	310	-48.50
2019	389	219	-170	608	96.13
2020	288	203	-85	491	-19.24
Total	**12533.1**	**2414**		**14947.1**	

Source: https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/sau/partner/eth, May 08, 2023.

Owing to their near physical proximity and the resulting political, social, and cultural contacts, Saudi Arabia and Sudan have a long history of robust commercial relations. The people of Saudi Arabia were supplied with agricultural and forest products by Sudan. The most significant economic sector in Sudan is agriculture (Alnafissa, et al., 2022).

The products that Saudi Arabia exported to Sudan include cars, delivery trucks, and propylene polymers, telephones, cellulose and refined petroleum etc. Figure 4.5 and Table 4.5 shows the value of export of Saudi Arabia to Sudan from 2000 to 2020[32]. Generally, from 2000 onward the export of Saudi Arabia to Sudan is increasing with abrupt increase in export value in 2006, 2007 and 2008. The export value in 2008 ($2370M) is astonishing. The products that Sudan exported to Saudi Arabia were live sheep and goats, sheep and goats meat other oily seeds, bran, tanned sheep hides etc. Figure 4.5 and Table 4.5 shows the value of export of Sudan to Saudi Arabia from 2000 to 2020. In general since 2000 the export of Sudan to Saudi Arabia is increasing.

Figure 4.5: Exports between Saudi Arabia and Sudan from 2000 to 2020



Source: Author’s computation based on raw data obtained from https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/sau/partner/sdn, May 20, 2023.

[32] https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/sau/partner/sdn, May 20, 2023.

Table 4.5 shows the value of export; trade balance and total trade turnover between Saudi Arabia and Sudan from 2000 to 2020. According to trade data in Table 4.5, the largest amount of Saudi Arabia's export to Sudan was seen in 2008 with a value of about $2370M and the highest Sudan export to Saudi Arabia was seen in 2017 and it was about $627M. Between the years 2000 and 2020, Saudi Arabia's total export to Sudan was around $15830M while Sudan's total export to Saudi Arabia was $5911M. As Table 4.5 reveals Sudan has negative trade balance and the trade deficit is rising. In Table 4.5 the negative trade balance shows that Sudan imports more from Saudi Arabia than it export to Saudi Arabia and the trade relationship is in favor of Saudi Arabia. Persistent trade deficit has remained the dominant feature of Sudan's external trade in the past two decades with Saudi Arabia. Sudan's export of agricultural products and Saudi Arabia's export of manufactured products and commodities are responsible for the trade deficit.

Between the years 2000 and 2020 total trade turnover was around $21741M. As indicated in Table 4.5, the trade turnover has increased from $294M in 2000 to $885M in 2020 showing more than two-fold increases in the trade relation between Sudan and Saudi Arabia. Over all, total trade turnover growth rate is large and positive except the major decline in 2009 (-58.34) and 2019 (-54.50) and minor diminish in 2001, 2011 and 2012.

Table 4.5: Exports, Trade balance and Total Trade turnover between Saudi Arabia and Sudan from 2000 to 2020

Year	Exports from Saudi Arabia to Sudan (MUSD)	Exports from Sudan to Saudi Arabia (MUSD)	Trade Balance (MUSD)	Total Trade Turnover (MUSD)	Total Trade Turnover growth rate (%)
2000	170	124	-46	294	
2001	210	51.9	-158.1	261.9	-10.92
2002	NDA	NDA	--	--	
2003	413	187	-226	600	
2004	483	254	-229	737	22.83
2005	624	194	-430	818	10.99
2006	1150	145	-1005	1295	58.31
2007	1390	138	-1252	1528	17.99
2008	2370	124	-2246	2494	63.22
2009	797	242	-555	1039	-58.34
2010	885	157	-728	1042	0.29

2011	724	273	-451	997	-4.32
2012	823	78.1	-744.9	901.1	-9.62
2013	638	240	-398	878	-2.56
2014	611	505	-106	1116	27.11
2015	609	618	9	1227	9.95
2016	701	553	-148	1254	2.20
2017	1000	627	-373	1627	29.74
2018	1290	598	-692	1888	16.04
2019	298	561	263	859	-54.50
2020	644	241	-403	885	3.03
Total	**15830**	**5911**		**21741**	

Source: https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/sau/partner/sdn, May 20, 2023.

Given that they share a common geography, religion, language, and cultural legacy, Saudi Arabia and Somalia have close trading links. Sudan provided Saudi Arabia's economy with forestry and agricultural supplies. Livestock and labor are the two main sectors of exchange in the close economic ties between Saudi Arabia and Somalia. A significant portion of Somalia's livestock exports are consumed in Saudi Arabia, which also draws the majority of Somali migrant laborers.

Saudi Arabia export products to Somalia include concentrated milk, tropical fruits, and plastic lids, raw sugar, delivery trucks, used clothing, flavored water etc. Figure 4.6 and Table 4.6 shows the pattern of change and the values of exports of Saudi Arabia to Somalia respectively from 2000 to 2020[33]. Over all, since 2000 the export of Saudi Arabia to Somalia is increasing continuously with lower growth rate. The products Somalia exported to Saudi Arabia were sheep and goats, other animals, sheep and goat meat, wood charcoal, and citrus etc. Figure 4.6 shows three patterns in the export of Somalia to Saudi Arabia. The first one is between 2002 and 2008 with almost the constant export, the second one is between 2009 and 2016 with increasing export and the third one is between 2017 and 2020 with decreasing export. Somalia's exports to Saudi Arabia have dropped at an annualized rate of 3.44% during the past 21 years, from $58.7M in 2000 to $39.2M in 2020.

[33] https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/sau/partner/som, May 26, 2023.

Figure 4.6: Exports between Saudi Arabia and Somalia from 2000 to 2020



Source: Author's computation based on raw data obtained from https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/sau/partner/som, May 26, 2023.

Table 4.6 shows the export; trade balance and total trade turnover between Saudi Arabia and Somalia from 2000 to 2020. Export of products between Saudi Arabia and Somalia is increasing even though trade balance is in favor of Somalia (Table 4.6). Between 2000 and 2020 Somalia's total export to the Saudi Arabia was around $2204.32M while Somalia's total import (Saudi Arabia's total export to Somalia) from Saudi Arabia was around $509.67M. The total trade balance for Somalia is around $1694.65M. Over all, between 2000 and 2020 Somalia's trade balance is positive except in 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2020.

Between 2000 and 2020 total trade turnover is around $2713.99M. As the value in Table 4.6 shows the total trade turnover has changed from $59.421M in 2000 to $343.6M in 2016 with 478% increase in the trade relation between the two countries. However, since 2017 the trade turnover has decreased continuously. In 2017 trade turnover was $134.3M but in 2020 significantly reduced to $87.7M with 35% decrease in trade relation between the two countries. The highest trade turnover is observed in 2015 ($366.8M). Generally, total trade turnover growth rate is positive between 2000 and 2015 except the minor decline in 2001 and 2007. Since 2016 the negative growth rate of trade turnover is points the weakening of trade relation between Saudi Arabia and Somalia. Therefore, in order to stop the trade turnover growth rate from declining, the two countries should strengthen their political and economic ties.

Table 4.6: Exports, Trade balance and Total Trade turnover between Saudi Arabia and Somalia from 2000 to 2020

Year	Exports from Saudi Arabia to Somalia (MUSD)	Exports from Somalia to Saudi Arabia (MUSD)	Trade Balance (MUSD)	Total Trade Turnover (MUSD)	Total Trade Turnover growth rate (%)
2000	0.721	58.7	57.979	59.421	
2001	1.39	6.3	4.91	7.69	-87.06
2002	3.62	4.93	1.31	8.55	11.18
2003	4.9	6.87	1.97	11.77	37.66
2004	6.52	5.93	-0.59	12.45	5.78
2005	6.66	7.25	0.59	13.91	11.73
2006	14.2	9.89	-4.31	24.09	73.18
2007	9.16	7.05	-2.11	16.21	-32.71
2008	19.3	14.8	-4.5	34.1	110.36
2009	13.8	40.7	26.9	54.5	59.82
2010	17.1	133	115.9	150.1	175.41
2011	24	217	193	241	60.56
2012	27.1	217	189.9	244.1	1.29
2013	25.9	299	273.1	324.9	33.10
2014	34.7	281	246.3	315.7	-2.83
2015	49.8	317	267.2	366.8	16.19
2016	37.6	306	268.4	343.6	-6.32
2017	53.7	80.6	26.9	134.3	-60.91
2018	61.2	71.7	10.5	132.9	-1.04
2019	49.8	80.4	30.6	130.2	-2.03
2020	48.5	39.2	-9.3	87.7	-32.64
Total	**509.67**	**2204.32**		**2713.99**	

Source: https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/sau/partner/som, May 26, 2023.

4.1.1.3. Trade Relation of Türkiye with Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia

Figure 4.7 and Table 4.7 shows the progress of the trade relation between Türkiye and Ethiopia from 2000 to 2020[34]. Export of Türkiye to Ethiopia includes raw iron bars, palm oil, and seed oils, semi-finished iron, copper wire, insulated wire, packaged medicaments, hot-rolled iron, cold-rolled iron, other small iron pipes etc. The highest export to Ethiopia was in 2019 ($479M) and raw iron ($148M) and semi-finished iron ($95.5M) were the main export products. As Figure 4.7 shows that between 2000 and 2011, the export value increased continuously and became almost constant between 2012 and 2019. However, in 2020 reduced by more than -37% relative to 2019's export.

Export of Ethiopia to Türkiye were dried legumes, other oily seeds, soybeans, heavy pure woven cotton, light rubberized knitted fabric, non-retain pure cotton yarn, buckwheat, sheep hides etc. Most of Ethiopia's export to Türkiye is agricultural commodities and primary goods and this indicates that Ethiopia's economy is in the early stages of economic development. Figure 4.7 and Table 4.7 indicates that the value of export of Ethiopia to Türkiye was enhancing from 2000 until 2014. However, since 2015 there was decline in Ethiopia's export. For Ethiopia the highest export to Türkiye was seen in 2014 ($88.3M), and the key export products were other oily seeds ($37.5M), non-retail pure cotton yarn ($11.9M) and dried legumes ($10M).

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[34] https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/tur/partner/eth, April 22, 2023.

Figure 4.7: Exports between Türkiye and Ethiopia from 2000 to 2020



Source: Author's computation based on raw data obtained from https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/tur/partner/eth, April 22, 2023.

Table 4.7 presents the export; trade balance and total trade turnover between Türkiye and Ethiopia from 2000 to 2020. Figure 4.7 and Table 4.7 indicates that there is high trade imbalance between Türkiye and Ethiopia. Since 2000, the trade balance is negative (-$48118.8M) for Ethiopia. The negative trade balance shows that the trade relation between Ethiopia and Türkiye was in favor of Türkiye. As the value in Table 4.7 indicates the total trade turnover increased from $38.517M in 2000 to $343.4M in 2020 indicating more than eight-fold enhancement in the trade relation between the two countries. The total trade turnover from 2000 to 2020 was $6447.4M and it is improving with higher contribution of Türkiye export. However, in 2006, 2008, 2014, 2016-2018 and 2020 there was decrease in growth of trade turnover. In 2020, Türkiye was number one destination in Ethiopia's export to Europe.

Table 4.7: Exports, Trade balance and Total Trade turn over between Türkiye and Ethiopia from 2000 to 2020

Year	Exports from Türkiye to Ethiopia (MUSD)	Exports from Ethiopia to Türkiye (MUSD)	Trade Balance (MUSD)	Total Trade Turnover (MUSD)	Total Trade Turnover growth rate (%)
2000	38.2	0.317	-37.883	38.517	
2001	40.6	0.558	-40.042	41.158	6.86
2002	49.6	7.22	-42.38	56.82	38.05
2003	69.7	20.5	-49.2	90.2	58.75
2004	110	20.7	-89.3	130.7	44.90
2005	142	30.1	-111.9	172.1	31.68
2006	131	14.2	-116.8	145.2	-15.63
2007	201	36.1	-164.9	237.1	63.29
2008	203	25.8	-177.2	228.8	-3.50
2009	216	39.5	-176.5	255.5	11.67
2010	229	54.3	-174.7	283.3	10.88
2011	350	58.7	-291.3	408.7	44.26
2012	453	56.1	-396.9	509.1	24.57
2013	474	79.8	-394.2	553.8	8.78
2014	386	88.3	-297.7	474.3	-14.36
2015	459	55.2	-403.8	514.2	8.41
2016	461	39.9	-421.1	500.9	-2.59
2017	456	44.6	-411.4	500.6	-0.06
2018	385	42.5	-342.5	427.5	-14.60
2019	479	56.5	-422.5	535.5	25.26
2020	300	43.4	-256.6	343.4	-35.87
Total	**5633.1**	**814.3**		**6447.4**	

Source: https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/tur/partner/eth, April 22, 2023.

Figure 4.8 presents exports of Türkiye and Sudan that took place among themselves from 2000 to 2020[35]. Since 2000, the main export products of Türkiye to Sudan includes dried legumes, tractors, yeast, raw iron bar, semi-finished iron, wheat flours, electrical machines, boilers, steel equipment, plastic products, textiles and paper[36]. The highest export of Türkiye to Sudan happened in 2016 ($490M) and the key export products were wheat flours, dried legumes and

[35] https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/tur/partner/sdn, April 15, 2023.
[36] https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkiye-and-sudan.en.mfa, April 13, 2023.

electrical transformers. Between 2000 and 2016 Türkiye export increased continuously however, since 2017 has decreased and again showed improvement in 2020.

Between 2000 and 2020 the products Sudan exported to Türkiye includes other oily seeds, fruits, raw cotton, tanned sheep and goat hides, tanned equine and bovine hides, gold, spice seeds, molasses, sugar and sugar products, lac, Arabic gum, resin and volatile oils. As Figure 4.8 declares, the export of Sudan was increasing continuously since 2000 and the highest export was registered in 2020 ($105M).

Figure 4.8: Exports between Türkiye and Sudan from 2000 to 2020



Source: Author's computation based on raw data obtained from https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/tur/partner/sdn, April 15, 2023.

Table 4.8 shows the value of export; trade balance and total trade turnover between Türkiye and Sudan from 2000 to 2020. According to trade data in Table 4.8, the largest amount of Türkiye's export to Sudan was seen in 2016 with a value of about $490M and the highest Sudan export to Türkiye was seen in 2017 and it was about $88.6M. Table 4.8 discloses that the trade deficit of Sudan is rising. Accordingly, Sudan's rising deficit of trade balance. As indicated in Table 4.8, the trade turnover has increased from $54.22M in 2000 to $479M in 2020 showing around eight-fold increases in the trade relation between Türkiye and Sudan. Over all, total trade turnover growth rate is large and positive except the minor diminish in 2017 to 2019. Continuously increasing positive trade turnover growth rate implies strengthening of trade relation between the two countries.

Table 4.8: Exports, Trade balance and Total Trade turn over between Türkiye and Sudan from 2000 to 2020

Year	Exports from Türkiye to Sudan (MUSD)	Exports from Sudan to Türkiye (MUSD)	Trade Balance (MUSD)	Total Trade Turnover (MUSD)	Total Trade Turnover growth rate (%)
2000	49.1	5.12	-43.98	54.22	
2001	NDA	NDA	NDA	NDA	
2002	NDA	NDA	NDA	NDA	
2003	NDA	NDA	NDA	NDA	
2004	132	12	-120	144	
2005	200	7.55	-192.45	207.55	44.13
2006	NDA	9.75	NDA	NDA	
2007	215	NDA	NDA	NDA	
2008	NDA	NDA	NDA	NDA	
2009	NDA	6.5	NDA	NDA	
2010	270	6.16	-263.84	276.16	
2011	283	9.71	-273.29	292.71	5.99
2012	299	13.9	-285.1	312.9	6.90
2013	323	33.6	-289.4	356.6	13.97
2014	352	21.8	-330.2	373.8	4.82
2015	475	31.2	-443.8	506.2	35.42
2016	490	58.7	-431.3	548.7	8.40
2017	438	87	-351	525	-4.32
2018	403	88.6	-314.4	491.6	-6.36
2019	306	82.3	-223.7	388.3	-21.01
2020	374	105	-269	479	23.36

Source: https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/tur/partner/sdn, April 15, 2023.

Figure 4.9 and Table 4.9 shows the pattern of change and the values of exports between Türkiye and Somalia respectively from 2000 to 2020[37]. Türkiye export products to Somalia include pasta,

[37] https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/tur/partner/som, April 26, 2023.

wheat flours, seed oils, medical instruments, delivery trucks, raw sugar etc. Figure 4.9 reveals that the export of Türkiye to Somalia was increasing since 2000 with high growth rate. However, significant growth was started in 2011. Between 2003 and 2010, pasta had more than 70% of share in total export of Türkiye. Figure 4.9 shows that the export of Somalia to Türkiye increased slowly except in the last three years. The export products of Somalia to Türkiye included other oily seeds, insect resins, and other hides and skins, wood charcoal, sheep hides.

Figure 4.9: Exports between Türkiye and Somalia from 2000 to 2020



Source: Author’s computation based on raw data obtained from https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/tur/partner/som, April 26, 2023.

Table 4.9 presents the export; trade balance and total trade turnover between Türkiye and Somalia from 2000 to 2020. Figure 4.9 above indicates that trading (export) between Türkiye and Somalia is increasing mostly since 2011 for Türkiye and since 2018 for Somalia. However, the negative trade balance for Somalia means that the trade relation is in favor of Türkiye (Table 4.9). The value of products Türkiye exported to Somalia was around \$1262.631M between the years 2000 and 2020 while Somalia’s import from Türkiye was around \$39.57M and total trade turnover is around \$1302.196M. As the value in Table 4.9 points the trade turnover has risen from \$0.469M in 2000 to \$268.67M in 2020 suggesting more than 57,186.6% increase in the trade relation between the two countries. Generally, trade turnover growth rate is positive and exceptionally high in 2011 (550%). Minor decrease in trade turnover growth rate was seen in 2004, 2007 and 2009.

Table 4.9: Exports, Trade balance and Total Trade turn over between Türkiye and Somalia from 2000 to 2020

Year	**Exports from Türkiye to Somalia (MUSD)**	**Exports from Somalia to Türkiye (MUSD)**	**Trade Balance (MUSD)**	**Total Trade Turnover (MUSD)**	**Total Trade Turnover growth rate (%)**
2000	0.336	0.133	-0.203	0.469	
2001	0.198	0.299	0.101	0.497	5.97
2002	0.399	0.119	-0.28	0.518	4.23
2003	0.22	1.73	1.51	1.95	276.45
2004	0.758	0.883	0.125	1.641	-15.85
2005	2.21	0.806	-1.404	3.016	83.79
2006	2.02	2.44	0.42	4.46	47.88
2007	2.32	1.75	-0.57	4.07	-8.74
2008	8.42	1.37	-7.05	9.79	140.54
2009	3.54	0.155	-3.385	3.695	-62.26
2010	4.81	1.31	-3.5	6.12	65.63
2011	37.5	2.28	-35.22	39.78	550.00
2012	41.7	1.08	-40.62	42.78	7.54
2013	55.1	1.08	-54.02	56.18	31.32
2014	62.9	1.66	-61.24	64.56	14.92
2015	72.2	1.22	-70.98	73.42	13.72
2016	120	2.16	-117.84	122.16	66.39
2017	145	1.22	-143.78	146.22	19.70
2018	183	6.49	-176.51	189.49	29.59
2019	256	6.71	-249.29	262.71	38.64
2020	264	4.67	-259.33	268.67	2.27
Total	**1262.631**	**39.57**		**1302.196**	

Source: https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/tur/partner/som, April 26, 2023.

4.1.2. Pattern of Middle East States investment in the Horn of Africa

The pattern of Middle East States (Saudi Arabia, UAE and Türkiye) investments in the HoA (Ethiopia) is derived based on the data obtained from Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC). The investments comprised wholly foreign and joint ventures foreign direct investments.

4.1.2.1. Overview of Investment activity in Horn of Africa

The HoA has been severely impacted by the economic and political upheaval that swept the world in the 1990s. Politically, the fall of communism in 1990 led to the fall of USSR-backed administrations, and domestic instability caused states like Somalia to deteriorate. Risk and uncertainty come to represent the HoA to everyone. The eastern side of the Red Sea's economy was severely impacted by the drop in oil prices on the world market. As a result, there was political upheaval throughout the HoA in the 1990s, and the price of oil was relatively low, at about $20 per barrel. Watershed moments in the history of the HoA include the toppling of the Derg government in Ethiopia on May 28, 1991, and the civil war that ensued in Somalia after Siad Barre's government (Tronvoll, 2009).

The 1990s low oil price depleted the Middle East States that exported oil. Gulf States interest in investing in the HoA was hampered by a lack of funds and a greater risk as a result of the region's instability. But by 2000, the price of oil had started to rise, increasing the Gulf States' earnings. Increased Gulf State revenue allowed them to make up for their lost investment in the HoA. Investment in the Gulf States clearly has a positive correlation with the price of oil. The relationship between the price of Brent crude oil and Gulf (Saudi Arabia and UAE) investments in the HoA (Ethiopia) from 2000 to 2020 is shown in Table 4.10 and Figure 4.10. The association between oil prices and Gulf investments in Ethiopia is positive, as Figure 4.10 demonstrates. Gulf investments in the HoA showed a similar positive link (Meester, et al., 2018). Ethiopia saw an increase in yearly investments from 4 in 2000 to 28 in 2010, almost in line with the price of oil at the time. Oil prices and investment volume peaked in 2008 and 2012, respectively, and have been declining since 2013.

Table 4.10: Number of investment projects in Ethiopia by UAE, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia; and Brent Crude oil prices from 2000 to 2020 G.C

Year	**Oil price (USD/Barrel)**	**Number of investments projects**	
		UAE, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia	**Saudi Arabia and UAE**
2000	28.4	4	4
2001	24.45	7	7
2002	25.01	3	3
2003	28.83	10	9
2004	38.1	15	14
2005	54.38	14	11
2006	65.14	20	14
2007	72.52	26	13
2008	96.99	39	25
2009	61.51	42	16
2010	79.47	56	28
2011	111.26	35	16
2012	111.63	55	27
2013	108.56	58	26
2014	98.97	39	20
2015	52.32	34	19
2016	43.67	42	21
2017	54.25	14	7
2018	71.34	18	13
2019	64.3	19	11
2020	41.96	8	8
Total		**558**	**312**

Source: Ethiopian Investment Commission, 2023

Figure 4.10: Number of investment projects in Ethiopia by UAE and Saudi Arabia; and Brent Crude oil prices from 2000 to 2020 G.C. Total 558 investments projects.



Source: Author's computation based on raw data obtained from Ethiopian Investment Commission, 2023.

4.1.2.2. Geographic investment patterns in the Horn of Africa

Since 2000, Ethiopia has gained international recognition as a key hub for renewable energy resources and as a potential location for investment, despite its reputation for a protracted civil war, harsh droughts, and resulting food shortages. During the 1990s low oil price period, there were only 35 Gulf investments in Ethiopia; however, after 2000, when oil prices improved, the number of Gulf investments in Ethiopia increased. According to a June 4, 2022 article in The Ethiopian Herald, Saudi Arabia was the biggest Gulf country to invest in Ethiopia, contributing 20.5 billion birr to 236 manufacturing and agricultural projects between 1992 and 2022. The UAE, with 104 investments, Kuwait, with 16 investments, and Qatar, with 12 investments, were the next highest number of investors. Agriculture, manufacturing, mining, health, education, hotels, tour operations, transportation and communication, real estate, machinery and equipment rental, consulting services, construction, contracting, including drilling water wells, and other fields are among the industries in which Saudi Arabia is investing. Saudi Arabia's investment in Ethiopia in 2022 produced employment prospects for about 80,000 people (The Ethiopian Herald, June 4, 2022).

In 2019-2020 bilateral trade between Türkiye and Ethiopia grew by $200 million to reach $650 million, according to Türkiye’s ambassador to Ethiopia, Yaprak Alp. With its cutting-edge textile and cable manufacturing industries, Ethiopia has attracted $2.5 billion in Turkish investments, second only to China. Approximately 200 Turkish enterprises have created approximately 30,000 employment prospects in Ethiopia (Tessema, June 10, 2020). The number of investments that the UAE, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia have undertaken in Ethiopia between 2000 and 2020 is shown in Figure 4.11. There were 558 total investment projects between 2000 and 2020. The number of investment projects by the UAE, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia generally exhibits two phases: an increase from 2000 to 2013 and a decrease from 2013 to 2020. Due to political instability throughout the nation, Ethiopia received 200% less Middle East investment in 2017 than it did in 2016 (Meester et al., 2018).

Figure 4.11: Number of investment projects in Ethiopia by UAE, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia from 2000 to 2020. Total 558 investments projects.



Source: Author’s computation based on raw data obtained from Ethiopian Investment Commission, 2023.

Gulf investments expanded steadily between 2000 and 2008, despite the United States imposing extensive economic sanctions on Sudan for twenty years, from 1997 to 2017. But after 2008, investments decreased. Between 2000 and 2017, 52 investments were made in Sudan. With 19 investment projects, the UAE was the most popular Gulf nation to invest in Sudan, followed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar with 16, 13, and 4 projects, respectively. From 2000 to 2017, six investment projects were drawn to Somalia, with five coming from the UAE and one from Saudi Arabia. The Gulf States invested in 434 projects totaling almost USD 13 billion between 2000 and 2017. Of the 434 investments, 252 were by Saudi Arabia and were estimated to be worth USD 4.9 billion, while 133 were by UAE and were roughly worth USD 5.1 billion (Meester, et al., 2018).

Higher number of Gulf investments in Ethiopia and Sudan reveals the dominance of the two states in HoA geopolitics. The majority of Saud Arabia's investments were located in Ethiopia, followed by Sudan. Only small Saudi investments were seen in Somalia specially in trading. Saudi investment projects in Ethiopia have been in agriculture and manufacturing; where as in Sudan have focused on agriculture. Particularly in Sudan, agricultural investments are located next to the Nile, whereas banking and telecommunications operations are centered in Khartoum. The very few investments in Somalia were located along the coast. However, Mogadishu enjoyed several small investments in services such as trading and logistics, as investing in fixed assets was unattractive given the insecurity in Somalia. The HoA has drawn 133 investment projects totaling almost USD 5.1 billion from the UAE between 2000 and 2017. Thus, UAE has the largest number of investments in the HoA, second only to Saudi Arabia. Ethiopia and Sudan have received the majority of Emirates' investments. In Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia, there were 104, 19, and 5 investment projects from the Emirates, respectively (Meester, et al., 2018).

Figure 4.12 shows the total distribution of UAE, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia investments in Ethiopia by region of investment from 2000 to 2020. As Figure 4.12 and Table 4.11 indicates the highest investment project goes to Addis Ababa followed by Oromia. According to economic theory, most investors prefer to invest in areas closer to the capital city due to security and other economic reasons. Addis Ababa is the capital city of Ethiopia and Oromia region completely surrounds Addis Ababa. Thus, the highest investment in Addis Ababa and Oromia is due to security, transportation cost and other related factors[38].

Figure 4.12: Distribution of total investment projects (UAE, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia) in Ethiopia by region of investment from 2000 - 2020. Total 558 investments projects.



Source: Author's computation based on raw data obtained from Ethiopian Investment Commission, 2023.

[38] Interview with Economist, Bank Manager, Dashen Bank, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, July 2023.

Table 4.11: Summary of Licensed Foreign Direct Investment Projects (UAE, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia) By Region of Investment and Status since 2000 – 2020.

Region of Investment	Total	Pre-Implementation	Implementation	Operational	
	No of Projs	No of Projs	No of Projs	No of Projs	Capital in '000' Birr
Addis Ababa	246	51	45	150	6,401,545
Afar	8	1	4	3	66,374
Amhara	36	13	13	10	7,168,026
B.Gumze	7	4	2	1	1,660
Dire Dawa	12	2	6	4	1,158,643
Gambella	2	1		1	15,592
Multiregional	27	2	5	20	1,739,507
Oromia	171	43	40	88	16,134,786
SNNPR	23	5	4	14	1,292,811
Somali	7	3	3	1	29,196
Tigray	19	5	5	9	519,448
Grand Total	**558**	**130**	**127**	**301**	**34,527,590**

Source: Ethiopian Investment Commission, 2023.

Figure 4.13 shows the distribution of individual countries (UAE, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia) investment projects in Ethiopia by region of investment since 2000 to 2020. 241, 198 and 121, Türkiye's, Saudi Arabia's and UAE's investment projects respectively were distributed all over Ethiopia; however Addis Ababa and Oromia received the majority. Türkiye's number of investments is higher in Addis Ababa followed by Oromia. UAE mainly invested in Addis Ababa followed by Oromia. Saudi Arabia's investments projects are higher in Addis Ababa followed by Oromia and Amhara in their order. In Amhara region Saudi Arabia was the highest investor followed by UAE. Türkiye's investments are higher in Addis Ababa followed by Oromia. Saudi Arabia's investments projects are higher in Addis Ababa followed by Oromia and Amhara in their order. In Amhara region Saudi Arabia was the highest investor followed by UAE. UAE mainly invested in Addis Ababa followed by Oromia.

Figure 4.13: Distribution of individual countries (UAE, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia) investment projects in Ethiopia by region of investment since 2000 to 2020.



Source: Author's computation based on raw data obtained from Ethiopian Investment Commission, 2023.

4.1.2.3. Sectoral investment patterns in the Horn of Africa

The HoA has a variety of industries that can draw in investors. The most promising industries are those in manufacturing, minerals and mining, agriculture and fishing, energy, transportation, building, and tourism. Ethiopia's manufacturing, real estate and agricultural sectors received most of the investments from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, whereas manufacturing, construction and real estate are the primary focus of Turkish investments (Ethiopian News Agency, November 08, 2019; Arab News, December 07, 2013; Ethiopian News Agency, March 08, 2023). Both the amount and the value of investments made in the manufacturing and agriculture sectors outpaced those in other sectors. More money has been invested in these two areas than in all other sectors put together.

Unutilized fertile arable lands in Ethiopia highly attracted the food-insecure Saudi Arabia and UAE. As Table 4.12 and Figure 4.14 shows regardless of many agricultural investments, manufacturing investments is the dominant sector in Ethiopia. According to the data obtained from Ethiopian investment commission, Saudi Arabia and UAE investments in agriculture, manufacturing, construction, real estate & renting, consulting & business services, hospitality & tourism, medical care, social work and education, are essentially in Ethiopia. Turkish investment in textile sector is gaining momentum. Türkiye is among the major actors for the growth of the textile sector inside Ethiopia's industrial parks (Samuel, November 02, 2021). Turkish participation through Yapi Merkezi in building a railway line worth $1.7B, named Awash-Kombolcha-Hara Gebaya Railway project that stretches from Ethiopia to Tanzania is an indicator of Turkish growing presence in Ethiopian economy.

When compared to other industries, manufacturing and agriculture investments have the highest investment value in terms of USD as illustrated in Figure 4.14 and Table 4.12. Meester, et al., 2018 state that Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Ethiopia frequently see the two sectors as strategic resources. The urban populations of food-insecure Saudi Arabia and the UAE are greatly pleased with Ethiopia's vast expanses of virgin, fertile, undeveloped agricultural land. Analogously, Ethiopia is aspiring to transit its economy from agriculture to manufacturing. Ethiopia has also high number of cheap labor to attract the manufacturing sector that does not require high skilled labor. Thus, investments in agriculture and manufacturing are highly desirable and advantageous for both Gulf (Saudi Arabia and UAE) and Ethiopia[39]. As Figure 4.15 shows that Türkiye is leading investor in manufacturing and construction sector, while Saudi Arabia is the principal investor in the agriculture sector.

Saudi investment projects in sectors like agriculture, manufacturing, mining, education and hotels, and have created job opportunity for almost 80, 000 Ethiopians (Ethiopian Monitor, November 10, 2022). Yaprak Alp, the Turkish ambassador to Ethiopia told *The Africa Report* that Türkiye is the second biggest investor in Ethiopia and around 220 Turkish companies working in Ethiopia have created jobs for 30,000 Ethiopians (Samuel, November 2, 2021). In agriculture and manufacturing, Saudi-led investment projects created most of the job opportunities in Ethiopia, follow by Emirati companies. Jobs created by Saudi, Emirates and

[39] Interview with Journalist, Ethiopian News Agency, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, July 2023.

Turkish investments assist Ethiopia effort to realize its objective of economic development and poverty reduction[40].

[40] Interview with Turkish investors in Ethiopia, August 2023.

Table 4.12: Summary of Licensed Foreign Direct Investment Projects (UAE, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia) in Ethiopia By Sector and Status, January 2000 - November 2020 G.C

Sector	Total	Pre-Implementation	Implementation	Operational	
	No of Projs	No of Projs	No of Projs	No of Projs	Capital in '000' Birr
Agriculture	73	22	17	34	3,094,177
Manufacturing	296	56	69	171	27,059,015
Mining and quarrying	3	1		2	348,198
Education	13	3	3	7	86,672
Health and social work	13	2	3	8	105,238
Hotels and Restaurants	15	6	3	6	31,623
Tour Operation, Transport and Communication	8	2	3	3	15,764
Real estate, Machinery and Equipment Rental and Consultancy Service	67	15	12	40	879,419
Construction	63	21	15	27	2,790,682
Wholesale, retail trade & repair service	6				
Other community, social and personal service activities	1	2	2	3	116,800
Grand Total	**558**	**130**	**127**	**301**	**34,527,590**

Source: Ethiopian Investment Commission, 2023.

Figure 4.14: UAE, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia investments in Ethiopia by sector. 558 investments.

Source: Author's computation based on raw data obtained from Ethiopian Investment Commission, 2023.

Figure 4.15: UAE, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia investments in Ethiopia by sector and investor. 558 investments.



Source: Author's computation based on raw data obtained from Ethiopian Investment Commission, 2023.

4.1.2.4. Modes of investments in the Horn of Africa

The ownership structure of an investment is referred to as its mode of investment. Thus, there are two types of investments: joint ventures with domestic businesses and fully foreign owned businesses. Foreign investors can often make single or joint ventures in HoA in sectors that are eligible for FDI. The Middle East States invested entirely in international companies as well as in joint ventures (JVs) with local investors in the HoA. Due to limited access for data related to Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and UAE investments in Sudan and Somalia, this section discussed only the mode of investments in Ethiopia. Ethiopian investment policies have been changed more than four times in favor of investors in the previous 20 years in an effort to draw FDI. Foreign investors may make solo or joint investments in sectors that are open to FDI, according to Overview of Ethiopian Investment Opportunities and Policies, 2014 (Ethiopian Investment Agency, 2014). No limitations on joint venture investment equity participation. Accordingly, foreign investors are allowed to make 100% owned or joint venture investments (Ethiopia, Investment Proclamation No1180/2020). Figure 4.16 finding indicates that, since 2000, slightly over half of the Gulf's investments in Ethiopia have been owned entirely by foreign entities, with the other portion being joint ventures with Ethiopian local businesses.

Figure 4.16: Modes of investments of UAE, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia in Ethiopia. 558 investments.



Source: Author’s computation based on raw data obtained from Ethiopian Investment Commission, 2023.

In Ethiopia, Saudi Arabian companies invest in both wholly foreign owned and joint ventures modes[41]. They also partnered with several other international investors, mostly from the United States, Algeria, Egypt, Slovakia, Yemen, Turkey, Kenya, Sudan, and so on (Ethiopian Investment Commission, 2023). Table 4.13 shows that Saudi companies that invest in the manufacturing sector prefer to form joint ventures (65%) with Ethiopian businesses, in contrast, approximately 55% of businesses in the agriculture sector are wholly foreign owned. Joint ventures account for 59% of investments in sectors like real estate, rentals, and company operations. Saudi Arabian national Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Ali Al-Amoudi[42] is without a doubt the biggest Gulf investor in Ethiopia. Al-Amoudi businesses with 100% foreign ownership include Saudi Star and MIDROC Ethiopia Investment Group.

Table 4.13: Saudi Arabia, share of wholly foreign and joint with domestic in each sector

Sector	Modes of investments		Total
	Wholly foreign	**Joint ventures**	
Agriculture	26	21	47
Manufacturing	32	53	85
Mining and quarrying	1	1	2
Education	6	2	8
Health and social work	6	6	12
Hotels and Restaurants	4	3	7
Transport, storage and Communication	3	2	5
Real estate, renting and business activities	7	10	17
Construction	8	4	12
Wholesale, retail trade & repair service	2	0	2
Other community, social and personal service activities	0	1	1
Grand Total	95	103	198

Source: Ethiopian Investment Commission, 2023.

[41] Interview with Saudi investors in Ethiopia, August 2023.
[42] Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Ali Al-Amoudi is Ethiopian by birth

Approximately 35% of UAE companies investing in Ethiopia operate as joint ventures with domestic companies, with the other 65% being fully foreign owned (Table 4.14). According to Table 4.14's data, UAE companies investing in sectors like agriculture, manufacturing and Real estate (including renting and business activities) are held entirely by foreign investors in 69%, 57% and 77% respectively.

Table 4.14: UAE, share of wholly foreign and joint with domestic in each sector

Sector	Modes of investments		Total
	Wholly foreign	Joint ventures	
Agriculture	13	6	19
Manufacturing	35	26	61
Mining and quarrying	0	1	1
Education	0	1	1
Health and social work	0	1	1
Hotels and Restaurants	3	0	3
Transport, storage and Communication	1	1	2
Real estate, renting and business activities	17	5	22
Construction	5	3	8
Wholesale, retail trade & repair service	3	0	3
Grand Total	77	44	121

Source: Ethiopian Investment Commission, 2023.

Of the Turkish companies investing in Ethiopia, about 27% are joint ventures with Ethiopian companies, and the remaining 73% are completely owned by foreign companies (Table 4.15). Turkish companies that have invested in Ethiopia have also formed alliances with a variety of countries, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, the United States, Germany, Britain, China, Sudan etc. The data presented in Table 4.15 indicates that 71%, 79%, and 63% of Turkish companies that invest in manufacturing, construction, and agricultural respectively are fully owned by foreign companies.

Table 4.15: Türkiye, share of wholly foreign and joint with domestic in each sector

Sector	Modes of investments		Total
	Wholly foreign	Joint ventures	
Agriculture	3	5	8
Manufacturing	107	43	150
Education	4	0	4
Hotels and Restaurants	3	2	5
Transport, storage and Communication	1	0	1
Real estate, renting and business activities	23	6	29
Construction	34	9	43
Wholesale, retail trade & repair service	0	1	1
Grand Total	175	66	241

Source: Ethiopian Investment Commission, 2023.

4.2. Middle East States-Horn of Africa Dynamics of Political Relations

The littoral states of both sides of the Red Sea and the Gulf States have had a long history of cultural, economic, political, and religious ties with HoA nations. The interaction has also contributed significantly to the history of HoA. As a result, advancements and changes in one region have an impact on the other because of their close proximity and vital geopolitical location. Furthermore, the ME and HoA are hotbeds of superpower rivalry due to their crucial roles in the strategically significant Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean (Verhoeven, 2018).

The ME and the HoA are two sub-regions with stronger ties to foreign countries. Historically, the sea has not been a barrier to ship movement, but rather a road, which has allowed for a rapid interchange of culture, language, religion, and science between these two regions. Due to these factors, MES' impact on the HoA political events has been greater than that of any other regions or countries in the globe. The section below briefly investigates the dynamics of the political relations of MES with HoA countries specifically the political relation of Saudi Arabia, UAE and Türkiye with Ethiopia Sudan and Somalia.

4.2.1. Dynamics of Political Relations of Saudi Arabia with Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia

As discussed in the preceding sections Saudi Arabia has good economic relations with countries of the HoA such as Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia. In sections that follow the dynamics of the political relations of Saudi Arabia with Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia are discussed.

4.2.1.1. Dynamics of Political Relations of Saudi Arabia with Ethiopia

Due to internal war in Ethiopia and rivalry between Muslim and Christian nations, the relationship between Ethiopia and Muslim countries increased fast during the medieval period. Saudi Arabia and northern Africa were subjugated by the Turkish Ottoman dynasty, especially the Sultanate of Yavuz Sultan Selim, who established himself as a caliphate and thus rose to become the emperor of a Muslim empire on a global scale. The relationship between Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia has long history that dates back far earlier to the emergence of the Islamic state in the ME. Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia have a lengthy history of engagement. Over the course of a century, Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia have maintained economic, cultural, and political ties over the Red Sea.

Prior to the first group of Sohaba (followers) being sent by the Prophet Mohammed (peace be upon him), there was close ties between Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia (the then Aksumite Empire). King Najashi governed the northern region of Ethiopia during that period. The historical relationship between Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia is still significantly impacted by the Islamic understanding of Mohammed's (peace be upon him) interactions with his contemporary king Najashi (Haggai, 2007). However, since the monarch of Ethiopia was a Christian, ties between the two countries were chilly. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia expressed alarm about Ethiopia's close links to Israel. Mutual distrust defined Ethiopia's relations with the Saudi Arabian government during the Derg dictatorship.

In terms of political ties, Saudi Arabia has been subversive against Ethiopia since country's founding (1932). For example, Saudi Arabia was one of the few nations to assist the fascist drive to destroy Ethiopia during the Italian invasion of 1935 in order to undermine Ethiopia, which was predominantly Christian state. The nation supplied the invading force of Mussolini with much-needed camels. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia was a major player in the 1974 revolution, which resulted in the fall of Ethiopia's imperial authority and the sustained strengthening of the Eritrea liberation forces. Additionally, Saudi Arabia was involved in the 1973 increase in oil prices, which had an impact on Ethiopia's economy and the 1974 revolution (Haggai, 2007). During the time of Derg regime Saudi Arabia did not have political relation with Ethiopia and was highly supporting Eritrea People Liberation front and Tigray people liberation movements.

Thus, from 1974 until the collapse of Derg regime, Saudi Arabia did not have appreciable political relation with Ethiopia.

The restoration of diplomatic ties between Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia resulted from the overthrow of the Derg dictatorship in 1991 and the rise to power of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front. The two countries' bilateral relations flourished due to the favorable conditions given by the Global War on Terror. Saudi Arabia need the alliance to safeguard the HoA, adjacent international waters, and shipping routes with Ethiopia's sizable, proficient army and strong state security apparatus. However, Saudi Arabia is now turning its attention from terrorism to political and economic threats, at the same time that a number of rival ME powers vying for dominance in the area, including Iran, Qatar, and Türkiye, are attempting to establish stronger ties with the region's countries in order to further their objectives.

The political relation between Ethiopia and Saudi is also vital for cash starved Ethiopian economy and leaders. It is not secret that having good political relation is necessary condition to attract foreign direct investments. Thus, to fulfill its goal of sustained economic growth and development, Ethiopian government started opening its door for Gulf countries especially for Saudi Arabia since 1991. However, Saudi's relation with Ethiopia from 1991 to 2018 was not without political turbulence as a result of Saudi Arabia's close relations with Eritrea. Saudi Arabia and its allies attempted to utilize Eritrea's port Assab as a military base for their military campaign in Yemen after the Yemen conflict broke out.

The International Crisis Group (2018) claimed that in April 2015, Saudi Arabia and Eritrea inked a security agreement that allowed Saudi to utilize the port of Assab for military purposes. The UAE constructed a naval and airbase at the port of Assab as a result of this arrangement. Ethiopia considered the activities of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to be a serious danger to national security and a breach of the UN Security Council sanctions placed on Eritrea for its suspected involvement in destabilizing the region by arming terrorist organizations in Somalia. The Saudi-UAE action was sharply denounced by the Ethiopian government, which claimed it would jeopardize Ethiopia's security and undermine regional stability. The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia deteriorated when they were in Eritrea. The fact that Saudi Arabia fully backed Egypt's Nile water claim was another sign of the tense political ties between the two countries. Ethiopia's national interest was served by Saudi Arabia's on-again, on-off strong backing for Egypt[43].

However, former Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn paid a high-level official visit to Saudi Arabia in November 2016 with the goal of enhancing economic cooperation and reducing tensions between the two countries brought on by Saudi Arabia's security pact with Eritrea. He spoke with Mohammed bin Naif bin Abdulaziz, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, about bilateral and regional security matters. A few weeks after Hailemariam's visit to Saudi Arabia, a high-level Saudi delegation visited Ethiopia under the leadership of Ahmed Alkhateeb, senior advisor to the royal court of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The two countries decided to expand their trade and investment cooperation as well as their joint efforts to address peace and security issues in the ME and the HoA (Tekle, December 18, 2016).

Following Ethiopia's 2018 political upheaval, there has been a noticeable shift in the country's relationship with Saudi Arabia. Ethiopia's political and economic turmoil compelled the country's new leadership to go outside for assistance in order to get over its severe foreign exchange shortage. At the time, the newly elected government was searching for a feasible foreign ally that might boost its economy and close the gap in its foreign exchange reserves. The rivalry between Qatar, Turkey, and other countries, and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and their allies, has also altered regional politics and the foreign policy of GCC nations toward the HoA. In an effort to fight one another, these rival powers—particularly the GCC nations—have been attempting to amplify their influence throughout the area. Thus, Ethiopia's political shifts were being shaped and influenced by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.

Abiy Ahmed visited Saudi Arabia in May 2018 and had a meeting with Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia. King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saudi's invitation is the reason for the visit. After three trips to neighboring nations, his visit is the first travel outside of Africa. Both bilateral and regional concerns have been discussed by the

[43] Interview with councilor, Saudi Arabia desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, May and July 2023.

two leaders (Shaban, January 09, 2019). On September 16, 2018, in the presence of UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, Saudi Arabia's King Salman, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki signed a historic peace accord. The Jeddah Peace Accord, aimed to increase security and stability throughout the area. External (influenced by Saudi Arabia and the UAE) and internal causes were behind the peace deal. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said he was "deeply appreciative" of Saudi Arabia's contribution. The two countries' relations have only gotten better since that time (Embassy of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, London, UK, September 17, 2018).

Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia have a close economic relationship, as section 4.1.1.2 illustrates. Similarly, experts at the Ethiopian investment commission[44] and ministry of trade & regional integration[45] assert that Ethiopia is primarily needed by Saudi Arabia for economic purposes. However, a councilor in Ethiopia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding relations with Saudi Arabia claims that Saudi Arabia primarily needs Ethiopia for security reasons due to Ethiopia's sizable and highly skilled army. The Saudi government is concerned that a sizable Ethiopian population could be exploited as mercenaries by countries hostile toward Saudi Arabia. Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia inked numerous military and security cooperation agreements as a result[46].

4.2.1.2. Dynamics of Political Relations of Saudi Arabia with Sudan

Under the leadership of Sheikh Hassan Al-Turabi, the Khartoum government worked to reform HoA IR as well as local and regional politics. In addition to waging a fierce war in Central and Southern Sudan against the rebels of the Sudan People's Liberation Army, the Al-Turabi government worked to drastically transform Sudanese society at home. Additionally, his administration attempted to radically alter Sudan's foreign policy toward the Middle East and the HoA.

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[44] Interview with expert, Ethiopian Investment Commission, Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, July 2023.

[45] Interview with expert, Ministry of Trade & Regional Integration, Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, July 2023.

[46] Interview with councilor, Saudi Arabia desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, July 2023.

The US and Saudi Arabia's involvement in the Islamic world was strongly opposed by Al-Turabi's military-Islamist regime. He made the decision to support Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (Faksh, 1994). Al-Turabi welcomed dissidents from all over the ME, including Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network, as part of his move against Saudi Arabia. He sought to topple Hosni Mubarak in Cairo and the House of Saud in Riyadh because he was opposed to the countries' established religious and political structures. Along with that, he established diplomatic and security ties with Iran and Iraq, King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdallah's two renowned adversaries. Sudan turned into Saudi Arabia's largest source of trouble. The administration of Al-Turabi extended its reach to include any group that opposes Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Due to Al-Turabi's actions against the interests of Gulf actors, the Gulf States-led by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia—were obliged to halt almost all public and private aid, investment, and economic contacts with Sudan in an effort to contain and isolate the Al-Turabi regime. Since 1995, Ethiopia and Eritrea have shared the same purpose and have expressed appreciation for the Gulf States' decision. Sudan got 5% (USD 3.6 billion) of pan-Arab development support in the 1980s, but barely 0.5 percent (USD 0.1 billion) in the 1990s. Sudan was given USD 0.5 billion in pan-Arab development aid in the ensuing ten years (World Bank, 2010). Al-Turabi and Sudanese secret services were responsible for the attempt by Egyptian Islamists to kill Hosni Mubarak in 1995 during a Pan-African summit in Addis Ababa as payback for being ostracized. Deep internal divisions existed inside Sudan's military-Islamist leadership as a result of the country's complete isolation, the SPLA rebellion's increasing strength, and the financial burden of being shunned.

In December 1999, al-Turabi was betrayed by his former co-conspirators and ousted from power by Brigadier-General Omar al-Bashir (Roessler, 2016). Al-Bashir announced the end to Sudan’s revolutionary foreign policy, while continuing to pursue its domestic agenda. Without delay to al-Bashir announcement, Cairo sent its political weight after the reformed Khartoum government and persuaded the Gulf States too to engage with the ‘new’ leadership of al-Bashir. Because of the reform undertaken by al-Bashir and Egypt’s support, Sudan once more became the Gulf’s principal point of contact and engagement in the HoA.

Despite the increased economic ties between Saudi Arabia and Sudan for years, Saudi Arabia failed to significantly woo al-Bashir to its axis in the Gulf and their political relation was not good. Regardless of good economic ties with Saudi Arabia, al-Bashir government sustained its connection and cooperation with Saudi Arabia's rival Iran. Sudan had widespread defense cooperation with Iran including production of weapons. In the beginning of 2010s, division of Iran revolutionary guards was in Sudan. In the 2010s due to South Sudan's secession, Sudan had lost its oil reserves that were in the region of South Sudan and the economy started struggling with shortage of hard currency. To alleviate shortage of cash Sudan initiated a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia.

Al-Bashir used the Yemeni conflict as an opportunity to deepen Saudi Arabia's political relations. Sudan were provided with financial support and deployed around 10,000 soldiers to support the coalitions during the Saudi-led war on Yemen in 2015. The money was used to pay for basic supplies subsidies, direct transfers to the state coffer, and the paychecks of the troops (International Crisis Group, 2019; De Waal, 2019). Despite deployment of soldiers in Yemen war in support of Saudi, al-Bashir's government took pleasure in its advantaged relations with Qatar and Turkey. Qatar and Türkiye are backers of Muslim Brotherhood, an ideology contrary to Saudi and this had created discomfort on Saudi Arabia and its allies. As a result, the two Gulf heavyweights, UAE and Saudi Arabia started their great game in the government of al-Bashir. They were happy with the revolutionary uprising of 2019 in Sudan and they quickly moved to take the advantage of the situation.

Because of their increased support, Saudi Arabia and the UAE anticipated Sudan to align with their group in their rivalries with Qatar and Iran. As promised, Sudan cut ties with Iran, however, in June 2017 GCC crisis, al-Bashir determined to be neutral, and his decision irritated both Saudi Arabia and UAE. In revenge, Saudi cut of paying Sudanese soldiers salaries and this exacerbated the rift. However, al-Bashir preferred to straddle on the fence and started playing the strategy of playing one group against the other. In March 2018, he obtained a $2 billion loan from Qatar and UAE subsidies, confirming his strategy (Abbas, 2018).

Saudi Arabia and the UAE were determined to overthrow al-Bashir because they felt that the game he was playing was too risky for their national and regional interests. Following up on Saudi Arabia's instigator of reprisal, the UAE cut off Sudan's petroleum supply in December 2018. The al-Bashir dictatorship was compelled to withdraw bread subsidies due to pressure from a severe foreign exchange shortage, a massive deficit, and crippling debt. This led to the first public protests, which later became the impetus for the Sudanese revolution.

Heavyweights in the Gulf abandoned al-Bashir as soon as the demonstration began, and no foreign friend intervened to save him. Even the military authorities have turned against him throughout the protracted protests. Hemeti's backing of the demonstrators' demands on December 24 demonstrated that al-Bashir had lost the military's allegiance and that his foundation was unstable. On April 7, 2019, General Jalal al-Dine el-Sheikh, the deputy head of the security agency, traveled to Cairo with representatives from the military and intelligence services to ask for help from Saudi Arabia and the UAE in carrying out a coup against al-Bashir. The three nations came to an accord in Cairo, spoke with Hemeti and al-Burhan, and talked about taking al-Bashir out of office.

Under the guise of stability, Saudi Arabia supported military and paramilitary representatives in their efforts to overthrow al-Bashir and include Sudan in its sphere of influence. On April 11, 2019, following a four-day delegation visit to Cairo, al-Burhan and Hemeti, along with the security apparatus, ousted al-Bashir from office and constituted a Transitional Military Council (TMC) (Magdy, 2019; Abdelaziz et al., 2019). Saudi Arabia backed al-Bashir's replacement, the Transitional Military Council (TMC). Generals held a strong status in the TMC[47]. The revolution of 2019 signaled a shift in Sudan's political ties with Saudi Arabia[48]. By seizing the opportunity presented by the revolution, the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia were able to unite Sudan with their bloc and begin working with the TMC. In a matter of days, the UAE and Saudi Arabia had promised $3 billion in direct help to the TMC[49].

[47] Interview with Journalist, Fana Broadcasting Corporate S.C, Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, July, 2023
[48] https://pomeps.org/the-great-game-of-the-uae-and-saudi-arabia-in-sudan, July 23, 2023.
[49] https://www.arabnews.com/node/1485726/middle-east, July 23, 2023.

Thirteen months have passed since the beginning of the fight in Sudan between army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his former deputy, Mohamed Hamdan "Hemeti" Dagalo, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) (Al Jazeera, July 24, 2023) and doesn't seem to be going anywhere anytime soon. Numerous cease-fires have been disregarded by the leaders of the two opposing factions as they have persisted in their efforts to seize state authority. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are escalating the rivalry between al-Burhan and Hemeti in the present turmoil in Sudan. The UAE endorsed Hemeti, while Saudi Arabia, despite its best efforts to project neutrality, is backing al-Burhan[50].

4.2.1.3. Dynamics of Political Relations of Saudi Arabia with Somalia

Since the collapse of Somalia's central government in 1991, Saudi Arabia has maintained neither diplomatic nor consular ties with Somalia. However, on January 18, 2017, in Mogadishu, Saudi Arabia's first ambassador to Somalia since the 1990s, Dr. Mohamed Abdi-kani Al-Khayat, gave President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud his credentials. After accepting the new envoy's official documents at the presidential palace, President Hassan and Dr. Mohamed Abdi-kani Al-Khayat discussed about how to strengthen and expand political connections between the two states. The ambassador announced during the event that Saudi Arabia would fund the establishment of the Somali Army and a facility for the rehabilitation of Al-Shabaab defector militia members and refugees making their way back home (Goobjoog English, January 18, 2017). The main subjects of contention in the two countries' recent bilateral ties have been the export of Somali cattle, the situation of Shia Islam in Somalia, and the status of Somali migrants in Saudi Arabia.

Somalia is strategically significant due to its closeness to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf region's oil deposits and facilities, and the sea lanes used to transport oil to the West. Thus, preserving cordial diplomatic connections with the Somalia, securing military access agreements, and monitoring the actions of other foreign nations are all part of the Saudi Arabia's interests in the region. A number of geopolitical concerns, including aspirations for regional leadership, oil export strategy, and relations with the United States and other Western nations, have caused tensions in the bilateral relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. There is a continuous rivalry

[50] Interview with Political Science scholar, Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, July 2023

between Saudi Arabia and Iran for power in the Middle East and other parts of the Muslim world. Saudi Arabia uses soft power approach to compel nations to sever ties with Iran. According to a document obtained by Reuters, the same day Somalia announced it was severing relations with Saudi competitor Iran, Somalia received a $50 million aid guarantee from Saudi Arabia and closed the Iman Khomeini Foundation, an Iranian charity located in Mogadishu (Reuters, January 17, 2016; Mohamed, January 8, 2016).

On November 12, 2023, the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inked a crucial Security Cooperation Agreement in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. This action is a sign that the two countries' security and political relations are getting stronger. The agreement aims to improve security cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Somalia by addressing significant issues including intelligence sharing, capacity building, and counterterrorism (Abdalla, November 12, 2023).

4.2.2. Dynamics of Political Relations of Türkiye with Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia

Türkiye has been dominated by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which was established in 2001 by members of the nation's conservative parties and obtained a majority in the 2002 parliamentary election. The Turkish economy has grown enormously during the AKP's rule. Under the slogan "zero problems with our neighbors," Turkish foreign policy from 2002 to 2010 was focused on regional economic cooperation (Van Veen, and Yüksel, 2018). Growth in the country's economy allowed the Turkish government to pursue a more assertive foreign policy, which in turn enabled prosperous Turkish businesses-known as "Anatolian tigers"-to grow to the point where they were eager to expand their market internationally (Hosgör, 2011). As the AKP tightened its hold on power in Türkiye (mostly over the military), the party's increasingly stable home base gave the ruling AKP more confidence to take risks internationally (Jenkins, June 20, 2018). The party began realigning its foreign policy to more closely fit with the ideological tenets of the AKP and less with the demands of the economy.

Türkiye's more active and assertive foreign policy and expanding footprint in the HoA are made possible by its economic success and stable home power base. Türkiye's position is seen in light of its strategic interests in the HoA as well as its own internal motivators. The AKP's philosophy has a significant impact on Turkish foreign policy. The Horn's geostrategic significance has increased due to economic and security advancements, which have resulted in the growth of foreign military outposts and the use of soft power strategies like foreign corporate investments. Türkiye's attention has been drawn to the HoA as a result of growing economic, political, and security interests. This section discusses Türkiye's political ties to the HoA, particularly to Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia.

4.2.2.1. Dynamics of Political Relations of Türkiye with Ethiopia

The first diplomatic mission exchange between Ethiopia and Türkiye in 1896 laid the groundwork for diplomatic ties between the two nations under the reigns of Türkiye's Sultan Abdülhamid II and Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia. In an effort to strengthen commercial ties with Ethiopia, the first Ottoman-Turkish Consulate General established in Harar town, in 1912. The first Embassy of the Republic of Türkiye in Sub-Saharan Africa was opened in Addis Ababa in 1926. In 1933, Ethiopia established an embassy in Turkey (Capital Newspaper, October 3, 2023). After a protracted closure in 1984 under the Communist Derg dictatorship, the Ethiopian Embassy in Ankara reopened in 2006 (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 09, 2023).

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Many African nations adopted democracy and a free market economy as a universal political and economic model following the fall of communism in 1990. Following the collapse of the Derge on May 28, 1991, Ethiopia transitioned from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. The country now has more investment possibilities thanks to the introduction of a free market economy and the deregulation of economic sectors. Türkiye has followed a plan of coordinated actions by official bodies and civil society organizations to enhance relations with Addis Ababa. Among these actions are the establishment of a TİKA office, the introduction of Turkish Airlines (a partially state-owned airline) on scheduled flights, the opening of an embassy and consulates, the establishment of schools through non-governmental organizations and charitable foundations, and diplomatic visits accompanied by businesspeople and other members of civil society (Mosley, 2021).

Türkiye and Ethiopia made efforts to advance their political relationship in addition to their economic collaboration. Following the appointment of Dr. Abiy Ahmed as the new prime minister of Ethiopia, the political relationship significantly improved. Ethiopia and Türkiye signed a number of agreements to improve their political ties. Other than politics, the two nations' economies were linked in the areas of financial assistance, technical collaboration, tourism, and social and cultural exchanges[51].

In a conflict "addicted" HoA, Ethiopia is critical power for any country aiming to have any relation with the HoA. The recent reality in Ethiopia is that numerous conflicts have continued propagating and immersing the country into domestic ethnic based conflicts and exposing the country for huge global actors trying to interrupt the peaceful economic development of the country. In the recent past Ethiopia were under pressure of western countries, including EU and the US because of TPLF's war; and Egypt and Sudan over GERD. TPLF war destabilized Northern Ethiopia and exposed the country for economic sabotage. At this critical juncture, Türkiye was one of the countries that has extended its hand to assist Ethiopia in every dimension the country requested. Although Cairo and Khartoum have frequently did their best to convince Türkiye to apply pressure on Ethiopia to close down the construction of GERD, Ankara rejected to entertain their demands stating that the issue must be handled by the three involved countries' efforts. Currently, they have good economic and political relations.

4.2.2.2. Dynamics of Political Relations of Türkiye with Sudan

Türkiye and Sudan have deep-rooted relations due to earlier historical, religious and cultural bonds between the two countries from the time when the Ottoman Empire had dominance in the region. As a result of historical connection, Türkiye and Sudan share some Ottoman legacy. In early 19th century, Muhammad Ali of Egypt assigned by Ottomans Empire conquered Sudan and originated the era of Turkiyah (Turkish rule). After the Tanzimat reforms were implemented during the Turkiyah era, Sudanese slavery was outlawed nearly instantly. The Tanzimat reforms made some progress in the Sudanese economy.

[51] Interview with councilor, Türkiye desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, July 2023.

Starting 1870s, declining of Ottoman Empire created fertile ground for birth of the rebellion movement led by Muhammad Ahmad against the Turks (Omer, 2014). Muhammad Ahmad proclaimed himself as Mahdi and started the Mahdist War against both Egyptians/Ottomans alike. Sudanese Mahdists profoundly defeated the Ottomans military. However, Ottoman Turks/Egyptians crushed the Mahdists through expensive and brutal struggle war and re-conquered Sudan (Eugene, 2015). Britain cut off Egypt and Sudan from the Ottomans after World War I broke out, and the two countries would not establish formal diplomatic ties until the middle of the 20th century. However, in 1916 the Sultanate of Darfur declared alliance to the Ottomans, and as a consequence British annexed Darfur to Sudan[52].

Sudan got independency from the United Kingdom and Egypt on January 1, 1956 and Türkiye recognized Sudan's independence officially. Türkiye was in the list of the first countries to recognize Sudan independency and immediately in 1956 opened an Embassy in Khartoum. Türkiye was also among the first countries to open an embassy in Sudan. Nevertheless, for most of the late 20th century, Türkiye-Sudan political and diplomatic relations were described as more of detachment due to divergence of interest, because Türkiye had more favored interests towards the ME and Balkans, whereas Sudan was struggling in the domestic political chaos. Regardless of divergence of interest, political relations were warm under Gaafar Nimeiry, but had become deteriorated at the time of Omar al-Bashir from 1990s to 2010s (Terzi, 11 March 2019).

However, after years of cold relations the political landscape was changed due to initiatives of neo-Ottomanism espousing Justice and Development Party and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Founded in 2001 and winning elections in 2002, the Justice and Development Party, or AKP as it is formally known in English, is a conservative-democratic political party in Türkiye. Under the direction of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Türkiye started to focus its attention on the HoA in the 2010s, and Sudan was one of the nations to which this attention was directed. Due to the strong hidden intention of AKP to revive neo-Ottomanism, the political relation with Sudan boosted and Türkiye has enhanced its appearance in Sudan[53].

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[52] https://www.britannica.com/place/Darfur, January 11, 2024.
[53] https://www.trtworld.com/africa/turkey-s-relationship-with-sudan-is-making-waves-in-the-red-sea-region-22013, January 12, 2024.

Due to long-standing and significant religious, historical, and cultural ties as well as geopolitical significance, Sudan remained Türkiye's most significant ally in the HoA. The signing of numerous cooperation agreements and reciprocal high-level visits reinforced the robust and ongoing deepening of bilateral relations in a variety of disciplines. The visit of H.E. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Sudan on December 24–26, 2017, is significant in the history of relations between Sudan and Türkiye[54]. One dozen agreements, including memorandums of understanding, were inked while Erdoğan was in town. During this visit, a declaration on the creation of a High Level Strategic Cooperation framework was also inked.

The 99-year lease of the Sudanese island of Suakin to Türkiye was a confirmation of the beginning of friendly relations in December 2017 (Amin, 19 March 2018). Therefore, the 2010s can be seen as a period of cordial political ties between Sudan and Türkiye, with Omar al-Bashir and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan leading respectively. However, Omar al-Bashir's presidency was rocked by the 2019 revolution in Sudan, which resulted in his overthrow and tarnished Sudan's relations with Türkiye. Türkiye made several attempts in 2019 to suppress growing anti-Bashir protests and to back Omar al-Bashir's government. However, Türkiye failed to save Omar al-Bashir's regime, and following al-Bashir's ouster, the transitional government canceled the leasing agreement of Suakin (Sudan Tribune, April 26, 2019). Al-Bashir was toppled in April 2019, and a transitional administration was put in place.

Türkiye has maintained its political ties with Sudan's transitional government even after al-Bashir was overthrown. As part of the ongoing diplomatic relations, H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the foreign minister of Türkiye, traveled to Sudan on August 16–17, 2019, for the Constitutional Declaration signing ceremony in Khartoum. The three-year transition phase was to be governed by the Constitutional Declaration. Minister Çavuşoğlu praised Sudan's Acting Foreign Minister Omer Dahab Mohamed for the country's efforts toward political reconciliation during their meeting that same day. During the discussion, he gave his assurance that Türkiye is prepared to move forward with its cooperation projects with Sudan as soon as the country's new government takes office. In an effort to strengthen their political ties, H.E. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok met in 2019 during the 74th UN General Assembly in

[54] https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkiye-and-sudan.en.mfa, July 13, 2023.

New York. Additionally, H.E. Minister Çavuşoğlu and the Minister of Defense, H.E. Hulusi Akar, had discussions with their Sudanese counterparts.

Improved diplomatic ties led to the start of several projects in Sudan by Turkish governmental and non-governmental groups. For instance, Turkish NGOs and the Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) have worked on humanitarian and development initiatives together. They provided emergency humanitarian aid for nearby populations while working closely and in unison with the relevant Sudanese authorities. Nyala Turkish-Sudanese Research and Training Hospital was constructed by TIKA and opened for business on February 28, 2014. In 2020, Ziraat Katılım Bank became the first Turkish bank to operate in Africa when it opened a branch in Sudan. Türkiye created the Türkiye Scholarships program as part of its development strategy, and since 1992, 654 Sudanese students have benefited from the program[55].

4.2.2.3. Dynamics of Political Relations of Türkiye with Somalia

Türkiye and Somalia have a lengthy relationship dating back to the middle ages. The Ajuran Empire had developed strong military and commercial ties with the Ottoman Empire by the middle ages. The Portuguese invaded Somalia in 1542, and the sultan of Mogadishu was compelled to sign a peace contract with them. Somalis were unhappy with the Portuguese government because of religious differences; therefore they began working with the Ottomans to fight the Portuguese. The joint Ottoman-Somali campaign against the Portuguese was successful in expelling them and ending their hegemony over the Indian Ocean.

The Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu opened its doors in 1979, closed because of the civil war in 1991, and reopened on November 1st, 2011. The Turkish Consulate General in Hargeisa opened for business on June 1st, 2014. Despite the closure of the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu in 1991, Türkiye continued to monitor the country's events and made efforts to support the building of stability and peace in Somalia (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 01, 2024).

[55] https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkiye-and-sudan.en.mfa, July 13, 2023.

Türkiye has developed into a more assertive and active regional force throughout the last ten years. Since 2011, it has expanded its presence in the HoA, particularly in Somalia, even though its primary concentration has been on the Middle East (Van Veen and Yüksel, 2018). Türkiye's history in the HoA dates back to the time when the Ottoman Empire ruled the area. Its involvement has been very little in modern times, but it took a sharp turn in 2011 when it made its way into Somalia. Türkiye has maintained the broadest level of engagement with Somalia ever since. Many in Somalia enthusiastically welcomed Türkiye's intervention during the 2011 famine, which gained notoriety for combining humanitarian supplies with business connections and official diplomacy (Pitel, May 25, 2016).

Türkiye selected Somalia from the HoA despite the considerable hazards because of the possible rewards in terms of profit, improved diplomatic profile, and worldwide recognition. In addition, Türkiye's engagement was successful because of its comprehensive strategy, willingness to take risks, and timing during the peak of the 2011 famine, which distinguished it from other foreign actors in the region (Cannon, 2016). The international community acknowledged Türkiye's involvement in Somalia. While the international community has typically viewed Türkiye's developmental and economic activities positively, its recent turn to more ambitious geopolitical and heavier security commitments has drawn caution.

As stated by Donelli (2018) and Wasuge (2016), Turkish involvement in Somalia has "brought together a variety of actors - government officials, aid agencies, Civil Society Organizations, religious organizations, municipalities, and the private sector" and has "combined political, developmental, economic, and humanitarian support" from the beginning. This stands in stark contrast to Western involvement in Somalia, which usually concentrates on security or humanitarian and development assistance. Türkiye's apparent success and succinct approach to dealing with Somalia are remarkable. Even though Türkiye has entered Somalia in 2011, Ankara can point to a number of documented successes and an arguably disproportionate presence in a turbulent nation that is sometimes referred to as a failed state (The Conversation, February 4, 2018). Currently, Türkiye has strong political relation with Somalia.

4.2.3. Dynamics of Political Relations of United Arab Emirates with Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia

Currently, the UAE enjoys strong economic relations with nations in the HoA, including Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia. The complicated and multidimensional political connection between the UAE and Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia is covered in some detail in this section, along with some of its major contemporary and present elements.

4.2.3.1. Dynamics of Political Relations of United Arab Emirates with Ethiopia

The UAE's and Ethiopia's current relationship dates back to the Cold War era. Ethiopia and the UAE established diplomatic ties in 1973 and since then, there has been an increase in the political and economic relationships (Fana Broadcasting Corporate, November 28, 2023). However, as indicated by official documents from both parties and the official media of the UAE, the formal and complete diplomatic relations between the two nations, particularly their economic ties, date back to the EPRDF government precisely in 2003–2004. Ethiopia initiated the diplomatic mission to exchange with the UAE in August 2003 when it opened its Dubai Consular Office, and the UAE subsequently accredited the Riyadh embassy to Ethiopia due to the two countries' rapid economic growth and political stability. In response to this move, Ethiopia opened an embassy in Abu Dhabi in 2013 while the UAE opened one in Addis Ababa in 2012[56].

Once the two nations established their embassies in their capital cities, they started exchanging official delegations and eventually established the Joint Ministerial Commission following two meetings, one in Addis Ababa in March 2010 and the other in Abu Dhabi in March 2007 (Emirates News Agency, November 7, 2019). It is believed that this evolution in the two nations' relationship is an indication of how their relationship is developing. Following 2018, their bilateral ties are exhibiting previously unheard-of growth in a variety of areas.

Strong and deeply ingrained, the UAE-Ethiopian relationship has seen impressive growth on many fronts. Friendship and shared interests have always been the cornerstones of the two

[56] Interview with councilor, United Arab Emirates desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, July 2023.

nations' relationship. The leaders of the two nations sincerely want to work together in areas of shared interest, and this is something extra. Under the administrations of the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, formal connections between the two nations were established (Emirates 24/7, August 18, 2023). The UAE was able to construct an air and naval facility in the port of Assab in April 2015 thanks to the security agreement that was negotiated between Eritrea and Saudi Arabia. The Ethiopian government regarded the acts of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as a grave danger to national security, casting doubt on the political relationship between the UAE and Ethiopia.

2018 saw a dramatic shift in Ethiopian politics, upending the EPRDF government and elevating Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali to the role of prime minister. The political relationship with the UAE has begun to strengthen since the political shift. Ethiopia's prime minister visited the UAE in May 2018 and spoke with the crown prince about measures to strengthen bilateral relations between the two nations as well as other regional concerns. A month after Abiy's visit, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi traveled to Ethiopia, where he met with his counterpart Abiy Ahmed to discuss a range of topics. They decided to strengthen their strategic alliance, friendship, and cooperative relationship (Emirates 24/7, June 16, 2018). Over time, there has been a close political relationship between the two countries. Additionally, the UAE played a significant role in the peace agreement that Eritrea and Ethiopia signed. Ethiopia is totally dedicated to working closely with the UAE to advance both countries' interest and to fortify ties between the UAE and the HoA.

4.2.3.2. Dynamics of Political Relations of United Arab Emirates with Sudan

In 1992 the UAE drove out the Sudanese ambassador in Abu Dhabi and six other Sudanese diplomats. The UAE rejected successive call of Sudan to re-establish full diplomatic relationship. Nevertheless, after a period of rejection between the two countries political relations enhanced appreciably in late 90’s. In 1999, UAE and Sudan decided to reinstate their diplomatic relations to ambassador level[57]. Since 1999, the bilateral relations between the UAE and Sudan began improving steadily in the following years and they have enhanced their collaboration in various fields. In 2008 under the invitation of President, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed, President Omer

[57] https://sudantribune.com/article26355/, July 14, 2023.

Hassan al-Bashir had a three-day visit in UAE[58] and since then the relations between Sudan and the UAE showed noticeable development in the political and economic fields. Huge increase in UAE foreign direct investments in Sudan and the trade exchange between the two countries is a witness of the improved relations.

Even though they did not publicly express it, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were unhappy with the al-Bashir government in Sudan, despite having long provided billions of dollars in financial and investment support for it[59]. But when President al-Bashir dispatched thousands of soldiers from Sudan to bolster the Gulf states' engagement in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the UAE' resentment toward him subsided. However, they were more and more incensed by al-Bashir's failure to honor his pledges to sever ties with the Islamist support base and its funders, Qatar and Turkey. Al-Bashir's refusal to choose a side in the 2017 economic and diplomatic embargo against Qatar, which was imposed by the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Bahrain due to Qatar's alleged support for Islamists, infuriated the UAE and Saudi Arabia more. It is logical to believe that the concept of a regime change in Sudan conceived on the day al-Bashir declined to back Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the GCC dispute.

Contrary to UAE' counterrevolutionary involvement in Egypt or Yemen to dissolve the accomplishments of popular revolts, UAE was blissful to see the collapse of al-Bashir government. In 2019, when al-Bashir government was in downturn due to revolts caused by economic difficulties, UAE stopped fuel supplies and financial aid[60], which in sequence deteriorated the economic crisis that was aggravating the mass anti-government protests. The Gulf state's first move toward backing regime change in Sudan was to cease support during such trying times, which sparked the overthrow of the al-Bashir government. Al-Bashir was deposed by the country's military in April 2019 in response to demands for regime change made by anti-government demonstrators. Al-Bashir's downfall was caused by his incapacity to do a thorough analysis of Middle East affairs and his inability to bind himself to a single, important coalition in

[58]https://sudantribune.com/article26355/, July 14, 2023.
[59] https://wam.ae/en/details/1395302674291, July 20, 2023.
[60] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190703-abandoned-by-the-uae-sudans-bashir-was-destined-to-fall/, July 19, 2023.

the area[61]. The UAE and Saudi Arabia promptly committed US$3 billion in assistance to the military government following al-Bashir's removal from office by the military on April 11, 2019.[62].

When the protest erupted in 2019, the UAE and the United States agreed that it was the time for Mr. al-Bashir to go but they possible had different views about what form of government should be established. The United States opted for transition to a civilian-led democracy; however, leaders of UAE believe that democracy is not the best model of governance[63] and they preferred replacement of al-Bashir government by the military rather than political groups and politicians. However, on August 17, 2019, a transitional government with both military and civilian components was established as a result of public and international pressure (Al Jazeera August 17, 2019). Civilian component of the transitional government structure under the leadership of Mr. Hamdok promised to reduce Sudanese soldiers from Yemen[64] and this was seen by UAE as a move against the interest of Gulf monarchs. Mr. Hamdok was against UAE-supported Sudanese military dominance in key sectors of the economy[65].

Mr. Hamdok was overthrown by a military coup on October 25, 2021, and the Sudanese military thereafter seized control (Relief Web, April 07, 2023). Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok was reinstated in November, 2021 but civilian organizations disputed the move, and Hamdok resigned in January 2022 in the face of ongoing protests. The UAE did not denounce the military-organized coup because of its preference for the military regime. The UAE backed the military side of the transitional government, which was led by Generals Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the army chief, and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, the commander of the notorious Rapid Support Forces (RSF), in order to further its goals and objectives. The two

[61] Interview with councilor, Africa desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, July 2023.
[62] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-emirates-saudi/sudan-has-received-half-the-3-billion-promised-by-saudi-arabia-and-uae-idUSKBN1WN137, July 20, 2023.
[63] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/magazine/united-arab-emirates-mohammed-bin-zayed.html, July 17, 2023.
[64] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-politics/sudan-says-it-has-reduced-troops-in-yemen-to-5000-idUSKBN1YC0H4, July 19, 2023.
[65] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/15/unacceptable-sudanese-pm-criticises-armys-business-interests, July 20, 2023.

individuals positioned themselves as anti-Islamist and had close ties to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

After they consolidated power, Sudanese military leaders promised to reverse Mr. Hamdok's decision to withdraw Sudanese soldiers from Yemen. The armed forces and the RSF leaders and military personnel have profited from the deployment of military personnel to fight alongside Emirati- and Saudi-backed forces in Libya[66] and Yemen[67]. The number of Sudanese soldiers had majority in the anti-Houthi alliance's ground troops deployed in Yemen. According to UAE officials, they had contributed almost $7 billion to Sudan's GDP by 2018. These included 871 million dollars in fuel subsidies and $1.4 billion in foreign exchange reserves held by the Central Bank (Abbas, 14 March 2018).

The UAE has implemented a policy in Sudan that prioritizes its interests over the political stability and economic growth of the HoA. UAE believed that one potential tactic to enhance its interests would be to facilitate Sudan's recognition of Israel. In order to carry out its plan, the UAE set up a covert meeting between General Al-Burhan and then-prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Uganda in February 2020; Mr. Hamdok, the prime minister of Sudan, was not invited (Amin, February 04, 2020). The UAE's malicious actions widened the rift between Sudan's transitional government's military and civilian branches. The idea of Sudan recognizing Israel was opposed by a sizable portion of the populace as well as many members of the political class.

The UAE and Sudan made the decision to start strategic economic alliances in many fields in 2022. Additionally, the UAE pledged to support Sudan's banking sector's reform and stabilization. UAE was supporting the transitional government of Sudan in diverse issues. For instance, the UAE and Sudan signed a $6 billion investment package in 2022, which included a $300 million cash deposit to the central bank of Sudan, the creation of a free trade zone between the two nations, and a significant agricultural investment project. Sudan has a reputation for

[66] https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis//2020/01/csdp-sudanese-militias-in-libya, July 17, 2023.
[67] https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/world/africa/saudi-sudan-yemen-child-fighters.html, July 16, 2023.

receiving aid from the UAE during trying times. Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan ordered the urgent gift of 25 million dirhams (AED) from the UAE to aid Sudanese impacted by floods in 2022 after flooding caused tragedy. In 2020, the UAE supplied medical supplies such vaccines, test kits, masks, and sanitizer in an effort to combat the COVID-19 epidemic (Know Afrika, April 22, 2023).

Hemeti led the RSF (formerly known as the *janjaweed*) alongside al-Burhan's army in Darfur under al-Bashir's reign. Using the coup of 2021 as an opportunity, Hemedti elevated al-Burhan's deputy. Al-Burhan and Hemeti disagreed, nevertheless, on matters of power and the future of RSF. Hemedti argued that the RSF should be integrated into the Sudanese military within ten years, but Al-Burhan wanted this to happen in two years. As the differences grew, fighting broke out on April 15, 2023, between the RSF, led by Hemeti, and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by al-Burhan (Gbadamosi, April 19, 2023).

As fighting continues between the army and the paramilitary RSF chaos proliferating in Sudan, has attracted serious attention of UAE and Saudi Arabia, which have great concern in the country's future in relation to their national and regional interests. The clash between al-Burhan and Hemeti is not simply a domestic competition between two strong men just for seizing power. Due to Sudan's advantageous location as a natural resource-rich bridge linking the ME and Africa, several Gulf countries have expressed interest in helping Sudan change. Heavyweights in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, saw the conflict as a potential tactic to bolster their hegemonic position in the region (Mohammad, July 12, 2023).

Since oust of al-Bashir in 2019, UAE and Saudi Arabia have been trying to enhance their sphere of influence in Sudan. In the past two years UAE was supporting both al-Burhan and Hemeti, however UAE realized that the policy of supporting competing two strong men does not profit much and started backing Hemeti while Saudi Arabia is supporting al-Burhan (Cafiero, April 28, 2023). UAE begun security and economic relations with Hameti and offered him with considerable military supplies to support his soldiers. So, due to their complex calculation of their game in the HoA, they are not on the same page and they are fueling the situation.

According to some expert depending on the course of Sudan’s internal fighting, the UAE might shift sides.

4.2.3.3. Dynamics of Political Relations of United Arab Emirates with Somalia

There is historical connection between the regions that comprise modern-day Somalia and the UAE. Throughout the Middle Ages and the early modern period, the succeeding Somali Sultanates maintained close relations with neighboring countries across the Red Sea. The UAE upheld diplomatic ties and encouraged the political endeavors of the Transitional Federal Government, which succeeded the Transitional National Government, following the outbreak of the Somali civil war in 1991 (Gulf News, September 11, 2011). The Emirati authorities expressed their support for Somalia's government, territorial integrity, and sovereignty, and welcomed the Federal Government of Somalia's subsequent establishment in August 2012.

The UAE backed Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in the 2012 Somali presidential election in the hopes that he would distance himself from Turkey. Under Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's administration (2012–2017), Somalia and the UAE maintained strong political connections. Somalia has ratified numerous financial and military accords and received material and financial support from the UAE. But conditions deteriorated with Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed's election in 2017. Abdullahi enjoys cordial ties with Qatar and Turkey, despite their strained relationship with the UAE. Following Mogadishu's rejection of Saudi Arabia's and the Emiratis' attempts to sever ties with Qatar over internal discord among the Gulf neighbors, Somalia reiterated its neutrality in the dispute (Aljazeera, April 11, 2018). Despite receiving backing from Qatar during the election, Abdullahi Mohamed's impartiality conveyed a strong message to Abu Dhabi. Political relations between the UAE and Somalia were immediately halted, and the UAE discontinued its security aid initiatives.

Following a five-year term out of office, Somali President Hassan Sheik Mohamud's return to government in 2022 upended both HoA geopolitics and Somali politics. Hassan is not the only person returning to Mogadishu, though. Saudi Arabia-backed Sheik Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ) of the UAE has been gradually repairing ties with Mogadishu since it withdrew military cooperation and aid in 2018. The bilateral political relationship between UAE and

Somalia had significantly improved and they signed a formal agreement to cooperate on many issues. The UAE's Ambassador, Ahmad Juma Al Rumaithi, confirmed the close bilateral ties between the two countries in a number of fields during a meeting with Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre. Al Rumaithi also emphasized the UAE's eagerness to expand opportunities for cooperation and fortify relations in order to realize the goals of both nations and their peoples (Nashar, January 18, 2024).

4.3. Dynamics of Security Engagements of Middle East States and HoA

The HoA region has witnessed a steady build-up of foreign military forces on land, at sea, and in the air during the past 20 years. In 2000s, security threats internal to the HoA such as counter terrorism and counter piracy were the major factor that attracted the deployment of external security actors the region. However, in 2010s security threats external to the HoA are the key factor that increased the accumulation of foreign military forces in the region. Especially since 2010, rising presence of military forces from China, Japan, and some Middle East States are witnessed.

The HoA is undergoing significant changes in its security interactions with regional and international powers, as seen by the growing number of foreign security actors and the increased presence of foreign military personnel. The diversity of foreign security actors implies the multiplicity of the security agendas of regional and global powers in the HoA (Melvin, 2019A). Surge of military bases in Djibouti and other HoA countries indicates that, the security of the region is vital to regional and global security developments. Inception of Middle East States military base in the HoA implies the crucial significance of the HoA countries to the national and regional security of Middle East States.

Middle East States have had extensive interactions with HoA over many years, primarily due to their close vicinity. The interactions have become more and more tied to politics and security in recent years. The regional power competition within the ME fed the growing security interaction of some MES with the HoA. Since the 1960s and the era of decolonization, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, for example, have maintained strong security ties with HoA (Verhoeven, 2018). However, Türkiye, the UAE, Iran, and Qatar have been involved since around ten years.

Ideological and power competition between Saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt axis against Qatar, Türkiye, and Iran alliance in the Middle East was projected to HoA and they made attempts to establish ties with Horn in order to attract Horn countries to their side and weakens their rivals. Since 2011, the political interruptions of the Arab Spring aggravated the already developing rift between Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt alliance and Turkey and Qatar axis in the Middle East. For example, to diminish the influence of Saudi Arabia and enhance its role, Iran has been trying to found a permanent naval base in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden (Lefebvre, 2012; Lefebvre, 2019).

As part of its bid, in 2008, Iran had made a deal with Eritrea to found a naval base at the port of Assab (Shazly, Dec 11, 2012). However, in 2015 the agreement was rescinded when Eritrea joined the Saudi Arabian-led alliance against the Iranian-supported Houthi rebels in the Yemeni civil war. For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, wave of instability resulting from Arab Spring in the North Africa and Middle East, the increase of countries sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran's apparent rising regional power encouraged them to commence new security ties with countries of the HoA.

After AK party took office, increased visibility of Türkiye in the HoA and its plans to create military bases and ports are indicators of Türkiye's initiatives to strengthen its military and commercial influence in the HoA and along the coasts of East African (Al-Ashkar, January 05, 2018; Kenyon, March 8, 2018). After establishing overseas military base in the ME, in Qatar in 2016, Türkiye's next immediate move was to the HoA (Murdock, 10 May 2016). Almost simultaneous initiatives of Türkiye in the HoA and the Gulf show the security weight given to the two regions. AK party presented its overseas military aspiration to its citizen as a means to regain Türkiye's historical influence in regions of the former Ottoman Empire. Türkiye's military presence in the HoA has strategic importance to advance its sphere of influence to ME and Western Indian Ocean (Ardemagni, April 11, 2018). Thus, in their bid for power and influence in the HoA, the Red Sea, North Africa and the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt consider Türkiye as their competitor along with Qatar and Iran (Melvin, 2019B). Therefore, Türkiye's posture and ambitions to establish military bases in and around HoA is seen as an attempt to diminish their position and dominance in the stated regions.

The UAE flag was spotted waving on the tiny island of Socotra in April 2018, almost four months after the agreement between Türkiye and Sudan was announced (Shami, March 24, 2023). The island of Socotra is strategically placed to oversee both the entrance to the Red Sea from the south and Bab el-Mandeb Strait due to its location in the Arabian Sea. Donelli and Cannon (2019) claim that the two events, which at first glance seemed unconnected, are proof, for some, of a complex political and ideological chess match between competing blocs in the ME that now stretches into Africa.

The Arab Spring upheavals in 2011 and the Yemen war in 2015 forced Middle East States to form coalitions in order to gain adequate regional dominance. The Middle East's engagement in the HoA region, notably Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, Iran, and Qatar, has undoubtedly increased geopolitical tensions and regional rivalries, leading to the militarization of the area (Kabandula and Shaw, 2018). The Middle East region became a theater of political and military balancing acts amid constant battle for regional domination due to the lack of undisputed regional hegemony and fragile power relations. Current security interactions across the Red Sea regions are integral part of the entangled act of rebalancing of power dynamic in the Middle East (Barry and Waever, 2003). In the sections follows security interactions of the UAE and Türkiye with Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia will be discussed.

4.3.1. Dynamics of Security Engagements of the United Arab Emirates with Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia

In an effort to secure its national security and diversify its economy, the UAE forged relations with the HoA. The UAE has been actively developing a network of mixed military and commercial port infrastructure in order to achieve its objectives. This development has been documented in various media outlets such as Quartz Africa (Dahir, April 11, 2017) and Asia Times (Brennan, May 26, 2018). As ally of Saudi Arabia and due to its national security interest, to diminish the sphere of influence of Iran in the Arabian Peninsula and HoA, UAE has established military and commercial bases along the Red Sea coast. The UAE' security cooperation with Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia will be covered in this section.

4.3.1.1. Engagements of the United Arab Emirates with Djibouti

In 2006, Dubai Ports (DP) World, a UAE corporation, signed a 30-year contract with Djibouti to manage and operate the Doraleh Container Terminal, as a result of the UAE's commercial ties with the country (Al Jazeera, February 24, 2018). However, there was conflict between officials from the UAE and Djibouti over the lease and the unapproved landing of a UAE plane at Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport. As a result, on April 28, 2015, diplomatic relations between the UAE and Djibouti were dissolved and the lease was revoked. On April 29, 2015 Djibouti ordered UAE soldiers to go away from Djibouti. So, currently, the UAE has no official security engagements with Djibouti (Tesfa News, May 15, 2015). However, as part of the coalition led by Saudi Arabia, the UAE had plans to create a military base and start security ties with Djibouti at the beginning of the civil war in Yemen.

4.3.1.2. Engagements of the United Arab Emirates with Eritrea

After Djibouti broke off diplomatic relation with UAE, as leader of Saudi-led coalition, Saudi Arabia opted to forge relations with other HoA countries. King of Saudi Arabia Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud met with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and negotiated and secured 30-year agreement to establish military base in Eritrean by UAE and from there to conduct GCC military operations in Yemen (Mello and Knights, September 2, 2016; Telci, and Horoz, 2018).

Construction of military base commenced around September 2015. Consequently, the UAE transferred its military base from Djibouti to Assab, Eritrea (Hansrod, December 26, 2016) and started security engagement with Eritrea. Initially, the UAE had no interest to establish security ties with Eritrea, however, the diplomatic broke off with Djibouti forced it to begin security engagement with Eritrea. For Eritrea, breaking diplomatic ties with Djibouti was a "*menna*" from heaven since it opens the door to security cooperation with the UAE, which will help Eritrea militarily and financially, among other things. Due to Abu Dhabi's decision to leave the Yemeni conflict, the Emirati military soldiers stationed at the Assab military base in Eritrea since 2015 announced their departure from the base in June 2019 (Gambrell, February 18, 2021). Currently, there is no much security relation between Eritrea and UAE.

4.3.1.3. Engagements of the United Arab Emirates with Sudan

Sudan's geographical location makes it a key entry point into sub-Saharan Africa, addition to accessing international trade routes and supply chains via the Bab al-Mandab strait. As a result, Sudan is of national interest to the UAE in terms of both economic and national security, among other areas. In the economic and political calculations of UAE, relation with Sudan has crucial role. A $6 billion agreement to build a port and commercial zone on Sudan's Red Sea coast was inked on June 20, 2022 by the country's military leadership and two Emirati-based businesses (Eltahir, June 21, 2022).

The deal includes the buildup of the Abu Amama port, which is situated on Sudan's Red Sea coast. This enormous project is a component of the UAE's larger African and Red Sea policies. To realize its vision of establishing a network of strategic stations, the port of Abu Amama is a decisive joint. The UAE aims to build a strategic, commercial, and/or military presence in the Arabian Gulf and Red Sea by utilizing ports in Sudan, Egypt, the HoA, and the Yemeni islands (Cafiero, April 28, 2023). In addition to its interest in the Red Sea and HoA, the UAE is expanding its political and economic ties to central and West Africa. Nonetheless, Sudan and the UAE do not yet have a formal security relationship.

4.3.1.4. Engagements of the United Arab Emirates with Somalia

The second nation to have troops in Somalia was the UAE ("Turkey sets up", 2017). The Federal Republic of Somalia's President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, and UAE Ambassador to Somalia, Mohammed Ahmed Al Othman, opened the Military Training Center in the country's capital, Mogadishu, on May 13, 2015. The facility is supported by the UAE government and is used to train the Somali Armed Forces (Relief Web, May 14, 2015). The construction of a military base in Mogadishu was intended to house a brigade that would defend Somalia. ("UAE-funded Military Training", 2015). The UAE Ambassador also promised opening of the UAE Hospital in Somalia having a capacity to serve more than 300 patients per day for free (The National New, May 13, 2015). UAE was establishing military bases not only in Somalia but also in Puntland and Somaliland, two of the country's semi-autonomous regions.

During Hasan Sheikh Mahmoud's administration in Somalia, the UAE and Somalia had close relations. However, after Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, also known as Formajo, was elected in 2017, things became worse. Abdullahi enjoyed positive ties with Turkey and Qatar, despite their strained relationship with the UAE. Following a conflict within the Gulf neighbors, Mogadishu refused efforts from Saudi Arabia and the Emiratis to sever ties with Qatar and instead Somalia declared its neutrality in the GCC dispute (Aljazeera, April 11, 2018).

After winning the president, Abdullahi condemned that the UAE did not respect Somalia's national sovereignty and denounced the construction of military bases in Somaliland and Puntland. In spite of Abdullahi's criticism, the UAE increased its involvement in Somaliland and Puntland and adopted a more assertive posture toward Somalia by endorsing political figures in these regions. The UAE supported Somaliland and Puntland's independence from Somalia, much to Somalia's dismay. Abdulahi made a strong stand against the UAE and stopped some of its operations from occurring in Somalia as a result of the UAE's actions that violate the country's national sovereignty. When the Somalian parliament approved a measure in March 2018 that forbade the UAE from conducting military or commercial operations there, the already strained relations between Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi worsened much worse.

When Somalian security forces apprehended a UAE-owned aircraft that was illegally transporting $9 million in cash into the country in April 2018, the conflict between the two nations reached a breaking point (Aljazeera, April 11, 2018). The Somali government reacted more forcefully to the Emirates following accusations that the funds in the aircraft were intended to be donated to anti-government organizations in the nation (Telci, April 26, 2018). Their security cooperation came to an end when the Somalian government ordered the UAE training forces to leave the country and took over the UAE facility (Aljazeera, April 11, 2018). As Somalia's Defense Minister Mohamed Mursal Abdirahman informed Somalia's national news agency SONNA, the soldiers in the program would be paid for and trained by the Somalia government (Sheikh, 2018). The UAE declared that it was stopping all military cooperation with

Somalia and closing the Sheikh Zayed hospital, which it had constructed, in reaction to the Mogadishu leadership's tough stance.

Analysts in the Ministry of Foreign affairs of Ethiopia claim that because Mogadishu has declined to take sides in the crisis between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Somalia's relations with the UAE are strained. Therefore, the primary causes for terminating the security cooperation are the UAE's actions that jeopardize Somalia's national sovereignty and the GCC crisis's influence over Somalia[68].

The election victory of Somalia's President Hassan Sheik Mohamud in 2022 made conditions favorable for the restoration of security relations between the UAE and Somalia. By February 2023, the bilateral military and security relationship between the UAE and Somalia had greatly strengthened, and they had formalized their agreement to work together on security matters (Milliken, May 06, 2024).

4.3.2. Dynamics of Security Engagements of Türkiye with Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia

There is a tremendous competition between nations vying for military sites along the Red Sea's coast in order to carve off areas of economic, political and security power. Similar to other nations, Türkiye has been forging security ties with nations in the HoA in an effort to expand its area of influence (van den Berg and Meester, 2019; Mahmood, January 28, 2020). This section discusses the dynamics of security relations of Türkiye with Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia.

4.3.2.1. Engagements of Türkiye with Djibouti

In 1977, diplomatic ties were established between Djibouti and Türkiye. The year 2012 saw the opening of the Djiboutian Embassy in Ankara, and 2013 saw the opening of the Turkish Embassy in Djibouti. There has been a consistent improvement in the political, economic, and

[68] Interview with councilor, United Arab Emirates desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, July 2023.

security ties between Djibouti and Türkiye (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 25, 2024). Djibouti's strategic significance is highlighted by its close proximity capacity to grant access to one of the most significant worldwide maritime chokepoints-the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb.

Currently, the United States of America, together with Britain, France, Italy, Japan, India, and China, are hosting military sites in Djibouti. Given that major countries have established naval bases in Djibouti, it makes sense for a large nation such as Türkiye to establish military and security ties with strategically important Djibouti. However, until 2020 there is no signed military and security agreement between Türkiye and Djibouti.

4.3.2.2. Engagements of Türkiye with Eritrea

In 1993, diplomatic ties were established between Turkey and Eritrea. The Turkish Embassy opened its doors in Asmara in 2013. The Embassy of Eritrea in Doha holds Turkish accreditation (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 20, 2024). The two nations do not have security or military agreements in place, despite their moderate political connections.

4.3.2.3. Engagements of Türkiye with Sudan

In an effort to deepen its security cooperation with the HoA countries, Türkiye opened its second military facility in Sudan after creating its largest military installation overseas in Somalia. In 2017, the relationship between Türkiye and Sudan in terms of security became increasingly apparent. Following their bilateral meeting in December 2017, Presidents of Türkiye and Sudan, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Umar al-Bashir, announced their agreement to rebuild the Ottoman port town of Suakin, which had been destroyed (Donelli and Cannon, 2019). The agreement gave Türkiye the right to build a maritime dock suitable for use by both military and civilian vessels. Suakin's crucial location is due to its existence on the Red Sea coast of Sudan. A permanent Turkish presence in the HoA was clearly strengthening, but this did not make certain powers in the region happy due to Suakin's strategic location and associated security concerns. Türkiye's bid for Suakin included a securitization process in and around the Red Sea.

Sawakin's revelation sparked a fierce regional outcry since it was seen as a component of a wider geopolitical conflict between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, and Iran, Qatar, and Türkiye, on the one side. Türkiye's growing ties with Sudan were perceived as a calculated maneuver to increase Türkiye's influence in the Red Sea area (Mazel, December 9, 2018). The Sawakin deal came only months after Türkiye said it was prepared to send troops to Qatar as the situation with the GCC deepened and shortly after the establishment of Türkiye's military camp in Somalia (Moubayed, December 28, 2017). Following the uprising against Omar al-Bashir, Türkiye was unable to preserve his dictatorship regime. As a result, the interim government terminated the lease deal for Suakin and Turkey's security cooperation with Sudan was terminated (Sudan Tribune, April 26, 2019).

4.3.2.4. Engagements of Türkiye with Somalia

As part of its attempt to exert its influence in Africa, Türkiye has commenced building military and commercial infrastructure along the HoA coastal areas. In the HoA, Türkiye has started its first commercial, diplomatic and security relations with Somalia in 2017. Türkiye opened its largest overseas military base in the Somalia capital, Mogadishu on September 30, 2017. But rather of seeing the site as a military installation, Türkiye saw it as a military training center (O'Connor, 2017; Rossiter and Cannon, 2019). As a result, the military training center was designed to function as an academy for preparing recruits for the Somali National Army, as stated in the official announcement.

The complex, which took $50 million to build, can accommodate at least 1,500 soldiers for training at once ("Turkey sets up", 2017). The task of establishing and training the Somali National Army was assigned to about 200 Turkish military soldiers ("Turkey opens largest", 2017). According to Chief of Staff of Türkiye, Hulusi Akar, the military base is the biggest training base outside of Türkiye. "The Turkish government and its army will provide all the necessary support to our brothers in Somalia," Akar declared during the ceremony ("Turkey sets up," 2017). Opening of Türkiye biggest overseas military base in the Somalia shows the determination of Türkiye to increase its presence in the HoA. External security actors who have geopolitical interests in the HoA region essentially pay attention to Somalia because of its geostrategic location[69]. The commencement of Türkiye’s security cooperation with Somalia signifies Türkiye’s acknowledgement of Somalia's enormous military and commercial significance. Support from Türkiye for Somalia's state building is directed toward mutually beneficial goals[70].

[69] Interview with councilor, Türkiye desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, July 2023.
[70] Interview with Journalist, Fana Broadcasting Corporate S.C, Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, July 2023.

Chapter Five

5. Identifying Challenges of the Middle East States-Horn of Africa Relations

History shows that the relations between the states of the Middle East and the HoA have evolved through a variety of historical events that were sparked by local, regional, or global factors. These events have shaped the political systems, economic conditions, regime types, and IR of the two regions' member states. Since 2000, due to global economic and political factors, the ties between Middle East and HoA is witnessing improvement. However, the relation is not symmetrical and it is in favor of Middle East States.

International relations professionals and scholars have debated the strengthened and asymmetrical interactions between the two regions. The first group views the relations overall beneficial while the second group as disadvantageous. The first group focused on the economic implications of the relations while the second group stresses the impacts on political stability and state survival. To support their positions, the two groups present their own historical, political and economic evidences and justifications. In the sections follows challenges related to the interaction of Middle East States with the HoA are discussed.

5.1. Challenges Related to Middle East States-Horn of Africa Relations

As a result of asymmetrical relation, the intervention of Middle East States in the HoA has terrifically affected Horn countries. In this regard, the best witness of the negative impact is seen in Somalia and Sudan. In the section below the challenges posted to HoA due to the interventions of Middle East States are discussed.

5.1.1. Competition in the Middle East States

The history and politics of ME/Gulf countries reveals that the region has no dominant ideology that creates sense of belongingness and unifies the countries in the region. Due to absence of hegemonic power in the region countries are doing their best implicitly and explicitly to present themselves as dominant power both politically and economically. They are thus engaged in both overt and covert competition to establish their supremacy in the international world.

Both their own region and neighboring regions are affected by the competition. The most accurate measure of the explicit completion is the GCC crisis of 2017. HoA is the best location for exporting and showcasing their competition because it is the nearest region to the Middle East States. Divisions within the HoA and within domestic politics have been made worse by their competition with one another and their importation to the HoA (imposition of Gulf divisions in the HoA). The competition between Qatar and other Gulf governments has had an impact on the states of the HoA, particularly Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia (Qatar supported the TPLF). Sudan and Somalia, in particular, have suffered greatly from the competition. The HoA is becoming more divided as a result of the practice of picking sides.

The export of the competition in the Middle East States to HoA highly impacted the stability of Somalia. Somalia is a country that has been hit by the regional competition in the Middle East States. The 2017 GCC crisis has revealed its negative impact on Somalia. The two competing countries, Qatar and UAE intervened in Somalia to ascertain the dominance. In Somalia, Qatar was supporting central government while UAE supporting regional governments. The intervention of countries with opposing agenda has sustained the instability in Somalia. It blurred the hope of peace and security in Somalia.

Somalia has suffered particularly as a result of the GCC split (International Crisis Group, June 05, 2018). The state-building effort in Somalia has been undermined by tensions between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, who have escalated internal divisions as a method of participating in competitive proxy politics. The situation worsened in 2018, to the point where the European Union and the African Union publicly pleaded with foreign governments to refrain from meddling in the country (Aljazeera, May 29, 2018).

Apparently it seems that there is alliance between UAE and Saudi, however, implicitly they are struggling for dominance in the Middle East. There are also hints that the alliance between the UAE and Saudi Arabia is just a cover for distinct strategic objectives. Saudi Arabia's top goal in the area is to oppose Iran. However, the UAE has evolved a more expansive geopolitical goal of extending its influence over the HoA (Kantack, September 26, 2017). UAE and Saudi Arabia had similar views before ousting al-Bashir, however on post al-Bashir political environment they had some differences emanating from their national and regional interest. In the current conflict in Sudan, UAE is supporting Hemeti, while Saudi is on the side of al-Burhan and their intervention obscured the optimism for peace and stability in Sudan.

As the above practical cases show that the division within the Gulf States had been aggravating the weaking of the regional cooperation/cohesion in the extremely fragile States of the Horn. Interference of Gulf States in the HoA is destroying the seed of collective security and development that has to be planted in the region. During the presentation of the study conducted by International Crisis Group on the impacts of Middle East States on HoA, Abdul Mohammed (Chief of Staff, AU High-Level Implementation Panel) said that USA has no coherent, tangible, and transparent policy toward the HoA[71]. Absence of clear policy toward HoA has made the region vulnerable to external powers who try to export the completion in their region. It seems that USA has outsourced HoA to Middle East powers. Lack of clear policy is a challenge for HoA countries and let free the Gulf countries to compete each other without any regard to the outcome to Horn countries. As global champion of peace and stability USA should have clear policy that advances the economic development, peace and security of HoA.

5.1.2. Lack of long term strategic goal

The other challenge in the relation between Middle East and Horn is the focus on short term goal instead of strategic long term relations. Middle East States, specially the Gulf countries need the relation with the Horn as an instrument to achieve their short and medium term national interests. They tend to use the asymmetrical relation as an advantage to realize their regional and national interest. Lack of genuine and long term foreign policy toward HoA is a great challenge to Horn countries because oscillating goals hinder horn countries to develop coherent foreign policy toward Middle East and pursue their national interest.

The intent and capability (resource) of Middle East States to effectively project power into HoA region are detrimental factors for states in the Horn. Middle East States have the intention to project power in the HoA however; at this time they are in short of resources necessary to successfully project hard power in the HoA for the length of time required to realize definite

[71] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l1Dj1f8IMw0&t=5579s

change in current distributions of power. As a result of limited capability the primary national security interest of Middle East States is defense of their country from external states and they have less appetite for security concerns in the more distant HoA. Thus, because of limited resource availability they continue to show their presence in the region without realizing any prospective, long-term and sustained deployment. Therefore, HoA countries should not depend on Middle East States for their security issues.

5.1.3. High Cash need of Horn of African countries

It is known that Gulf countries have petrodollars while Horn countries are financially weak. Horn countries are highly starved in cash money. Cash money starvation has played its own challenge in the relation between Middle East and HoA. The need for financial and humanitarian support to bolster their expanding economies is what motivates the countries in the HoA. They are looking more and more on the Middle East States for political and security cooperation as well as economic support. Relations between Africa and the Middle East are typically unbalanced, sporadic, and personalized. The development of long-term, mutually beneficial relationships is hampered by the asymmetrical, impromptu, and individualized nature of the relationship.

5.1.4. Lack of regional identity and collective security

Lack of regional identity and perception of collective security in the HoA made the countries in the Horn susceptible to unfair treatment in their interaction with Middle East States. Absence of regional identity created fertile ground for competing middle powers from Middle East to project their powers in HoA. In HoA the two dominant identities are religious identities. They are Christian and Islam based regional identity. Due to lack of perception of collective security, countries of HoA are working against each other and this created enabling environment for Middle East States to use the old tactics of divide and intervene strategy. Horn countries focus on bilateral relations not on regional concept, that is they do not conceive themselves as a region. They do not have well articulated regional goal and visions. Even though there are some attempts horn countries are not wholeheartedly willing to curb some of their interests in favor of greater regional interest. Lack of unity in strategy and vision has enabled the influx of policy from ME to horn.

5.1.5. Militarization of the region

Since two decades, among the most momentous changes in the security of the HoA has been appearance and strengthening of foreign military forces from both middle and great powers. Concern over dangers to maritime trade, particularly in the southern Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden, was the primary reason for the deployment of foreign military forces in the HoA. These counter-piracy operations later served as the impetus for the establishment of military installations throughout the Horn. The increasing security interaction of Middle East States with HoA led to the founding of military bases in the Horn region. Due to weak adaption nature of Horn countries security structure to new external security politics, the proliferation of external security actors in the HoA is creating challenges for Horn countries.

Since the opening of UAE military base in Ertieria, HoA is witnessing establishment of military forces and bases in the region. Increase of UAE's military forces and bases in the HoA might induce unhealthy contest among gulf countries and this might result in proxy war between Horn countries as it was happened in the cold war. Thus, excessive development of military forces and bases especially by ideologically rival countries could be a security threat to the Horn countries. UAE controlled ports include Berbera in Somaliland, Bosaso in Putland, Doraleh in Djibouti, Assab in Erteria etc. Control of many ports along Red sea is existential threat for landlocked countries like Ethiopia.

Appearance and persistence of crowded external security politics environment in the HoA creates enabling conditions for proxy war, increasing geopolitical tensions and a proliferation of externally crafted security agendas in the Horn. The emergence of external security actors with opposing security agenda may force Horn countries to align with or join a particular security grouping. Somalia has suffered because of involvement of Qatar and UAE in the domestic politics. In Sudan the conflict erupted between al-Burhan and Hemeti in 2023 and the resulting destabilization is the consequence of latent competition between UAE and Saudi Arabia. The persistence of destabilization in the HoA as a result of Middle East and Gulf countries intervention is becoming conventional and accepted characteristic of the HoA.

Chapter Six

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

6.1. Conclusions

The finding of this study reveals that Middle East is more involved in HoA than HoA is in the Middle East when it comes to the economic, political and security relationship between the two. As discussed in chapter 4, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye have improved their economic, political and security ties with the HoA countries over the past fifteen years. Interactions between the Middle East and the HoA are centered on investment, especially in sectors of lower geostrategic importance such as manufacturing, agriculture, construction, and services. Trade and investments are key components of Middle East policy toward Africa. However, Türkiye and the UAE have made a major political presence into the HoA. In a manner and to an extent not accomplished by others, the UAE has greatly strengthened its political, economic, and security relations with the HoA.

The results of this study indicate that regional and international geoeconomic and geopolitical competition amongst Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, and Türkiye has been a major motivator of their activity in the Horn. The region has become more divided and fragmented as a result. According to the study's findings, a rift within the Gulf Cooperation Council has replaced the historical competition between Iran and the Arab states, while Türkiye has become a competing regional security player in the HoA. HoA has seen a "spillover" of Middle East tensions, adding to the instability and fragility of already unstable region. In the HoA particularly Somalia has experienced turmoil and insecurity as a result of competition between Türkiye and the Gulf states.

The involvement of Middle East States in the HoA has evolved into a symbol of the geopolitical rivalry within the region and the marine geostrategic conflict between the many medium-sized countries engaged in the Red Sea. The rivalry between the Middle East powers could make the HoA region more strategically significant, but it also runs the risk of escalating existing tensions or starting new ones amongst players in the HoA. The efforts of HoA to stabilize the region are threatened by the spillover consequences of rivalry in the Middle East. The interventionist policies of the Middle East States, as evidenced by the recent events in Sudan, lack a clear vision for the HoA and frequently lead to antagonistic relationships and protests that highlight the increasingly divergent goals of these outside powers.

6.2. Recommendations

The region, HoA cries for multilateralism and principle driven institutions. There is no substitute for multilateralism. Arab league is weak; GCC is private domain for 1 or 2 countries. IGAD[72] is weak. In order to play positive role in the economic and political developments on the HoA, Gulf countries needs to be part of the multinational organizations (international financial institutions). International solution is better than stand alone Gulf approach. To take advantage of the economies of scale, it is good to encourage multilateral bloc-to-bloc interactions rather than bilateral country-to-country relations.

Transparency should be established in direct investment, political agreements, and security cooperation between Middle East and Horn countries. The Middle East should make sure that the funds it provides are put to good use and aren't being utilized for evil.

States in the ME should prioritize prosperity and mutual security in order to avert the disruptive implications of their engagements with the HoA. They must refrain from military adventurism in the HoA since it exacerbates the region's security and conflict climate by extending the already complex Middle East security environment into the continent. Military adventurism jeopardizes both Middle East and HoA peace and security. It is important for the Middle East to exercise caution so as not to spread regional tensions and wars to the HoA.

Given the growing strategic significance of the Horn region in the context of growing worldwide geopolitical rivalry, more militarization of the region is probably in store. These events highlight

[72] With its headquarters located in Djibouti, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is an organization with eight member states: Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda (Eritrea is not a member at this time). Building and increasing cross-border cooperation and regional integration among Member States is the aim of IGAD. But because of lack of capacity and the low level of commitment from its member states, IGAD is weak.

how important it is for the Horn's countries to devise strategies for handling the new external security politics. So, to reduce the militarization of the Horn, HoA countries should establish institutes that foster the collective security and common good and bargaining power of the region. Establishment of institutes that works for collective security and common good is a means to reduce that factors and threats mentioned by countries that develop military bases in the region.

If regional instability is a threat to their interests or presents a chance to further their objectives, external security actors are not hesitant to increase their involvement in the Horn. There is a potential of greater fragmentation and a significant escalation of regional hostilities if major powers are lured into the internal instability and conflicts of the Horn and these become part of their international competition. Therefore, there is a fresh need for the Horn nations to improve their coordination and collaboration as well as their ability to handle regional problems in light of the new foreign security politics.

Diplomats of HoA are trained to negotiate with Western countries but they are not trained to deal with Gulf countries. When they deal with Gulf countries they end up with the wrong side of the bargain. Horn countries need to develop the capacity of its diplomats because of inevitable interaction with the Gulf.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Consent Form

Dear Sir/Madam,

My name is **Endale Tsegaye Mohammed**, M.A degree student in International Relations and Diplomacy at Hawassa University, College of Law and Governance School of Governance and Development Studies.

Currently, I am undertaking research on the title ***"M*****iddle East States in the Horn of Africa: Dynamics of Economic, Political and Security Engagements"*** as part of my M.A degree study. The general objective of this study is to analyze the of dynamics of economic, political and security engagements of Middle East states (Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) with countries in the Horn of Africa (such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea).

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Thus, your truthful information is greatly valued and crucial to the completion of this study. I want to reassure you that all information will be handled with the utmost confidentiality and used exclusively for this research. Thank you so much for cooperating with me on this interview.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

Appendix 2: Interview questions

1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia

- How do you evaluate historical relations between Middle East States (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye) and the HoA (Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia) for last hundred years?
- How were economic and political relations between Middle East States (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye) and the HoA (Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia) affected during cold war? What happened? Why that happened?
- What are the main factors that motivated Middle East States (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye) to establish diplomatic relations and to invest in the HoA (Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia) since 2000?
- How 2018 political transition in Ethiopia and 2019 revolution in Sudan affected the Middle East States (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye) and the HoA (Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia) economic and political engagements.
- What is your recommendation for HoA leaders on their economic and political relation with MES (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye)?

2. Ministry of Trade & Regional Integration, Ethiopia

- How is the progress of trade relations between Ethiopia and Middle East States (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye) since 2000?
- How is the trend of total trade volume of Ethiopia with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye since 2000?
- What are the opportunities and challenges related to trade between Ethiopia and Middle East States (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye)?
- What kind of products Ethiopia export to Middle East States (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye) or import to Ethiopia since 2000?
- According to many official data, trade relation is asymmetrically benefits Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye. What are the reasons behind the trade imbalance? If is there any, what are measures taken by Ethiopian government to avert the trade imbalance?

3. Ethiopian Investment Commission

- ❖ How do you evaluate the progress of Middle East States (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye) investments in Ethiopia since 2000?
- ❖ How 2018 political transition in Ethiopia affected the Middle East States (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye) investments in Ethiopia
- ❖ How do you motivate foreign investors so as to invest in Ethiopia? What are the policies to attract foreign investors? What kinds of incentives are available for Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye investors?
- ❖ Which investments sectors are preferred by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye firms to invest in Ethiopia?
- ❖ What are the benefits of the MES (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye) investments for Ethiopian Nationals?

4. National Bank of Ethiopia

- ❖ What are the contributions of Ethiopia's economic relation (trade and investments) with MES (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye) for economic growth and development?
- ❖ How is the trend of remittance flow from MES (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye) to Ethiopia?
- ❖ How is the contributions of trade and investments of Middle East States (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye) for Ethiopia's hard currency demand

5. Foreign investors and traders in Ethiopia

- ❖ What motivates you to invest in Ethiopia and in which sector you are investing?
- ❖ How is the Ethiopia's government trade and investment policy? Does the policy encourage investors or business people?
- ❖ In your investment or trade what are the challenges you faced in Ethiopia? How did you manage the challenges?
- ❖ Do you recommend foreign companies to invest in Ethiopia and why?

6. Economist

- Do you think the home homegrown economic reform program of Ethiopia attracts foreign direct investment from countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye?
- What are the main economic sectors that Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye need to invest in?
- What are the possible contributions of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye's investments in fostering socio-economic development in Ethiopia?

7. Journalist from Ethiopian Fana Broadcasting Corporate S.C

- Historically how the Arabian Peninsula and HoA relations explained?
- Would you explain the historical background of Ethio-Gulf and Ethio-Türkiye economic and political relations?
- What are the impacts of current Ethio-Gulf/Türkiye relations on the existing Ethiopian political and economic environment?